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In a debate significant for both its stakes and longevity, medievalists and early 
modernists have engaged the question of selfhood and argued about its ostensible 
“beginning.” Scholars on both sides have imagined the medieval concept of selfhood as 
fundamentally shaped by political systems of national violence or various programs of 
social control. Within this imagination, the critical concept of selfhood has assumed its 
modern definition, which equates selfhood to “agency” and associates the self with choice, 
mobility, and power. Such assumptions perpetuate the notion that medieval selfhood was 
underdeveloped for those with limited social power and implicitly value white, male, and 
classed subjects as “selves.” In this way, our criticism has reinforced modern biases via 
scholarship, and we have imposed these values upon the past. Additionally, these critical 
assumptions have led to problematic views about medieval conceptions of the “person” in 
conjunction with race, gender, and key medieval social institutions, especially the church. 
This dissertation confronts these assumptions and shows how three late medieval 
literary texts instead define selfhood and identity in accordance with the Christian concept 
of a relational and Trinitarian God: for them, relationship with God and neighbor is the 




Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, I show how medieval writers are concerned with the 
evolution of the self toward perfection through their conceptions of charity, “transcendent 
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The glory of God is man fully alive, and the life of man is the vision of God.1 
Context and Methodology of the Present Argument 
In a debate significant for both its stakes and longevity, medievalists and early 
modernists have engaged the question of selfhood, working to understand both its 
ostensible “beginning” and its range of definitions. In response to Jacob Burckhardt’s 19th 
century claim that the concept of selfhood originated in the European Renaissance, 
medievalists have proposed various interpretations of the self, arguing that the concept 
originated much earlier and that it had various legitimate meanings.2 The debate itself 
continues as an “auto-legitimizing” process that seeks to validate not only medieval 
people as selves, but also scholarship of the Middle Ages.3 David Aers, Anthony Lowe, 
Lee Patterson, Peter Haidu, and others have argued that medieval selfhood was 
fundamentally shaped by the influence of communities, formed as a result of political 
systems of national violence, or manipulated by various programs of religious and social 
control.4 Echoing Haidu’s argument that “the millennial interregnum of the medieval 
                                                 
1 Irenaeus of Lyon, Contra Haeres. IV. Ancient Christian Writers: The Works of the Fathers in 
Translation. Translated and Annotated by Dominic J. Unger, OFM CAP. New York: The Newman Press, 
2012. Ch. 20, 7. 
 
2 Jacob Burckhardt. The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy. New York: Penguin, 1990. 
 
3 I borrow the term “auto-legitimizing” from Cole and Smith’s Introduction to The Legitimacy of the 
Middle Ages. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010, 23. 
 
4 David Aers, Community, Gender, and Individual Identity. New York: Routledge, 1988; Anthony Low, 
Aspects of Subjectivity: Society and Individuality from the Middle Ages to Shakespeare and Milton. 
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2003; Patterson, Lee. Chaucer and the Subject of History. Madison: 
The University of Wisconsin Press, 1991, esp. “The Subject of Confession,” 367-421; Peter Haidu, The 




period is the revolution which cast the die of futures we tremble in,” Andrew Cole and D. 
Vance Smith assert that “medieval modes are sustained within modernity [and] no theory 
of modernity can be complete or legitimate without a constant reckoning with the 
‘medieval’.”5 Haidu’s analysis of the medieval subject and Cole and Smith’s study of 
periodization are entangled in the process of legitimization. 
Likewise, these are critiques of periodicity and the desire for legitimacy are 
wrapped up in claims of identity. Cole and Smith’s “rejection” of Hans Blumenberg’s 
The Legitimacy of the Modern Age summarizes the problem: 
For Blumenberg, a radical shift takes place between the Middle Ages, with its 
emphasis on sacred ontology and the divine presence infusing the intelligible 
world, and modernity, with its new modes of inquiry, self-reflection, and human 
agency via epistemology, hypothesis, new scientific cosmologies, and the 
processes of rationalization that render nature as inherently knowable in its laws. 
Indeed, this radical shift…is most evident in the rise of the new person, the self-
determined, free subject of modernity.6  
 
For Blumenberg in 1983, as for Burkhardt in 1878, the question of the self is intimately 
tied to modernity. The “shift” is most evident in the “rise of the new person” because in 
this scheme, modern epistemologies of the world are epistemologies of the self and vice 
versa.  
Blumenberg’s argument is predated only slightly by Stephen Greenblatt’s 1980 
landmark study, Renaissance Self Fashioning, which demonstrates this scheme in literary 
criticism. Greenblatt observes in the sixteenth century “an increased self-consciousness 
about the fashioning of human identity as a manipulable, artful process,” and he shows 
                                                                                                                                                 
“‘Literary’ texts and historical practices from the Middle Ages participate in the cultural invention of the 
subject as part of the political invention of the state.” 
5 Haidu, Peter. The Subject: Medieval/Modern, 2. 
 





that a new prevalence of the term fashioning “seems to come into wide currency as a way 
of designating the forming of a self.”7 Greenblatt’s highly influential argument has 
shaped critical definitions of selfhood in early modern and medieval studies for the last 
39 years, and the terms of the debate remain centered within his framework and 
methodology.8 When critics discuss Margery Kempe’s “agency” as an outspoken woman 
in the Middle Ages, for example, they assume Greenblatt’s terms “encounter” and 
“achievement of identity” as evidence of her medieval selfhood.9  
In his preface to the second edition, Greenblatt clarifies that his argument, like its 
subject, was a result of its own historical context and influence. Greenblatt names 
Foucault’s ideas as a clear inspiration for his thought about selfhood. In more recent 
years, critics such as Laura Varnam also make the connection explicit by using 
Foucault’s terminology—“technologies of the self”—to explain the mechanics of 
Greenblatt’s method.10 With Foucault, Greenblatt’s work remains foundational for the 
terms we use to understand the concept of medieval selfhood via the notion of this 
modern self.  
                                                 
7 Renaissance Self Fashioning, 2-3.  
 
8 Ibid. Greenblatt’s sustained influence in this debate is also evidenced by the release of a second edition of 
the book in 2005. I discuss these ideas in more detail as they pertain to each chapter, with the added 
analysis of several other scholars’ similar ideas, especially in chapter 2.  
 
9 See, for example, Riddy, Felicity, “Text and Self in The Book of Margery Kempe,” Voices in Dialogue: 
Reading Women in the Middle Ages. Ed by Linda Olson and Kathryn Kerby-Fulton. University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2005, 437. See also Lynn Staley’s caution against such framing in “Introduction,” The Book of 
Margery Kempe. Edited by Lynn Staley. Kalamazoo, MI: TEAMS, 1996, 8. I would argue that when we 
articulate (and value) Margery’s agency in terms that uphold this paradigm, especially the measures by 
which identity is “successfully achieved,” we ourselves impose its limits upon her. A critical history that 
views Margery’s narrative as manipulative or as the operation of an ulterior motive—even a motive 
resistant to patriarchy, clericalism, and misogyny—is still patriarchal because it adopts misogynist terms 
and limits the possibilities for interpretation of a specifically female text. It is no small matter that these 
limits cooperate with misogynist views of women active in both the Middle Ages and our present day.  
 
10 Laura Varnam, “The Crucifix, the Pieta, and the Female Mystic: Devotional Objects and Performative 




A significant line of argument in this dissertation shows how medievalists have 
accepted this foundation uncritically and presses the limits of this critical bias. Having 
accepted Greenblatt’s framework of “self-fashioning” as wholly applicable to the 
medieval paradigm, we have articulated a definition of self that equates self- and 
personhood to agency and modern notions of freedom. The ideal of selfhood is 
constructed through choice and power. This is the pattern Greenblatt observes among the 
subjects of his case studies for whom “self-fashioning occurs at the point of encounter 
between an authority and an alien,” through which the “alien” asserts agency in the face 
of power. These writers thereby “fashion” a self in resistance to or competition with 
authority. Such fashioning is an “achievement of identity,” which “always contains…the 
signs of its own subversion or loss.”11 The assumption that selfhood correlates with 
agency, “achievement,” and competition implicitly values the subject’s power, even if 
associated with loss.12 Without this power, the self remains subject to authority. Yet such 
assumptions applied to medieval subjects perpetuate the notion that medieval selfhood 
was underdeveloped for those with limited social power and implicitly value white, male, 
and classed subjects as “selves.”  
In this way, our criticism has reinforced modern biases and imposed modern 
values upon the past. We have re-entrenched a rupture between medieval and modern 
because we have privileged modern definitions of selfhood in our analyses of medieval 
selves. This dissertation upholds Cole and Smith’s critique of this presentism first by 
articulating how medieval conceptions of self and personhood have already been 
                                                 
11 Greenblatt, Renaissance Self Fashioning, 2-3. 
 





established on their own terms according to different values and second, by illustrating a 
path of continuity for those terms into the present age.  
As Cole and Smith argue, medieval selfhood is intimately bound up with the 
future: “to be medieval is to posit a future in the very act of self-recognition, to offer a 
memory or memorial to a future that will be recognized at a time and place not yet 
known.”13 Indeed, Augustine, “who shaped medieval thought as no one else did,” 
articulates this argument in his Confessions:  
The power of the memory is great, O Lord. It is awe-inspiring in its profound and 
incalculable complexity. Yet it is my mind: it is my self. What, then, am I, my 
God? What is my nature? A life that is ever varying, full of change, and of 
immense power…This is the great force of life in living man, mortal though he 
is!14  
 
For Augustine, memory reminds the self of its being—and all being. It is not only in the 
mind, but the memory is the self, a “force of life,” that recognizes God/Being within 
itself. Augustine cannot know what he is without the past he remembers. Nor, I argue, 
can we. Despite modern resistance to this “logical consequence” of memory, the 
medieval concept of self, as Cole and Smith suggest, “adds historical substance—
memory—to the present.”15 That is to say, even while the medieval conception of self is 
fundamentally different, its relationship to the modern must be one of continuity, not 
rupture.   
In the same three decades that Renaissance Self Fashioning came to prominence 
in studies in literary selfhood, the theological and philosophical movement of Christian 
                                                 
13 The Legitimacy of the Middle Ages, 2010, 3. 
 
14 Spade, Paul Vincent. “Medieval Philosophy.” In The Oxford Illustrated History of Philosophy. Edited by 
Anthony Kenny. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1994. 57; Augustine, Confessions, X.17. 
 






personalism developed from a point of view of continuity between periods. Jan 
Bengtsson shows that the movement has a long history with several iterations that stem 
from the late eighteenth century, which coincides with Burkhardt’s now infamous 
claims.16 Then, in the latter half of the 20th century—that is, at the same time Greenblatt 
and Foucault came to the fore in literary and cultural studies—Christian personalism took 
up its roots in Augustine, “the first personalist,” and in Aquinas, who “reinterprets 
Boethius’ definition [of person]…in order to present a definition of the person.”17 As a 
development from classical and medieval philosophy, it witnesses to the legitimacy of 
these early definitions of self and personhood as well as their continued relevance. This is 
a truly interdisciplinary movement; Christian personalism draws on the work of 
philosophers and theologians as well as cultural studies, anthropology, and sociology, to 
respond to ontological questions of the human person and the concept of selfhood.  
Invigorated by the thought of Karol Wojtyla, Deitrich von Hildebrand, Jean-Luc 
Marion, John Zizioulas, W. Norris Clarke, John Crosby, and others, Christian 
personalism develops “a comprehensive view of personal selfhood” from its classical and 
medieval foundations that addresses “those aspects of personal being that seem to stand 
in contradiction to selfhood, such as interpersonal communion, contingent existence, and 
                                                 
16 Bengtsson, Jan Olof. The Worldview of Personalism: Origins and Early Development. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006. I will not rehearse that history here, as other scholars have reviewed it. In addition 
to Bengtsson, see De Tavernier, Johan, “The Historical Roots of Personalism,” Ethical Perspectives, 362-
92. 16.3 (2009). 
 
17 Tavernier, Johan, “The Historical Roots of Personalism,” 362-63. The five characteristics are: “(1) 
substance—excluding accidents; (2) completeness—it forms a complete nature; (3) per se subsistens—the 
person is sui generis, exists in him/herself and for her/himself, the ultimate subject of his/her nature and 
acts; (4) separata ab aliis—excluding the universal; (5) rationalis naturae—excluding all non-intellectual 





dependency on God (theonomy).”18 Distilling notions like “the individual,” “self,” 
“human nature,” and “the soul” into the term person, Christian personalism both 
encompasses and qualifies them. As John Crosby explains, it views the person as at once 
independent and autonomous and dependent and interpersonal.19 These seeming 
contradictions “are in fact grounded in selfhood, [and] selfhood is grounded in them, 
[and] they serve to specify the exact sense of human selfhood.”20 Personalism proposes a 
selfhood grounded in memory, yet transcendent of periodizing boundaries.  
In this dissertation, I examine three well-known medieval texts: the morality play 
of Wisdom, The Book of Margery Kempe, and Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. I 
explain how these texts present a view of human selfhood founded in Augustinian and 
Thomist ontological thought. The method of inquiry for this dissertation is thus 
theological and philosophical as well as literary. I investigate ontological and theological 
questions that emerge from the text as they pertain to the notion of selfhood. I do not 
formally claim that the above three texts can be interpreted according to the modern 
philosophical or theological paradigm of Christian personalism. I endeavor to remain 
sensitive to the dangers of presentism and anachronistic readings. However, insofar as the 
established research shows that each of these texts has theological bases in Augustinian 
or Thomist thought, the texts themselves draw upon and participate in these shared roots 
of Christian personalist philosophy. My dissertation does not apply personalism as an 
interpretive key; rather it shows how Christian personalism offers useful terms for 
                                                 
18 Crosby, John, The Selfhood of the Human Person, 2-3. Other theorists whose work contributes to this 








articulating the sense of relationality and simultaneity at the heart of medieval selfhood. I 
use terms from personalist philosophy only when the text shows how that term develops 
from its Augustinian or Thomist context of thought. 
The Argument 
From the fact that the human being is a member of the Church, he becomes an ‘image of 
God,’ he exists as God Himself exists, he takes on God’s ‘way of being.’ This way of 
being is not a moral attainment, something that man accomplishes. It is a way of 
relationship with the world, with other people and with God, and event of communion, 
and that is why it cannot be realized as the achievement of an individual, but only as an 
ecclesial fact.21 
The full argument of this dissertation extends beyond critical problems of framing 
to investigate a medieval alternative paradigm of the self. I show how medieval writers 
view selfhood as an onto-theological category, rather than an “identity.” I also examine 
their expressions of self-formation and communion as ideals of selfhood, even while they 
recognize the benefits of power and choice for personal gain in social negotiations. My 
dissertation demonstrates that medieval writers recognized the value of the self as 
intrinsic—ontologically given and giving in imitation of the Incarnate Christ. As Cecelia 
Hatt writes of the Gawain poet, these medieval writers “evidently understand art as a 
formalized sign of the reciprocity inherent in createdness.”22 They understood that the 
soul is fully itself when it achieves its proper end, reestablishment in its original likeness 
to God. Finally, I show how these texts define self and personhood in terms of the soul’s 
                                                 
21 John Zizioulas. Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church. Crestwood, NY: St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1993. 15. 
22 Cecelia Hatt, God and the Gawain Poet: Theology and Genre in Pearl, Cleanness, Patience and Sir 





conformity to the persons of the Trinity, as participants in the divine life rather than as its 
competitors.  
For the medieval person, knowledge of God’s selfhood through Augustine or 
Aquinas provides understanding for human selfhood and all other ethical and spiritual 
goods, which flow from their similitude. So, although recent critical discussion of 
selfhood tends to ignore or malign medieval religious paradigms and values as 
mechanisms of institutional power, these texts insist upon the legitimacy and seriousness 
of religious and theological considerations for our understanding of medieval selfhood.  
 The centerpiece of the project analyzes the “doctryne of charite” in the fifteenth 
century morality play, Wisdom. The drama illustrates a soul’s path toward self-
knowledge and responds to contemporary criticism of orthodox doctrine and ritual. I 
show how Wisdom employs a longstanding orthodox response to heresy through its 
reframing of theology, doctrine, and ritual under the ontological truth of God’s selfhood. 
Insisting that all theological and doctrinal truth flow from God’s selfhood, the play meets 
Lollard criticism with Augustinian ontology, using it to both reestablish ontological truth 
as “soveren” and to establish a theological selfhood of the soul.23 The play argues that, 
properly understood, selfhood manifests in the soul’s reformation to its original likeness 
to God through self-giving love (charity). I further advance the argument, developing the 
connection between the play’s onto-theology of penance and charity. I show how the 
protagonist, Anima (Soul), becomes more a self as she gives way to the mutual and 
relational self-giving that marks a proper love of God. In this first chapter, a dialectical 
                                                 
23 The term “Lollard” refers to the followers of John Wycliffe, a proto-protestant who advocated for reform 
in the medieval church. His views, which preceded Luther’s in philosophical content, were considered 





selfhood emerges in which the self constantly negotiates between its original likeness to 
God and its fallen state.  
To better access the experience and implications of a dialectical selfhood, I 
examine in the beginning of Chapter Two the reason that, for a modern audience, the 
notion of formation connotes subjection and self-suppression, while for Margery Kempe, 
as for the Wisdom writer, formation leads to freedom. Specifically, for Margery, self-
formation is the antidote to self-fashioning and marks freedom from a slavery to sin. In 
fact, Margery’s “power to control identity” does not depend on an “achieved identity.”24 
Rather, her power depends on a willing participation in the personalist concept of 
“transcendent autonomy,” which marks the self’s decision to conform to its true nature.25 
What Greenblatt calls a “loss” of self is, for Margery, a willed gain of the good; the 
struggle for identity is not to “achieve” it, but to return to it. Margery’s ever-developing 
negotiations between her earthly society and “heavenly bliss” affirm that God’s plan is 
non-competitive with human thriving. 
In Gawain and the Green Knight, we encounter a third expression of selfhood 
based on the same ontological paradigm. However, we shall see that this poem reflects a 
Thomist sense of “personal” being, through which actus humanus (human action) 
“engages the intelligence and freedom of the person” to reveal what he is. 26 Here, 
selfhood is grounded in Aquinas’ notion of a divine persona, which is revealed through 
acts which accord to the dignity of personal being. As Karol Wojtyla explains, we find 
                                                 
24 Renaissance Self Fashioning, 1, 9. 
 
25 For “transcendent autonomy,” see Crosby, The Selfhood of the Human Person, 2.  
 
26 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 6ff; Buttiglione, Rocco, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of 
the Man who Became Pope John Paul II, trans. Paolo Guietti and Francesca Murphy (Cambridge: Willaim 





Aquinas’ discussions of persona “mainly in his treatises on the Trinity and Incarnation” 
because persona is first a category of God’s being. 27 Aquinas’ persona reflects 
Augustine’s sense of God as reality in that God’s personal being remains the basis for 
human personal being. From this premise, I show how Gawain and his hosts engage in a 
series of depersonalizing acts, which render Gawain susceptible to sin, and degrade his 
personhood. 
Throughout this dissertation, but explicitly in the second and third chapters, my 
analysis is inflected by the late 14th century poem, Pearl, which anticipates the theo-
philosophical arguments of Christian personalism. It is a sublime and disorienting 
meditation which recalls the speaker and reader alike to the ultimate Good, the marriage 
of the soul to Christ in heaven. Through a poetic re-telling of Matthew’s account of the 
laborers in God’s field, the Pearl urges the speaker to consider his ontological origin in 
God and his duty to re-align his selfhood with it. Pearl claims that the human soul has 
intrinsic value, specifically without power or agency.  
My research makes the case that medievalists must attend to the theological and 
philosophical underpinnings of medieval conceptions of selfhood. Scholarship must look 
beyond the defense of medieval selfhood and into the realm of positive claims for its 
legitimacy, taking its concept of selfhood on its own terms and exploring its potential 
social consequences. This understanding of the human person has increasingly significant 
implications in other humanistic fields, such as disability studies, critical race studies, and 
women’s studies because it offers useful terms for theorizing an alternative paradigm that 
                                                 
27 Wojtyla, “Thomistic Personalism,” Person and Community: Selected Essays. Trans. Theresa Sandok, 




regards human value as intrinsic and non-dependent on capitalistic production or social 
competition.  
In a 2016 keynote address at the annual conference of the Medieval Association 
of the Pacific, Zrinka Stahuljak demonstrated the potential of the human imagination to 
create future possibilities and explained how such imaginative possibilities create real 
social change.28 In that spirit, my research shows how a recovery of this medieval 
conception of selfhood, with its placement of value upon the givenness of the human 
person, provides an opportunity for us to re-imagine the modern self. In this imaginative 
space, we might view the human person as worth more than their power or agency, and 

























                                                 
28 Zrinka Stahuljak, “On the Medieval Potential,” Keynote Presentation, Medieval Association of the 






“WAT YS A SOULL?”:  
ONTOLOGICAL SELFHOOD IN THE MORALITY PLAY OF WISDOM  
 
“For we have not a high priest who is unable to sympathize with our weaknesses, but one 
who in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet without sin.”29 
  
As many were astonished at him—his appearance was so marred, beyond human 
semblance, and his form beyond that of the sons of men.30 
 
The fifteenth century morality play, Wisdom, examines the soul’s salvation via 
dramatic events structured, as David Klausner notes, in a “sequence of temptation, fall, 
and redemption.”31 Its strategy for conveying the sequence of the moral life is common to 
morality plays, but as Eugene Hill argued decades ago, there is a curious difference 
between Wisdom and other plays in its genre: certain “standard features of the morality 
form are excluded from Wisdom by the very tight focus of the poet’s attention.”32 For 
Hill, “the point at issue is…the context of thought, Augustinian or Scholastic, within 
which the play is properly to be interpreted.”33 The distinction is significant, he argues, 
because “context of thought” has direct bearing on the play’s “psychology.” Scholarly 
consensus seems to have finally agreed with Hill’s Augustinian interpretation and has 
recently taken new directions as a result. For example, Julie Paulson’s recent work shows 
that the play’s Augustinian sources and their framing of the penitential ritual are central 
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to its strategic response to Lollardy.34 Other research on Wisdom has been meaningful to 
our understanding of ritual, mysticism, and the interaction between orthodoxy and 
heterodoxy, as well as the concept of drama in the period.35  
The outcome of Hill’s argument for Wisdom’s Augustinian context has been 
fruitful, but a deeper question lies behind his and other inquiries about context, especially 
those which point up the striking, and yet unnamed, “difference” between Wisdom and 
the other morality plays. At this point in the trajectory of scholarship on Wisdom, I 
propose to return to Hill’s directive, to engage that Augustinian “context of thought” 
toward a better understanding of the play’s Trinitarian “psychology.” 36 I argue that this 
psychology, or “the very tight focus of the poet’s attention,” in fact expresses a medieval 
ontological paradigm significant to our understanding of the medieval concept of 
selfhood. Ultimately, the difference in Wisdom’s “characters, its structure, and its 
theological content” reveals a radically different educational objective.37  
Specifically, while Wisdom shares the conventional “sequence of temptation, fall, 
and redemption” with its counterpart plays, its didactic focus diverges from The Castle of 
Perseverance, Mankind, Everyman, and The Pride of Life. In these other morality plays, 
the sequencing teaches the viewer to avoid sin or at least to repent of it after an inevitable 
fall. However, in Wisdom, the “typical structure” instead expresses the ontological 
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35 See, for example, Riehle, Wolfgang, The Secret Within: Hermits, Recluses, and Spiritual Outsiders in 
Medieval England. Translated by. Charity Scott-Stokes. New York: Cornell University Press, 2014, esp 
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mechanisms of sin and mercy or, in other words, how sin works within the soul, whose 
being and identity are grounded on a relationship of likeness to God. As a result, rather 
than merely “confirm and celebrate” orthodox doctrine, Wisdom educates the audience 
about sin and mercy through rigorous engagement with the philosophical principles of 
Augustinian selfhood.38  
Within an Augustinian context of thought, penance is self-educative in that it 
literally re-constitutes the self through the soul’s return to God’s likeness. With 
Augustine, the playwright understands sin as a category of being—actually a non-
being—rather than a vice. And, likewise, selfhood has less to do with active claims for 
identity than with the ontological category of likeness to God. So, while Paulson rightly 
argues that the play responds to Lollard heresy by emphasizing the self-educative practice 
of sacramental penance, I would extend the idea to center upon the playwright’s 
understanding of the mechanism of sin within the soul, which is grounded in the 
ontological view I shall investigate here.39 My critical investigation of that context of 
thought clarifies why Anima is played by multiple actors and precisely how the 
playwright responds to the social and political realities of the time during which this play 
was produced.  
I argue that the play is self-aware of its ontological argument, which assumes that 
salvation and redemption depend on an Augustinian ontological perspective of God and 
the soul. The play’s conception of being and reality are inextricably tied to a theology of 
Christ’s gift of himself to the soul, “graunted” through his merciful charity. Under this 
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rubric, the play argues that God’s selfhood and the soul’s “knowynge” of it are ultimately 
questions of onto-theological knowledge based in the nature of Trinitarian self-giving. 
The soul’s identity is its formation to the Trinitarian nature, therefore, and it depends 
upon the soul’s grasp of this ontological personhood. Concerned more with what the soul 
is than how it should behave, Wisdom establishes and develops an Augustinian ontology 
of the soul based, first and foremost, on a proper understanding of God’s selfhood. 
Wysdom’s Ontology of the Godhead 
To arrive at an ontology of the self, Wysdom, the eponymous character 
representing Christ, employs a rhetorical strategy through which he constantly reframes 
Anima’s inquiry in an attempt to engage his more fundamental questions. Negotiating 
rhetorical control of Anima’s interview through this reframing, he ultimately steers the 
conversation to conform to his vision of reality. In the process, Wysdom presents a two-
fold argument that acknowledges Anima’s desire for knowledge of the Godhead, but 
develops the subject on his terms. Specifically, while Anima is concerned with an 
epistemological question—“How may I have knowynge/ of thi Godhede 
incomprehensyble?”—Wysdom repeatedly redirects her line of inquiry toward an 
ontological inquiry: “wat ys a soul?”40  
I will briefly sketch each part of the argument and then explain its implications in 
closer detail. Wysdom’s initial argument meets her epistemological concern: Anima can 
have knowledge of the Godhead “by knowynge” herself. He explains that self-knowledge 
can offer a true—albeit partial—understanding of God: “by knowynge of yoursylff…the 
                                                 





more veryly ye shall God knowe.”41 Yet here, knowledge is not an end, but a means; 
knowledge of God leads to a purpose beyond knowledge itself. Over and again, Wysdom 
argues that knowing God is less a question of doctrinal knowledge, the “scolys of [his] 
dyvynyte,” and more a question of understanding his being.42 Rather than explain 
ecclesiastical doctrine, Wysdom consistently refocuses the dialogue on Anima’s 
experience of what he is because, he argues, experience is the first point of knowledge.  
Having specifically framed the question of being, he can make his second 
argument: the soul’s knowledge of God is marked by intimacy rather than distance. 
Wysdom explains to Anima what she is in relation to him: “the ymage of Gode that all 
began/And not only ymage, but hys lyknes ye are.”43 He reasons that because she is the 
imago dei, she can know him by knowing herself and, moreover, this double knowledge 
is marked by her closeness to him, via their “lyknes.” Together, Wysdom’s two-fold 
argument makes use of the rhetorical strategy through which Augustine principally works 
to negotiate heretical doctrine: he reframes the ontological questions of God and soul as 
fundamental.44  
According to Wysdom, Anima will require experiential knowledge in addition to 
intellectual “knowynge” because the fundamental issue is ontological, not 
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epistemological.45 While he provides some doctrinal understanding within the opening 
dialogue, which speaks to Anima’s intellectual desire, Wysdom insists that Anima’s 
intellect alone will not suffice to understand this “as yt ys veryly”:46  
 The hey worthynes of my love 
 Angell nor man can tell playnly; 
 Yt may be felt from experyens above, 
 But not spoke ne tolde as yt ys veryly. 
 The godly love no creature can specyfye.47 
 
Wysdom explains that knowledge of him cannot be expressed in words “veryly.” Such 
knowledge is intimately experiential and must be “felt.” At first Anima demonstrates an 
intuitive “felynge,” which Walter Hilton describes as knowledge of God gained through 
the spiritual senses.48 But neither she nor the audience can know Him “veryly” without 
experiencing his love.  
Even while Wysdom insists upon the concept of experiential knowledge as real, 
or true (“very”), he argues simultaneously that such experience is not of this world; it is, 
rather, “felt from experyens above.” In this sense, the soul’s internal experience of love is 
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at the same time outside of herself: the subjective experience of divine love transcends 
the soul into objective reality.49 In other words, her “subjectivity” isn’t something she 
possesses. Instead, it is referential, something that exists in proportion to her participation 
in God’s love. Only then does she know love “as yt ys veryly.” As a result, Anima’s 
innermost experience of self-actualization, personal intimacy with God, is an experience 
of divine love that transcends her being. As we shall see, the above description of 
Wysdom’s love works in parallel to the Augustinian Trinitarian Formula in that objective 
reality (God), his self (Jesus Christ), and his love (the Holy Spirit) relate to each other 
and are one in the same. When Wysdom speaks of love, grammatically, as an object of 
possession (“my love”), he is really speaking of objectivity itself: his love is objective 
reality.50 Wysdom argues that experience is as essential as the intellect to real knowledge, 
which is knowledge of the real. 
If we are to grasp the pith of Wisdom’s ontological argument, we must examine 
its Augustinian source. In the Confessions, for example, Augustine meditates on his 
experience of God’s reality. He affirms first that God “has being” in Truth: “I heard your 
voice saying I am the God who IS.”51 And later: “I heard your voice…and at once I had 
no cause to doubt. I might more easily have doubted that I was alive than that Truth had 
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being.”52 The experience of hearing God’s voice, rather than the intellectual knowledge 
he gains from the “books” of the first half of the Confessions, erases his doubt; 
experience confirms that truth exists in a way even more real than Augustine himself 
may exist. Augustine explains that the absoluteness of God’s reality means not just that 
he is real, but that he is reality. After all, when Augustine hears God’s voice, he is 
received into his being. Wysdom argues for experiential knowledge in this vein; 
experience of God is ineffable, but it leads to the purest knowledge of his being.  
At the same time, pure knowledge gained by experience remains complex for 
Augustine; he continues his meditation, explaining that God’s reality is, first of all, 
paradoxical and second, the paradox of his reality functions through the concept of 
giving. God is at the same time utterly other and intimately related to the creature:  
I considered all the other things that are of a lower order than yourself, and I saw 
that they have not absolute being in themselves, nor are they entirely without 
being. They are real in so far as they have their being from you, but unreal in the 
sense that they are not what you are.53 
 
In other words, for Augustine, the intimacy between God and the creature to whom he 
gives his being is grounded in God’s utter otherness. Augustine’s God, in the words of 
Kathryn Tanner, is in fact “otherly other,”54 or, as Robert Barron puts it, “he enjoys a 
transcendence that is not contrastive to the world.”55 Over and again, Augustine affirms 
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God’s otherness, emphasizing God’s eternal nature: “Eternal Truth, true Love, beloved 
Eternity—all this, my God you are.”56  
Yet as Augustine observes in the Confessions and later in de Trinitate, the 
paradox also indicates intimacy between the Creator and the creature because their 
relationality is founded on gift. It is only through the intimacy of giving that God’s “non-
contrastive” otherness can contribute being itself to the creature. The creature’s specific 
experience of God—reception of the gift of being—reveals God’s reality as givingness. 
Augustine thus proclaims: “I should not even exist if it were not by your gift.”57 God 
gives his reality to the creature, and the creature receives it in order to exist.58 Through 
this grace, God becomes incarnate in the soul, dwelling there in communion with his 
creature. 
For its part, the play closely follows Augustine’s ontological paradox in its 
insistence that “godly love no creature can specyfye,” as well as in its emphasis on giving 
throughout.59 Together with these, the play’s rhetorical parallel of Augustine’s onto-
theology of reality also serves Wysdom’s second theological argument of the opening 
dialogue, that relationality between God and the soul is marked by intimacy, rather than 
distance. That is to say, Wisdom participates in and develops the Augustinian principles 
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of God’s reality, suggesting congruence between the nature of reality, the selfhood of 
God, and the relationship between God and his human creatures. 
The functional mechanism of God’s paradoxical reality, self-giving love, results 
in Augustine’s formulation of the Godhead as communio. For Augustine, the Incarnation 
perfectly expresses this ontology of self-gift because God becomes human without 
ceasing to be God the Son, who is simultaneously the Father and the Holy Spirit, so that 
humans might once again be the image of God. Barron explains how the relational nature 
of the Trinity underpins Augustine’s theology of communion: 
In most forms of metaphysics, both ancient and modern, and in accord with 
common sense, substance is privileged over relationship, the latter viewed as a 
modification of the former. On Aristotle’s reading, for example, substance comes 
first, since substance coincides with the basic category of being, and relationships, 
derivative of substance, come definitively second. But in light of [Augustine’s] 
Trinitarian Formula, we see something completely different: at the most 
fundamental level of existence, substance and relationship utterly coincide. To be 
is to be in rapport with another, for the Father is the Father only in relation to the 
Son, the Son is the Son only in relation to the Father, and the Holy Spirit is 
nothing but the relation between the Father and the Son. Through and through, the 
divine reality is a communion of love.60 
 
In short, Augustine finds that divine relationality—which is specifically marked by self-
giving—is ontologically basic.61 Reality itself is given, and eternally giving. For the 
human soul, the experience of God’s love-gift, then, is to transcend itself by entering into 
its objective reality.  
Wisdom’s emphasis on intimacy manifests, not accidentally, in its central motif of 
spousal symbolism. Drawing from the Song of Songs, Wysdom expresses selfhood as 
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intimacy, specifically in terms of spousal relationality: he is “Spous of the chyrche 
…Wyffe of eche chose soule.”62 Here again, Wysdom frames his selfhood upon the 
principle that relationality, not substance, is ontologically basic. He chooses the specific 
type of relationality symbolized by the spousal bond to indicate how the relationship 
ideally works.63 The spousal metaphor indicates the specific structure of self-gift and 
mutual communion in the relationship between the persons of the Trinity as well as 
between the Trinity and the human creature.  
In fact, spousehood, whether between human subjects or within the sponsa Christi 
tradition, gains its entire meaning from Trinitarian love because, like Trinitarian 
relationality, it ideally enacts total self-giving. Wysdom’s spousal relationship with “eche 
chose soulle” is inextricably bound up with the requirements of human salvation enacted 
through the personality of the Son, who gives himself bodily and spiritually to humanity 
in both incarnation and atonement.64 In return, the “clean” soul receives the Son, and 
keeps a dwelling place for him. Receptivity is the soul’s reciprocation of self-gift; it is not 
equal (God’s self-gift cannot be equaled), but is nevertheless total.65 The exchange of 
total self-gift between God and the soul results in mutual in-dwelling, which not only 
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imitates, but also participates in Trinitarian selfhood.  Wysdom’s self-identification 
makes this participation concrete:  
Therfor the belovyde Sone hathe this sygnyfycacyon, 
Custummaly Wysdom, now Gode, now man 
Spous of the chyrche and very patrone, 
Wyffe of eche chose soulle. 66  
 
Here, Wysdom explains why he is called Wysdom, recalling his relationship with God 
the Father as “the belovyde Sone.” This relationship, he continues, “hath this 
sygnifycacyon.” In other words, the relationship, which is his self, can be named. In this 
case, he offers multiple signifiers: “Wysdom” (both God and man, or, Christ), “Spous,” 
“patrone,”67 and “Wyffe.”  
For Wysdom, as for its Augustinian source, the word “sygnyfycacyon” signals 
participation, which Heather Phillips reminds us was “the fundamental philosophical 
attitude of the Middle Ages.”68 Likewise, Lucien Levy-Bruhl explains that under the 
paradigm of participation, symbol “was not a linguistic mechanism, a conceptual 
category or a code to be cracked, but a living reality.”69 Symbols of every degree, 
including the human self, whose being participates in the ipsum esse subsistens of God as 
the imago dei; linguistic symbols, both spoken and written; and objects used in liturgical 
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67 The OED misses this earlier meaning of the word, explained in the MED: “patrone, a. a model of 
behavior or appearance…; b. a model from which an object is made, exemplar, prototype…; c. image, 
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practice participate in and therefore make visible God’s invisible reality. Symbols do not 
merely represent, but re-present, reality to the world. Under this paradigm, simultaneity is 
key: as Phillips explains, “the subject was at once himself and the being in which he 
participated.”70 Wysdom takes this paradigm so for granted that his initial self-description 
need not even mention the actual name by which he is “customarily” known: Jesus 
Christ. He can designate only signifiers because in view of participation, they re-present 
Christ to the audience. Wysdom doesn’t merely stand for Christ, he is Christ. 
 Founded on the concept of relationality, Augustine’s theology of participation 
insists again on intimacy—rather than the distance—between “sygnyfycacyon” and the 
signified. To be clear, the name itself is not equal to God’s reality—God is still “otherly 
other”—but, as Phillips shows, “the symbol or sign…participated in the reality that it 
signified….the image was a participation, not, as it was to become in the fourteenth 
century, a mere image.”71 Because the phenomenon, which Augustine calls sacramentum, 
reveals the “invisible and spiritual reality” that gives it meaning, their relationship is not 
parallel, as with metaphor, nor oppositional, as in the hierarchy of substance over 
relationship. Rather, it is a relationship of “rapport” reflective of Trinitarian self-giving: 
“the visible sacramentum participates in the invisible reality that it signifies…the 
sacramentum is the res.”72 In this way, Thomistic thought also follows: “creatures don’t 
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so much have relationships to God, they are relationships to God.”73 So, though it may 
appear that Wysdom metaphorizes himself by self-identifying as “spous” or “Wyffe,” he 
instead elevates the concept of spousal relationality to a sacramentum of his being, which 
speaks to his nature as self-gift.    
Under the paradigm of participation, Wisdom’s spousal imagery can no longer be 
mere metaphor; instead, Wisdom argues that spousal self-giving is the image of and 
“very” real participation in divine love. Read this way, Wisdom expresses a philosophy of 
selfhood as participation in God’s reality through intimate union with God. Marriage, in 
this view, is not only modeled on Trinitarian love, but it also participates in Trinitarian 
intersubjectivity through the mutual self-giving of spouses. Most of all, Wisdom 
synthesizes spousal union with participation through Augustine’s ontology of God as 
fundamentally relational.  
As a result, the play views such intersubjectivity, mechanized by self-gift, as 
ontologically basic. Only through the intimacy of the spousal relationship—the constant 
re-formation toward mutual self-giving with the beloved—can Anima know God 
“veryly.” Put another way, self-giving is the (paradoxical) action by which the soul 
becomes itself. Thus, selfhood is communion, and it requires active participation in 
God’s reality of giving and receiving. To know oneself, therefore, is to experience divine 
love and to become more like it. As we have already glimpsed, Wisdom argues for this 
concept of selfhood even while recognizing that mutual self-giving is a prelapsarian 
ideal, toward which the fallen soul must continually strive. The play’s self-conscious 
awareness of this striving suggests that by the time we meet her, Anima is dislocated 
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from her basic ontology, not by sin, but by the fall; her task, Wysdom says, is to reform 
herself to that original state.74 
In other words, Wisdom’s assumptions about the self are rooted in the concept of 
original likeness. Original likeness is a term which borrows from Augustine’s doctrine 
that the soul is the image and likeness of God, which Wisdom examines in detail. 
Additionally, the term original refers to the pre-lapsarian ideal, which I consciously 
borrow from Karol Wojtyla’s Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the 
Body.75 In it, amidst a vast and exhaustive meditation on the meaning of the human body 
and the ontology of the soul, Wojtyla reflects upon Augustine’s exploration of selfhood 
in the Confessions, interpreting the Genesis accounts of Adam’s “original solitude.” 
Wojtyla observes, with Augustine, that God “did not say ‘Let man be made according to 
his kind’ but Let us make man wearing our own image and likeness. You [God] spoke in 
this way because you meant us to see for ourselves what your will is.”76 From this 
observation Wojtyla suggests that God communicates his will for the human self by 
means of being “alone,” that is, the only creature made in God’s image and likeness: 
The body, by which man shares in the visible created world, makes him at the 
same time aware of being ‘alone.’ …The analysis of the Yahwist text will allow 
us, further, to link man’s original solitude with the awareness of the body, through 
which man distinguishes himself from all the animalia and “separates himself” 
from them, and through which he is a person.77  
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Thus, in his original state, Wojtyla argues, Adam found that he was a creation like the 
other creatures, but he was the only creature that did not have a “kind.” He found that 
“the distinctiveness of his being” was, in fact, the image and likeness of God, the gift of 
an embodied rational soul. Thus his solitude among the other creatures revealed his 
nature in that it set him apart from their various “kinds,” and defined his specific 
relationship of self-giving love with God as likeness.  
 For Wojtyla, the concept of personhood flows from original likeness, and 
articulates the kind of relationship God shares with human creatures to whom he has 
given his own likeness. Personhood, then, is grounded in the soul’s responsiveness to this 
gift. The specific relationship of giving, Wojtyla argues, makes the human creature a 
“subject of the covenant,” and “partner of the Absolute”; this peculiar association sets the 
human person “into a unique, exclusive, and unrepeatable relationship with God 
himself.”78 Finally, because it is rooted in the Augustinian paradox of being, God’s 
selfhood—his relationship to the soul—is non-competitive with human thriving.  
 In the play’s opening dialogue, Anima remembers her original likeness 
instinctively. At her entrance, Anima proclaims “Hanc amavi et exquisivi,” quoting the 
biblical book of Wisdom, proclaiming her spousal relationship to her creator through 
Wisdom’s echo of the Song of Songs.79 And, similar to Wojtyla’s account of Adam’s 
realization of his original solitude, Anima recognizes her unique relationship with 
Wysdom for which she is “wroute,” and notices that her own “bewty” is a result of her 
creation “in wysdom”: 
                                                 
78 Ibid, 151. All italicized text is original to Wojtyla. 
 




‘Hanc amavi et exsquisivi’— 
Fro my yougthe thys have I soute, 
To have to my spouse most specially 
For a lover of your schappe am I wroute. 
…. 
In wysdom I was made all bewty bryghte!80  
 
Anima’s initial self-understanding, which articulates her relationship to God as both 
likeness and spouse illustrates the simultaneity of God’s being, giving, and loving. This 
intuitive understanding reflects Adam’s recognition of his original likeness to God and 
articulates a basic knowledge of God’s nature learned by studying the “scolys” of the 
Bible.   
Yet, though she speaks righteously, Wysdom knows that she lacks “experyens”81 
of self-giving love, a naïveté that diminishes the effect of her first speech. Still, his 
pedagogical strategy is puzzling. Despite her claim that it is impossible to know his “full 
exposycyon,” Wysdom responds to Anima’s naïveté by continuing to describe himself: 
“Sapientiae specialitor est sole…”.82 This response strikes some readers as a “brag” that 
seems to emphasize Anima’s naïveté and point up her “inability to move beyond literal, 
carnal meanings.”83 For example, Paulson suggests that Anima is unable to sense the 
difference between worldly love and the love of the divine: “While Wisdom’s words may 
appear to make him culpable as well, the point here is not that the Son of God is a 
Casanova, but that a soul without self-knowledge could not tell the difference between 
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the Son and a Lothario.”84 Paulson ultimately concludes that this scene “reflects the 
danger in affective piety of mistaking the medium for the message.”85 Indeed, Anima’s 
inability to distinguish between them becomes clear when she next replies, requesting 
Wysdom to “speke of love” as if it were a game.86 The answer, Paulson rightly suggests, 
is self-understanding. 
However, to view Wysdom’s participation in the language of this affective 
exchange as a “brag” is to miss the play’s underlying pedagogical strategy. Anima’s 
understanding of divine love is certainly naïve, but Wysdom’s self-descriptive response 
isn’t “bragging.” On the contrary, it’s a strategy of disputation, and the stakes are high for 
interpreting this response accordingly. He anticipates Anima’s eventual question, “how 
may I have knowynge/Of thi Godhede?,”87 by actually addressing the question, “what is 
the Godhead?” That is, to her claim that full knowledge of him is impossible, Wysdom 
responds with ontological description: “I am light,” “mirror,” “the image of [divine] 
goodness,” etc.88 He is adamant that self-understanding, and knowledge of the Godhead, 
be framed under a specific kind of knowledge. Thus, Wysdom’s response argues that he 
can be known, but not “veryly” by epistemological means: “Yt may be felt from 
experyens above,/but not spoke ne tolde as yt ys veryly.”89 This dialogue—indeed the 
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entire play—is ontologically oriented; its primary pedagogical focus is to establish the 
parameters of the soul’s being as well as what it means to be a soul in relation to God.  
In the second half of the opening dialogue, Wysdom finally makes explicit his 
argument that the question Anima really needs answered is ontological, not 
epistemological:  
By knowynge of yoursylff ye may have felynge 
Wat Gode ys in your soule sensible.90 
 
Here, Wysdom proposes the final and highest objective of her inquiry and how she will 
arrive there: as with both Augustine’s Confessions and Wojtyla’s “original solitude,” the 
more fundamental question of “what God is” can be reached by self-investigation. 
Moreover, such investigation leads to “felynge” what God is, which is the deepest sense 
of “knowying” him. For Wysdom these processes are, in a sense, simultaneous; 
knowledge of his nature comes through the “sensible” soul, and it will satisfy any and all 
other questions she could have about him.  
By this point in the exchange, the opening dialogue of Wisdom has established a 
pattern in which Wysdom consistently redirects Anima’s questions about him, each time 
revising her approach away from epistemological questions and toward ontological 
truths. For example, when Anima suggests that Wysdom “wolde speke of love, that wer a 
game!” Wysdom redirects the conventional pedagogy of the court—a tale of love, or 
perhaps a poem—and gently admonishes her worldly desire for diversion.91 The 
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admonishment doesn’t come as a scolding but as a speech on the divine nature of his love 
and its salvific power.92 
Again, in the style of a disputation, he reframes the “game” of love, pointing 
toward his love, which is the infinite source of love itself: “Of my love to speke, yt ys 
myrable.”93 Wysdom insists again on questions of ontological definition. As he continues 
his response, the subject of love becomes immediately interchangeable with the personal 
noun, “wysdom,” and the pronoun, “I.” It’s even used, simultaneously, as a verb: 
Of my love to speke, yt ys myrable. 
Beholde now, Soull, with joyfull mynde, 
How lovely I am, how amyable 
To be halsyde and kyssyde of mankynde. 
To all clene soulys I am full hende 
And ever present wer that they be. 
I love my lovers wythoutyn ende 
That ther love have stedfast in me. 
… 
My love dyschargethe and puryfyethe clene. 
It strengtheth the mynde, the soull makyt pure, 
And gevyt wysdom to hem that perfyghte bene.94 
 
In fact, love shifts from object, something Wysdom has, to subject, something he is, and 
back again, suggesting that love’s nature is simultaneous. “My love” becomes an “I” who 
is rightly “halsyde and kyssed.” Just as seamlessly, love becomes a verb, and then a noun: 
“I love my lovers.” And after that, the ambiguous “ther love,” might be “there, love” or 
“their love,” which implies a transmutability between the love he gives, the love that he 
is, and the love he receives in return. In this passage, love perfectly reflects its self and 
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source in Wysdom, who is himself simultaneously God and man, the Word incarnate, the 
lover and the beloved.  
 Yet, for all this transmutability and simultaneity, Wysdom insists somewhat 
rigidly that, as love, he self-communicates in a specific way: he is a gift that relieves “the 
hevy burthen of synne,” that “strengtheth the mynde, the soull makyt pure,” and above all 
“gevyt wysdom” to the beloved.95 In other words, Wysdom’s love will heal the soul and 
strengthen it against its tendency to offend the love that Wysdom himself offers, all by 
means of the gift that he will give of himself. Here is a love that is offered without the 
merit of its receiver or the expectation of equal reciprocity. Indeed, Wysdom 
acknowledges his “prerogatyff” to offer an unmatchable gift, one “so grett” that it makes 
pale all other worldly desires, and which no person can even articulate.96 Moreover, this 
love is a total gift of himself: he is “full hende,” or fully ready at hand, and “ever present 
wer that they be.” Wysdom holds nothing of himself back, and he doesn’t parcel himself 
out. This is no secular courtly love, which may borrow from Wysdom’s self-exhaustive 
language, but cannot match it “veryly.”  
To her credit, even if she cannot understand his love fully, Anima desires to 
reciprocate, indicating an intuitive understanding of the creature’s proper response to 
God. Anima’s intuitive reciprocity within Wysdom’s ontological discourse demonstrates 
that knowledge of the self is primary to her knowledge of moral action: “Wat may I geve 
you agayn for this,/O Creator, lover of your creature?....Wat may I geve to your most 
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plesaunce?”97 Specifically, ontological knowledge of her original likeness in the imago 
dei brings about the memory of God, which in turn enables her finally to re-form herself 
in his likeness through the sacrament of penance.98  
However, before Anima can fully recover this memory, it remains for her to 
reform her habits of inquiry. Anima’s question—what can I give?—still slightly misses 
the mark because it assumes a parceling of the gift. She would give some part of her self, 
but Wysdom’s reply expects more: 
Fili, prebe michi cor tuum! 
I aske not ellys of all thi substance; 
They clene hert, thi meke obeysance, 
Geve me that and I am contente.99 
 
The response is easy to gloss: Wysdom desires nothing of her except her heart and 
obedience. But the use of “substance” here, in the context of the allegory, signals that 
Wysdom wants nothing less than everything.100 “Substance” necessarily acquires 
ontological overtones because Anima is a soul without any tangible substance that can be 
divided. “Give me what you are,” he seems to say, “I ask for nothing else.” Wysdom 
furthermore invokes the father-son relationship of the Trinity, alluding to its tri-fold and 
yet undivided substance, which is itself total gift. Anima’s “substance” consists 
completely of her “clean heart” and “obedience.” In other words, Wysdom’s desire is the 
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complete and total requisition of her heart (“cor”) and her will—a request we see fulfilled 
in later scenes as her Mights reunite through the process of penance.  
 Through these opening exchanges, Wysdom argues that experiential knowledge 
of divine love is a knowledge framed by ontological truth, and he recalls Anima to her 
original likeness, which is a communion between God and the human soul. Communion, 
then, is the state toward which Anima must be re-formed. Underlying this dramatic 
objective is its specific ontological argument: a philosophy of self as communion means 
that the self becomes more itself in the measure that it gives itself. Wysdom’s definition 
of selfhood is a gift of the heart, total and self-exhaustive. In the next section of this 
essay, I explore this concept of selfhood in more detail as the dialogue shifts from 
description of the Godhead to an account of Anima’s selfhood.  
Imago Dei: The Meaning of Existence and Anima’s Ontology 
The first half of Wisdom’s opening dialogue establishes an ontological perspective 
of the Trinitarian God, which has at its heart the notion of self-giving relationality. The 
second half maintains this principle as Wysdom explains the soul’s onto-theology. 
However, the perfect harmony of self-giving relationality shifts significantly in the 
second half: Wysdom sets forth a kind of simultaneous selfhood for Anima, which 
articulates the tension between her original likeness and concupiscence, the lasting effect 
of original sin. That is, he expresses her postlapsarian selfhood as double: she is 
simultaneously created in his image and likeness and also fallen, since “the tyme of 
Adamys offence.”101 The simultaneity with which Wysdom describes Anima signals her 
complex ontology: she is removed from God in that she is not God, but she is further 
removed from her original likeness to him by original sin and the tendency to 
                                                 




concupiscence that follows, even after baptism.102 Yet she remains the imago dei through 
his self giving: the once-for-all sacrifice on the cross and the recurring grace of the 
sacraments. 
The tension is palpable in his grammar as Wysdom begins to describe Anima’s 
nature. He leaves off speaking in the pure sense in which we can understand the ontology 
of the Godhead, and “I AM” becomes “ye ware”:  
Anima: Wat ys a soull, wyll ye declare? 
Wysdom: Yt ys the ymage of Gode that all began, 
And not only ymage, but hys lyknes ye are. 
Of all creaturys the fairest ye ware 
Into the tyme of Adamys offence.103 
 
In the same breath, Wysdom declares that she is the image and likeness of God, and yet 
she is no longer the “fairest” of his creatures. Grammatically and theologically, Logos 
shifts to logos as concupiscence makes its mark on the soul. Still, Wysdom describes her 
this way because, he argues, sin does not change the ontological foundation of her being. 
The soul’s basic nature, the imago dei, remains despite her distance from the nature of 
God. Moreover, through his plea for her to return to communion with him, Wysdom 
argues that sin does not equate to selfhood. Selfhood, for Wysdom, is expressed primarily 
in terms of the soul’s ontological potential. Wysdom is always thinking of Anima as “hys 
restyng place, hys plesant see.”104  
The tension becomes clearer through the play’s dramatic development. At the 
height of the opening dialogue, when Anima finally asks the right kind of question—
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“Wat ys a soull?”—Wysdom makes the play’s clear and definitive declaration on human 
selfhood: 
Wysdom:  Yt ys the ymage of Gode that all began, 
      And not only ymage, but hys lyknes ye are.105 
 
This seemingly simple answer will become the thesis upon which rests the exposition of 
the play. We have seen that Anima’s selfhood is expressed as a tension between the 
perfection of imago dei and concupiscence, but ontologically speaking, there is 
something even deeper at work here. As with the language of spousehood above, this 
thesis can be easily metaphorized and abstracted. Specifically, as Phillips notes, the 
notion of “image” was beginning to lose a sense of participation in the late fourteenth 
century; for modern audiences, this sense is nearly completely lost. Wysdom’s phrasing 
now appears to the modern reader as metaphorical poeticism—“mere image or 
picture.”106  
Yet, as Hill explains, late medieval theology of “image and likeness” had complex 
ontological underpinnings. Hill points out that the phrase is not to be understood, in the 
modern sense, as a hendiadys. Rather, “Image and likeness” is an extrapolative phrase in 
which “equality is a special, limiting case of likeness.”107 That is, the medieval 
understanding is that image and likeness are actually distinct; the human soul can be in 
the image of Christ on the condition of its likeness to Him. In Wisdom, when the action of 
the soul is synonymous with gift, and therefore with love, it is like unto Christ because it 
therein participates in him and the activity of his selfhood. As a result, the soul becomes 
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an image of God that participates in his “bewty.”108 Hill explains: “one does not approach 
God across intervals of space but by likeness, and by unlikeness he draws away from 
him.”109 Closeness can be expressed in terms of the clarity of the image rather than 
spatial distance. So, the image accompanies likeness, but the two are not one and the 
same. When the soul becomes more like God, it appears like him, actually re-presenting 
him in the world.  
It is fitting, then, that following the opening dialogue, the drama introduces 
Anima’s “Mights,” and carefully establishes their self-giving relationality in God’s 
likeness. First, as Wysdom introduces the Mights, he explains that their relationship “ys 
symylytude of Gode.” Next, as the three Mights introduce themselves, they syntactically 
imitate God’s Trinitarian mutuality:  
 Mynde: All thre here, lo, byfor your face: 
  Mynde, 
 Wyll: Wyll, 
 Undyrstondynge: And Undyrstondynge, we thre!110 
 
 Then, as they offer their respective self-descriptions, each refers to their unity in “the 
soule,” demonstrating how they participate in God’s “lyknes.”111 Finally, Wysdom warns 
against their “thre enmyes,” imploring the Mights to work together in unity to resist the 
influence of “the Fende”:  
Wan suggestyon to the Mynde doth apere, 
Undyrstondynge, delyght not ye therin! 
Consent not, Wyll, yll lessons to lere!112 
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In other words, when a “suggestion” of sin appears to the Mind, his counterparts are 
responsible for keeping the entire soul “in” Wysdom.113 Just as the persons of the Trinity 
are unified by their relationship of self-giving, the Mights maintain Anima’s image and 
likeness through mutual self-gift.114 Accordingly, Wysdom emphasizes the “partnership” 
of the Mights as he speaks to them, and Anima answers him as a unified voice for the 
three. 115 
Conversely, when the soul’s action is unlike God, that is, either when the gift is 
made symbolic or when it is denied through disobedience, the image becomes 
disfigured.116 Just as Anima appears “in the most horrybull wyse,” Wysdom rebukes her 
“dedly synnys” and reveals three assumptions that speak to her ontology as image and 
likeness: “Wy art thou creature so onkynde,/Thus to defoule Godys own place…so many 
devllys in your soule be./Beholde wat ys therin reclusyd!”117 First, her visible appearance 
signals the state of her invisible soul. Anima’s “horrible” appearance becomes an icon for 
her invisible unlikeness. 118  
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Anima’s sin perversely imitates—and reverses—the Incarnation which, we recall, 
is the icon of reality itself. Second, “devllys” corrupt what was first “God’s own place,” 
signaling Wysdom’s original intention that her very self should be a “dwelling” for God. 
As he reiterates the fundamentality of original likeness over fallenness, Wysdom assumes 
that her unlikeness to God is “unnatural.”119 In this way, Wisdom suggests that original 
likeness and sin co-exist in the soul after the fall, but (1) their co-existence is an internal 
war and (2) likeness is the clear objective toward which the soul should always strive.  
While Lucyfer’s intent to corrupt the soul to some extent follows the conventions 
of devils in the other morality plays, his specific strategy in Wisdom underscores the 
play’s argument that selfhood is the ontological category of likeness to God. In particular, 
sin is marked by the state of the Mights’ relationship, and their discord brings about 
Anima’s disfigurement. When Lucyfer plots the soul’s destruction, he strategizes not 
directly to send Anima to hell, but to “dysvygure” her so that she can no longer 
participate in God’s likeness.120 Lucyfer instigates Anima’s internal striving by disrupting 
the harmonious relationality of her Mights: 
In the Soule ben thre partyes, iwys: 
Mynde, Wyll, Undyrstondynge of blys— 
Fygure of the Godhede—I know wele thys! 
… 
                                                                                                                                                 
believer and his creations reflect this divine light. Thus the word and the manuscript ‘is illuminated’ by the 
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To the Mynde of the Soule I shall mak suggestyun, 
Ande brynge hys Undyrstondynge to dylectacyon, 
So that hys Wyll make confyrmacyon.121 
 
Lucyfer uses the vestige of the Trinity in the soul—mind, which corresponds to 
Augustine’s memory, Reason, and Will—to “make it appear…that perfection is sin” and 
to convince Anima’s faculties (“mights”) to turn from giving to desiring.122 In so doing, 
Lucyfer plans specifically to bring the soul “to nought.”123 Lucyfer recognizes Wysdom’s 
ontological arguments and affirms that a disruption of the Mights’ relationality will bring 
Anima out of her likeness to God.  
When Lucyfer does draw the three together again, it is under the “false pretense” 
he has vowed to present. Here, he invokes Wysdom’s earlier implication of the “clene 
soul” in which each of the Mights works for the good of the other, and thus for the 
unified Anima.124 But he twists the concept of the “clene soul,” as Klausner observes, 
“redefining the ‘clene soull’ (which Wisdom had identified as ‘Godys restynge place’) as 
‘mery’.”125 While the “clean soul” participates in Trinitarian relationality, the disunified 
soul can only be “mery” by taking pleasure in lower-order goods or by indulging its 
desires. When he requests that the Mights “acorde you thre togdyr,” he ultimately 
suggests they make a false Trinitarian image under the pretext of his revised definition of 
the “clene soul.”  
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Under Lucyfer’s influence, the Mights’ “acorde” eventually guarantees Anima’s 
movement into the regio disimilitudinis, but that movement is not fundamentally a result 
of the sins—that is, the actions—the Mights commit. Lucyfer’s plan is not primarily to 
convince the soul to commit the sins traditionally associated with vice. In fact, he desires 
to change her likeness; and he acknowledges that he must do so in order to root out 
God’s dwelling there, and make the soul “the Develys place”126:  
That Soule Gode made incomparable, 
To hys lyknes most amiable, 
I shall make yt most reprovable, 
Evyn lyke to a fende of hell.127 
 
Here, Lucyfer acknowledges what it is to be a soul in God’s likeness. He knows that 
simply tricking Anima into sinful action will not condemn her. Evil acts are only a 
means. Instead, he reasons that his only recourse is will change the soul from the image 
of God to an image of himself. His goal is to shift the soul’s ground of being from the 
harmonious self-giving relationality between her Mights, which makes her the image and 
likeness of God, to a false inner-relationality that makes it like him—fallen, deficient, a 
non-being. 
In order for Mynde, Wyll, or Undyrstondynge to consent to sinful action, he must 
first be dislocated from the free and total self-giving relationality of the unified soul. This 
dislocation is itself already a movement into unlikeness. Here, because the audience can 
view the disruption of Wysdom’s opening arguments under Lucyfer’s plan, the play 
begins to develop its theology of the self in a most comprehensive way. Wisdom argues 
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that the root of sin itself is the ontological mutability of the soul: the vulnerability to 
ontological change within the soul’s own inner relationality is “original sin.” 
Thus, as Hill implies, even as the imago dei remains imprinted upon the soul from 
its creation, the soul’s post-lapsarian selfhood constantly flows between perfect image 
and “disfigurement.” To signal this fluidity and the internal struggle it effects, Wysdom 
speaks with utter grammatical strangeness, at once in the past and in the present. 
Likeness, Wysdom explains, was the soul’s original, prelapsarian state, though sin 
dislocates it into Augustine’s regio disimilitudinis:128  
For every creature that hath ben or shall 
Was in natur of the fyrst man, Adame,  
Of hym takynge the fylthe of synne orygynall, 
 For of hym all creaturys cam. 
… 
For ye be dysvyguryde be hys synne129 
 
Original sin “disfigures” the soul, marring the image as a result of unlikeness. Still even 
as he speaks of the soul as once and for all “dammyde to derknes,” 130 Wysdom offers the 
sacraments, which confoundingly restore the soul to the present: 
 Fyrst baptem clensythe synne orygynall, 
 And reformyt the soul in feythe verray true 
 To the gloryus lyknes of Gode eternall 
 Ande makyt yt as fayer and as celestyall 
 As yt never dyffoulyde had be, 
 Ande ys Crystys own specyall, 
 Hys restynge place, hys plesant see.131 
 
 Wysdom moves with frustrating fluidity between the present and the past tense, the 
subjunctive and the indicative: is Anima the image and likeness of God, or was she? Is 
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she his “specyall” or was she already “dammyde” by Adam’s sin? Wysdom’s 
simultaneous grammar reflects the tension the soul experiences within herself and 
manifests this sense of warring within her.  
More significantly, however, this sense of tension within the self via the 
playwright’s use of simultaneous tense and mood signals God’s eternal perspective, 
which occurs outside of the sense of time that governs our grammar. For humans, 
fluctuation between likeness and unlikeness happens linearly in time. But for God, who is 
eternal, the soul can be both present and past. Here again, Wisdom relies on Augustinian 
thought. Grappling with this notion in the Confessions, Augustine frames the soul’s 
return to self as a return to the unchanging and eternal Beginning, who is Wisdom: 
Even when we learn from created things, which are subject to change, we are led 
to the Truth which does not change. And there we truly learn, as we stand by and 
listen to him and rejoice at hearing the bridegroom’s voice, restoring ourselves to 
him who gave us our being. He is therefore the Beginning, the abiding Principle, 
for unless he remained when we wandered in error, there would be none to whom 
we could return and restore ourselves. But when we return from error, we return 
by knowing the Truth; and in order that we may know the Truth, he teaches us, 
because he is the Beginning…The Beginning is Wisdom and Wisdom is the 
Beginning in which you made heaven and earth.132 
 
 Augustine explains that the Beginning is, for us, temporally qualified, but from the 
perspective of eternal Truth, it is coequal. A return to the Beginning, therefore, amounts 
to a return to unchanging, eternal Truth. While the soul may “wander in error,” the 
Beginning “abides,” reminding her that she can be “restored” to the Truth. Augustine’s 
notion of “restoration” signals that “wandering” is not permanent “change” but, instead, 
depletion. “Restoration” to the Truth suggests, then, that the soul has some part in 
eternality; even while she exists in time and is subject to change, the eternal Beginning 
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“gave us our being,” fundamentally providing the mark of her potential. The soul’s 
eternal quality and potential, as Augustine explains, is Truth: the eternal establishes a 
True human self, and maintains it in the non-time of Wisdom’s eternal Beginning.  
The eternal perspective explains the possibility for Wysdom that original likeness 
and concupiscence can be simultaneous states of the soul, even while he resists their 
conflation. That is, while he implies that her likeness to him has been altered with 
finality, “ye be dysfyguryde be [Adam’s] synne/Ande dammyde to derknes from Godys 
syghte,” he anticipates Anima’s response, which simply assumes the possibility of 
Johanine re-birth:133 “How dothe grace than ageyn begynne?/ Wat reformythe the soull to 
hys fyreste lyght?”134 In response, Wysdom proclaims that he himself, “that was Gode 
and man ryght,” made a complete atonement (“full sethe”) from which the sacraments 
“spronge.”135 Here again, Wysdom speaks simultaneously in the past and present: the 
singular act of Christ’s “sethe” occurred once, in the past, but the sacraments “all synne 
wasche awey” in the present.136  
Similarly, when Wysdom combines the subjunctive and indicative moods, he 
signals his indifference to the concept of time: the soul “reformyt [reforms]…to the 
gloryus lyknes of Gode eternall…As yt never dyffoulyde had be [been],/ Ande ys Crystys 
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own specyall.”137 Grammatically, we could make sense of this if Wysdom were to use 
either the subjunctive or future tense: the soul could reform, or it will reform, as if it had 
never been defiled. Instead, he uses the indicative, “the soul reforms,” and “is Christ’s 
own intimate,” once more signaling that all is in the present tense from his eternal 
perspective. Indeed, the only portion of the sentence in the past tense is the clause 
associated with sin, as if Wysdom somehow always looks forward to the reformative 
possibility. However disorienting to Anima (and the audience), Wysdom, Word 
Incarnate, grammatically illustrates the argument that the human soul fluctuates on a 
spectrum between perfect likeness and complete unlikeness to God. Yet it is never 
changed with finality until the body dies, and its potential for reform, through grace, 
remains ever present. 
The play’s thesis unfolds in the opening dialogue with this in mind. Wysdom 
establishes Anima’s simultaneous self, subject to concupiscence, but imprinted with the 
Truth to which he implores her to return: 
Thus a soule ys both foulle and fayer: 
Foull as a best, be felynge of synne, 
Fayer as an angell, of hevyn the ayer [heir], 
By knowynge of Gode by hys reson wythin.138 
 
The project of the play, then, is to show how the soul might return to what she is, and the 
exposition of the drama leaves nothing vague about her re-formation, even while the 
penitential act itself occurs offstage. Wysdom’s “docrtyne” of re-formation is “charite,” 
the virtue that expresses his own selfhood with all possible precision. God’s relational 
selfhood—caritas—is the key to Anima’s epistemological-turned-ontological quest. 
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Wisdom as Response to Wycliffite Heresy 
Since Eugene Hill’s examination of the play’s Augustinian influences, several 
critical works have addressed the play’s theology and doctrinal message to suggest that 
Wisdom was written as a response to Wycliffite heresy. Two are particularly relevant. 
Clifford Davidson’s Visualizing the Moral Life: Medieval Iconography and the Macro 
Morality Plays argues that the iconography of the play “extends the allegorical treatment 
of the human condition in the direction of mysticism” and is “driven by 
phenomenological considerations.” 139 Davidson addresses the play’s response to Lollard 
objections to images. He concludes that “the play of Wisdom…is intended to function as 
an extended visual reminder of man’s earthly fate according to contemporary theology” 
and, further, that the iconography of the suffering Christ as refuge for sinners reaffirms 
the contemplative life and authenticates “image theology.”140 The more recent analysis is 
Julie Paulson’s, in which she examines the ritual of penance as the play’s response to 
Lollard anti-sacramentality. She argues that “Wisdom presents penance not merely as a 
vehicle for the communication of Church doctrine and authority,” but as “a ritual that 
constructs meanings and values (such as what a soul is) that are central to Christian 
faith.”141 Both analyses contribute to our understanding of Wisdom as a response to 
Lollard criticisms of medieval orthodoxy.  
As a response to Wycliffite teaching, Wisdom is profoundly innovative in that not 
only does the play make a compelling response to doctrinal conflicts, but the playwright 
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also uses an Augustinian rhetorical strategy to negotiate unorthodox doctrine: he reframes 
the epistemological questions of doctrine under ontological terms. This kind of response 
should not surprise us given Wisdom’s Augustinian influences, in which theological 
argument persistently returns the reader to its foundations in the ontological 
“Beginning.”142  
In the Confessions, for example, Augustine responds to Neoplatonism by 
meditating on his experience of God’s reality, rather than responding directly to doctrinal 
questions. He affirms first that God “has being” in Truth: “I heard your voice saying I am 
the God who IS.”143 And later: “I heard your voice…and at once I had no cause to doubt. 
I might more easily have doubted that I was alive than that Truth had being.”144 Rather 
than the intellectual knowledge he gains from the Platonists’ “books” of the first half of 
the Confessions, it is the experience of hearing God’s voice that erases his doubt; 
experience of God’s being confirms that truth exists in a way even more real than 
Augustine himself may exist.  Likewise, in De Trinitate, Augustine meets the Arian 
heresy with a meditation on the definition of God established in Exodus 3:14, “I AM 
WHO I AM.” It is here that Augustine establishes his Trinitarian formula to refute the 
Arian theological heresy.145 For Augustine, Trinitarian theology must find its basis in 
Trinitarian ontology. Finally, De Civitate Dei similarly relies on the foundations of 
ontological argument to respond to the Roman social and theological order, arguing that 
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participation in the civitate dei—the ontologically basic communio established in de 
Trinitate—is the proper role of the civitas terrena.  
With respect to Wisdom’s contemporary sources, we should note that all of them 
have, to adjust Davidson’s phrase, “ontological considerations.” 146 Still, Wisdom’s 
principle achievement is its way of drawing their doctrinal theses together and 
interrogating their ontological foundations. For example, as we have seen in the opening 
dialogue, the Wisdom playwright also argues for experiential knowledge to reflect the 
doctrinal orthodoxy of his source.147 More than that, however, he emphasizes experience 
of God in imitation of Augustine’s most effective rhetorical strategy. Through Augustine, 
our playwright recognizes that the primary cause of theological doctrine is ontological 
truth. Rather than meet unorthodoxy at its doctrinal questions—Are sacraments good and 
necessary? What function do images have in religious life?—Augustine models for the 
Wisdom playwright how to reframe the discussion on the basis of a more fundamental set 
of truths: what God is determines what we know about him; what God is determines what 
humans are; and what humans are determines how they should act, and not the reverse. 
For both writers, experience of God’s being is an encounter with ontological selfhood 
that should direct every action. As a result, Wisdom offers a response to Lollard heresy 
based on an Augustinian reframing of doctrinal arguments within more fundamental 
ontological truths.   
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As the play’s opening dialogue insists through Wysdom’s constant re-direction of 
Anima’s inquiries, both the ritual of penance and the play’s iconographic descriptions are 
not ends in and of themselves, but signs that participate in transcendent reality. Through 
them, Wisdom testifies that only through these sensible signs do we begin to know; they 
are the first and the last step, since the knowledge Anima gains is always embodied 
knowledge. Even though she allegorically represents a non-bodied soul, her presence on 
stage demands that she must return to her body with the truth she comes to know and 
activate it by her Wyll. She must live the truth. When she does so, Wysdom argues, she 
participates in his divine life.  
Paulson alludes to the ways in which ritual and sign accomplish this 
transcendence in a particular way: 
The elaborate spectacle of Anima and her inner faculties’ penitential cleansing is 
finally a visible sign of the invisible grace of human redemption. For it is, as 
Wisdom insists, through the elaborate spectacles of orthodox practice, the sensible 
signs through which the divine is not studied but recognized, that such grace is 
known.148  
 
However, without articulation of the mechanism by which the “elaborate spectacles” 
function, the “visible sign” loses its participatory connection to the “invisible grace” it 
re-presents to the world. The playwright recognizes that “orthodox practice” is deeply 
rooted in the ontology of God who is non-competitively transcendent and relational, and 
which renders invisible “grace” God’s gift. When they are not recognized as participants 
in divine reality, signs and rituals become mere spectacles, and both become more 
difficult to justify in religious practice. Wisdom insists on the connection between reality 
and symbol through participation, and particularly through a relationship of giving. This 
is the deepest rhetorical objective of the play: through its dramatization of the ritual, 
                                                 




Wysdom expresses the ontological concern at the heart of orthodoxy and the paradigm of 
participation that bridges them.  
Furthermore, Wisdom’s ontological response to Lollardy addresses Wyclif’s 
ultimately ontological concern. Gordon Leff explains that Wyclif’s “rejection of the 
prevailing explanation” of the Eucharist was based in his opposition to “two 
assumptions…almost universally held until Wyclif,” that explained how the host 
maintained its accidents—the appearance of bread—while its substance was completely 
changed in the consecration to Christ’s being. Leff explains: 
Wyclif’s position meant two fundamental shifts away from the hitherto accepted 
one… Wyclif distinguished between the eucharist in its natural form as bread and 
wine and in its sacramental import. In the latter sense Christ was really and truly 
present spiritually in the host, as he was not in a mere sign for him such as a 
crucifix. But at the same time that did not for Wyclif…mean that Christ was there 
in his own person. Wyclif gave none of Ockham’s consideration to the problem of 
Christ’s mode of existence in the host, because he did not conceive him in the 
eucharist in a personal manner; nor indeed did Wyclif ever specify what he meant 
by Christ’s spiritual presence.149 
 
Wyclif ultimately fell into heresy under an ontological problem: as Leff explains, his 
dismissal of the Thomist account of the Eucharist marked “a divergent ontology and with 
it a conflicting conception of what God can legitimately do.”150 While Wyclif believed 
that Christ was present in the Eucharist, he did not believe that Christ transubstantiated 
the substance of the host. According to Leff, Wyclif understood God to be in all created 
things by means of “the archetypes or intelligible being (esse intelligibile) that God had 
of all possible or actual creatures.”151 In other words, Wyclif’s ontology held that God’s 
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“eternal and indestructible” being infused creation, such that created substances were not 
an image and likeness but, in at least some small manner, a shared being.152 For this 
reason, “he refused to accept transubstantiation as the supersession of one substance by 
another; for that would entail the annihilation of what was transubstantiated.”153 
Ultimately, Wyclif’s obstacle is his rejection of Augustine’s ontological paradox whereby 
God’s utter otherness facilitates intimacy with his creation, rather than competition.  
Like Duns Scotus and Ockham before him, Wyclif’s ontology gave way to a 
“univocal construal of the term being [which] turned God into one being—however 
supreme—among many.”154 Under Wyclif’s framing, for Christ to truly transubstantiate 
the substance of bread, he would be forced to compete with his own presence in the 
substance of created bread, which Wyclif denied was possible. Put into competition with 
other substances, God becomes one being among many, rather than the ipsum esse 
subsistens. Wyclif’s view is strikingly opposite of the Augustinian and Thomistic 
paradigm of participation by which God gives his being to creation and invites them to 
participate in him.155  
Augustinian participation, we remember, establishes and articulates the intimate 
connection between the creator and creation, the invisible and the visible, the sign and the 
res. Both intimacy and connection are the specific relationship of gift; giving is not 
merely the thing God does, they are that which he is. When, like Anima, the human 
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reassumes her original likeness, she participates in this giving, and thereby becomes its 
icon. Within its subsequent Thomist framing, everything that participates in God is 
elevated into his Reality. And God’s “noncompetitive transcendence,” in Robert 
Sokolowski’s words , makes participation possible.156 Or, as Barron says, participation 
suggests that  
God is so radically other than creation that he can enter into what he has made in 
a nonintrusive manner…The true God, who is the sheer energy of to-be itself, is 
not a threat to human flourishing but precisely the ground of human 
flourishing.157 
 
 It is, finally, the idea that as the human creature participates in God’s relational nature 
through original likeness, he also transcends into Reality without loss. Like Christ he is 
human and through Christ he is divine. 
For Aquinas, transubstantiation implied conversion of the substance of bread and 
wine into the body and blood of Christ; the twin concepts of participation and non-
competitive transcendence are at its heart. Aquinas argued by “analogy”158 that the 
substances of bread and wine do not compete but convert—their “being” is thereby 
elevated—into the transcendent Reality of God’s selfhood. And, as above, God’s 
selfhood is, for both Aquinas and Augustine, understood as relationship, the 
convertibility of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, which is the basis of all ontology.  
For Wyclif, however, Eucharistic participation shifted toward competition—the 
bread remains bread, and competes for physical space, even after it becomes Christ’s 
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body. He rejects God’s ability to “legitimately” coinhere.159  Wyclif wished to claim that 
all being shared, somehow, in the nature of God’s “intelligible being,”160 but he insisted 
that such sharing could not involve the destruction or loss of the sacraments as material 
objects.  He could not admit that God’s unique nature, his being “otherly other,” would 
let them participate in his transcendent Reality without making them one with it.  
As Leff says, “by identifying the intelligible in God with being,” Wyclif’s theory 
actually corralled God’s being into the realm of equality with creation because he 
supposed them both incapable of destruction.161 Wyclif seems to maintain God’s 
omnipotence, but he levels God and his creation despite his insistence that God was 
“supreme.” Thus “transcendence” for Wyclif meant becoming something akin to 
“supreme being.” The ironic result of this leveling was Wyclif’s argument that Christ was 
“present” in the Eucharist only potentially; the substance of bread and wine remained 
attached to their accidents. Because, for Wyclif, God and creation shared an ontological 
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category, annihilation was impossible and, therefore, the notion of transubstantiation 
could not be sustained.  
As Leff explains, Wyclif’s ideas constitute primarily an ontological shift, and 
only secondarily a theological one. From the orthodox perspective, Wyclif’s theological 
error—his claim that transubstantiation is impossible—resulted not from a lack of faith in 
miracles so much as it was a failure to understand God’s ontology.162  
As a result, if we take Paulson’s suggestion that Wisdom should be seen as a 
response to Lollard heresy, I argue that that response is focused less on the specific ritual 
of penance and more on the fundamental question regarding the nature of the human soul. 
Theorizing the play’s dramatic visualization of the “route to self-knowledge [as] a 
manifestly and materially penitential one,” Paulson makes a strong case for the play’s 
specific defense of the penitential ritual as an educative practice that responds to the 
Lollard criticism that “traditional confessional language was an inadequate means of 
representing the interior.”163 However, as I have shown above, both Wyclif and Wisdom’s 
central concerns are ontological; any response the play may be making to Lollardy should 
be understood this way as well. If penance is educative, it performs that function with the 
ultimate end of restoring Anima’s selfhood to her original likeness by means of self-
giving love. 
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The Self According to Good Friday: Anima’s Re-formation to Selfhood 
In the preceding discussion, I have argued that Wisdom’s central concerns are 
ontological and that its rhetorical choices are a response to theological and philosophical 
ideas that dissent from an orthodox understanding of being. However, these concerns 
drive the play’s further argument, which develops beyond the opening dialogue in the 
remainder of the drama. While the opening dialogue frames the play’s immediate concern 
with the soul’s ontology, the rest of the drama develops the meaning of that ontology as 
well as how Anima can return to original likeness. The final portion of this chapter, then, 
addresses these essential questions: what, specifically, is Wisdom’s ontological vision? 
That is, how does the universal claim of original likeness become manifest in the 
particular soul, and how does Anima exhibit that universality? Given the allegorical 
nature of the play, is it possible to outline Wisdom’s argument for original likeness of the 
soul in more practical terms? What is the vision of selfhood Wysdom has in mind, and 
how does the play’s climactic event—sacramental penance—educate Anima so that she 
comes to know herself?   
With regard to each of these questions, I propose that the “doctryne” of charity 
Wysdom elaborates is both a moral directive and an unfolding of Anima’s selfhood. The 
soul’s charity, he shows, is the ground of Anima’s original likeness to the Trinitarian God 
who “ys charyte.”164 When she is like God, Anima actualizes her being through a self-gift 
of love. In Wisdom, charity is something one does to be who one is.  
On one hand, as we have seen above, the play insists that God’s being love and 
his giving love are simultaneous and that the relationality implied by this simultaneity is 
                                                 





ontologically basic: it is the third person of the Trinity, one with the Father and the Son. 
On the other hand, though the fallen human soul still bears the likeness of its creator, only 
by being and giving love can it be reformed in its original likeness. This is the problem 
with which the play is concerned following the opening dialogue: Wisdom argues that 
such reformation hinges on Anima’s “undyrstondynge” of the love-gift through both 
knowledge and experience, and through it she becomes most fully a self. So, as we shall 
see, she must freely choose to be “in charyte,” by remembering and conforming herself to 
him. 
Re-formation to her original likeness comes to fullness only when Anima 
“images” the simultaneous harmony of Trinitarian relationality, which the play calls 
“charyte.” The way Anima “images” charity is expressed by her Undyrstondynge; we see 
this perhaps most clearly when Wysdom explains that souls can be “in charyte” or “cum 
to charyte.”165 Undyrstondynge makes a case for this combination of concepts under the 
term “charyte” when he first introduces himself as the part of Anima that “behold[es] wat 
Gode ys”:  
For, for love, that Lorde made man of nought. 
Thys ys that love whyche ys clepyde charyte; 
For Gode ys charyte, as autors tellys166 
 
With a characteristic nod to its patristic influences, Wisdom affirms, through 
Undyrstondynge, the Irenaean doctrine of creation ex nihilo167: “for love, that Lorde 
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made man of nought.”168 It is precisely this love—with which God speaks his creature 
into being and gives the creature his Reality—“whyche ys clepyde charyte.” Caritas is 
God who IS and who DOES: giving, loving, and both simultaneously. The Wisdom 
writer’s insistence that the soul’s likeness to God depends upon one’s self-giving 
constitutes the difference between orthodox and heterodox doctrines of being and non-
being. For Wysdom, “charyte” is being169 in that it verbally combines the gerunds 
“loving” and “giving”: it reflects the Trinitarian relationality of the Word as the 
ontological ground of the human soul. 
The Wisdom writer’s syntactical construction indicates a further argument in that 
“for” implies another simultaneous meaning. Not only does God create man out of love 
for—or, because he loves—him, but God also created man intending him for the purpose 
of love. This simultaneous meaning bears out in the rest of the passage, as 
Undyrstondynge makes explicit the inherent mutuality of “charyte”: “Ande woo ys in 
charyte, in Gode dwellyt he,/And Gode, that is charyte, in hym dwellys.”170 Here, 
Undyrstondynge clarifies this double purpose of God’s creation: the soul who is “in 
charity” dwells “in God,” and God, likewise, “in hym dwellys.” As above, when Anima 
maintains her original likeness to God, who is love-gift, she is in him and he in her.171 
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They are in communion when Anima participates in God’s Trinitarian givingness. This 
communion both parallels and participates in His Trinitarian relationality.172  
In God, love and gift do not merely exist simultaneously; they are in fact the 
same. They are not attributes or qualities: God’s Being is Loving Giving. For this reason, 
Undyrstondynge and Wysdom (themselves both epithets for Christ) express this co-being 
by means of copulatives: “Gode ys charyte.” With the introduction of the Mights, the play 
shifts its focus in order to emphasize this copulative relationship between love and gift; 
through their harmony, they explicitly imitate and thereby participate in God’s being. The 
soul and its intra-relationality is, as Philips explains, beyond signs; “the sign is the 
res.”173 
When the play re-situates the emphasis of God as Love to God as Charity, it 
necessarily shifts our understanding of the human soul. The play emphasizes self-giving 
as requisite to Anima’s original likeness as Undyrstondynge finishes his introduction: 
“Thus, undyrstondynge of Gode compellys/To cum to charyte—than have hys lyknes, 
lo!”174 Here the playwright reenlists Wysdom’s emphasis on participation from the 
opening dialogue and applies it to the human soul: to participate in God’s Reality, one 
must also be loving-giving. To do so is to be one’s self. As it unfolds beyond these 
opening “introductions,” the drama underscores the simultaneous relationality of caritas: 
the human self must also be a gerund. So, when Wysdom replies to Anima that she 
should give him her heart, it is not as a sign of her love that she should give it; rather it is 
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a real giving-over to his governance, and a new existence of herself as gift that he 
requires. His most basic desire is for her to be love-gift, as he is. 
However, the moment the gift is separated from the self, it becomes a mere 
transaction of symbols. Indeed, the precursor to Anima’s fall shows her inner life 
deteriorating into the realm of symbolic exchange, which denies participation its power to 
image reality. Aware of the participatory power of the mights’ unity, Lucyfer strategizes 
to “dysvygure” Anima, so that she can no longer participate in God’s likeness.175 When 
Lucyfer plots to “sew damnacyon,” he accomplishes it by separately convincing each 
Might to work against his former nature, and therefore against unified participation in the 
soul’s likeness to the Trinity.176 For example, as he attempts to gain Wyll’s consent to 
“leve [his] stodyes,” Lucyfer works to divide him from his two counterparts: 
The Wyll of the Soule hathe fre dominacyon, 
Dyspute not to moche in this wyth reson, 
Yet the nethyr parte to this taketh sum instruccyon, 
And so shulde the over parte, but he were woode.177 
 
Lucyfer explains that Wyll has freedom over himself and that he need not “dispute” too 
much with “reason” (Mynde), nor consult with Undyrstondynge; instead, Wyll should 
take instruction from Lucyfer, unless he is crazy. And, as Klausner notes, “since Will is 
not much given to logical argument, he falls easily.”178  
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176 For example, Lucyfer convinces Mynde, to cease contemplation and live the active life instead, which is 
a direct turn away from what Mynde is made for. Undyrstondynge, for his part, is convinced to feel through 
the bodily senses, rather than seek “knowynge” with the help of Mynde. Finally, Lucyfer convinces Wyll to 
cease that which he was made to do—offer praise and choose righteous action—and to “lede a comun lyff” 
instead, ll. 389-92, 472.   
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In both the Augustinian and Thomistic traditions, reason understands that 
something is true and presents it to the will that further knows that it should be desired as 
Good. However, in this traditional medieval epistemology of “act,” the will is not 
beholden to the dictates of reason; it is free. Lucyfer plays on the sense that the Wyll is 
superior, and not in need of Mynde or Undyrstondynge’s guidance. In reality, Wyll needs 
his two “partneres” in order to be fully himself, a fact of which Lucyfer takes full 
advantage. Lucyfer later reasons that since he has made reason (Mynde) “both deff and 
dumme,” and since Grace (Undyrstondynge) “ys out and put arome,” he can easily cause 
Wyll to “spyll.”179 Lucyfer is jealous of “man” for displacing him from his heavenly 
dwelling, that is, his communion with God.180 So he plots to instigate Anima’s internal 
self-rupture by disrupting the harmonious communion of her mights.  
As the Mights begin to commit active sins—those familiar ones such as 
maintenance and lechery—the play demonstrates how those sins flow from the 
destruction of the Might’s relational harmony. Specifically, we see how caritas changes 
from an element of being and becomes instead a symbolic exchange. For example, before 
the Mights commit themselves to their debauched revelry, they consider the cause of their 
“welfare.”181 Their self-giving relationality already disrupted, the Mights offer various 
“condycyons,” or reasons, that they have to “worschyppe”: each of their “causes” 
demonstrates an objectification of the notion of gift.182  
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For example, Mynde, they say, is a steward many fear because of the possible 
consequences of a sudden withdrawal of his “frendeschyppe.”183 He then reveals that he 
supports the “shendeschyppe,” or shameful behavior of others under his “lordeschyppe” 
“for, to get good, this a grett spede ys!”184 That is, he gives monetary support for the sins 
of others in return for certain “goods” he can get in return. Mynde’s gift is no longer a 
gift of self in charity; his giving is conditional, and comes at a great price to his receiver. 
In linguistic terms, his gifts leave off being gerunds and become nouns; they are things to 
be exchanged for services. Divorced from being, they become symbols to be used.  
Undyrstondynge, likewise, has come to objectify the gift, but much more 
explicitly: “[I] choppe and chonge with symonye,/ And take large geftys!” Here, he 
admits to bargaining and trading with simony, the illicit practice of selling ecclesiastical 
offices, benefits, and pardons for money. This is a particularly egregious offense because 
it attempts to equate the participatory Reality of the gift that obtains in the supernatural 
realm to the temporal and material advantage to be gained by a simoniac.185 To take 
bribes in return for sacraments and sacramentals is to reduce them to objects for sale. 
Simony falsifies the economics of redemption; it turns Christ’s buying back the soul, 
embodied, as it were, in the Eucharist, into a financial transaction.  
Finally, Wyll takes Undyrstondynge’s commodification of the sacred and applies 
it in his own way to the flesh. Spending three times the amount he “takes,” Wyll engages 
in an unequal exchange in which “onclennes [sexual impurity, lechery]” is a “nysyte 
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[nicety, trivial object].”186 For Wyll, who sometimes gives and is sometimes given187, the 
exchange of objects—including bodies—is as “cumun [common] as the way!”188  
But these kinds of exchange, which the Mights claim are the source of their 
“welfare,” are clearly not the “charyte” Wysdom had in mind earlier in the play. Here 
instead, giving becomes mere “gift,” a symbolic exchange of object for object, which 
disassembles the original ontological self-sameness of caritas and self.189 Indeed, as the 
dialogue between the Mights progresses, each admits that he “takes” money and property 
from unsuspecting victims, which marks the deterioration of exchange into outright 
theft.190 Because it is no longer a full giving-over of the self out of love for the other, as 
among the Trinitarian persons or between God and the Soul, giving cannot remain being.  
From Wysdom’s perspective, then, Anima’s “re-education” through sacramental 
penance must be a process that restores the copular relationship between giving and 
being.191 He begins by “re-minding” the Mights—in other words, by helping them to 
remember their true selfhood. Speaking to the Mights and Anima simultaneously, he 
exclaims his horror at her “horrybull wyse”: “Wy art thou creature so onkynde 
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189 See also l. 922, where Wysdom rebukes the Mights for their misdirected “giving,” in which they have 
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[unnatural]/Thus to defoule Godys own place/That was made so gloryus wythout 
ende?”192 Drawing attention to the unnaturalness of her current state—her choice, 
literally to de-nature herself—and to the contrast between her hellish appearance and her 
original likeness, Wysdom reminds Anima not only of what she was created to be but 
also of what she was supposed to do with his giving: “Thou hast made thee a bronde of 
hell/Whom I made the ymage of lyght….Why gevyst thou myn enmy that I have 
wrought?...Why lovyst that ys nought?”193 Wysdom’s line of inquiry here reveals the 
ontological consequences for misdirected giving: Why do you give my enemy [Lucyfer] 
what I have made [the soul herself]? How can you mistake a hellish brand for the 
spiritual light that is God in you? Why do you love that which does not illuminate but 
burns until nothing remains? In other words, the Mights’ distortion of the self-gift 
relationship has led to a love of nothingness. And such love, Wysdom argues, is no love 
at all.194 
Mynde responds, finally, by recognizing his offense, which spurs his companions 
to recognize their own sins as well. This moment enacts the play’s argument regarding 
the educative process of penance as an ontological project: the scene reveals that Wisdom 
is not solely concerned with ritual penance as a pedagogical tool. Of course, sacramental 
penance is self-educative, but the play is particularly careful to indicate its participatory 
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understanding and concern with the ontological reality effected by penance. Specifically, 
the moment when the Mights recognize their sin is not yet penance, and not yet 
contrition. Instead, we witness their compunction—that “pricking” of the conscience, 
through which the soul is re-minded of its true self through its memory of What and Who 
God IS.195  
In this moment, the play dramatizes the opening dialogue’s theoretical differences 
between “knowynge” and “experiens.” That is to say, the difference between 
compunction and contrition is the difference between knowledge and experience; and just 
as the Wisdom writer was careful to parse their theoretical differences in the opening 
dialogue, he is careful now to show their different ontological effects in practice. This 
parsing, as Paulson suggests, serves to “[mark] the importance of contrition in the 
penitential process.”196 Paulson refers here to the height of the drama when Anima 
becomes contrite and devils literally run out from under her garments, which is indeed 
visually dramatic.197 However, this visual drama signals, rather, that contrition is a source 
of deep ontological change that involves a shift from knowing to being. Wisdom shows 
that while compunction and contrition appear emotionally similar, they have different 
epistemological and ontological consequences.  
Whereas compunction is a “pricking” of the conscience, which speaks to its 
epistemological capacity, contrition is a deep and genuine “sorowe,” a “bruising of the 
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heart,” a “crushing,” or even “destruction.”198 The latter are ontological rather than 
epistemological conditions; they actualize the knowledge that is “pricked” by 
compunction. Thus, as the devils finally exit the scene, Wysdom observes that 
“contrycyon avoydyth [drives out] the devllys blake!/Dedly synne ys non you within!”199 
The power of contrition is so great an ontological modifier that even though she has not 
performed the full act of penance, the strongest consequence of her sin (a turn toward 
non-being) is literally driven out of her. In this moment, Anima begins to live again. 
Indeed, the Mights demonstrate the difference between the epistemological 
change produced by compunction separately from the ontological effect of Anima’s 
contrition of heart. They display knowledge of their sins and even their dependence upon 
God to “be amendyde.”200 Wyll, for example, understands that he will be “grounded” in 
God through “the giffte of hys specyall [intimate] grace.”201 However, even after each 
Might has diligently prompted the others to acknowledge his sin, and after they have 
thereby restored a working relationality, Anima is surprised to see herself unchanged:  
Than wyth you thre the Soule dothe crye, 
“Mercy Gode!” Why change I nowte, 
I that thus horryble in synne lye, 
Sythe Mynde, Wyll, and Undryrstondynge be brought 
To have knowynge they ill wrought? 
 
Why, she asks, have I not changed, despite my Mights’ knowledge of their sins? She 
continues: 
 What ys that shall make me clene? 
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 Put yt, Lorde, into my thowte! 
 Thi olde mercy let me remene. 
 
Here Anima finally realizes that, beyond all knowledge of her sins, she must “remene”—
remember—mercy, which is God’s very self-giving. And remembering, as in Augustine, 
prompts not merely the soul’s knowledge of sin, but her reciprocal experience of self-
giving, since what the soul re-members is God’s incarnation and crucifixion.  
 The distinction Wisdom sets up in this moment, wherein Anima realizes that 
knowledge of her sins is not enough to make her clean, parallels her opening inquiry 
about love, in which Wysdom shows her the difference between knowing about love and 
being love itself. As a result, Wysdom’s answer to her question—“what is it that shall 
make me clean?”—parallels his response to her question about love in the opening 
dialogue. That is, when Anima desires an epistemological answer to her problem—“Put 
it, Lord, into my thought!”—Wysdom reframes the resolution ontologically:  
 Thow the soule mynde take 
 Ande undyrstondynge of hys synnys allwey, 
 Beynge in wyll, yt [sin] forsake, 
 Yit thes do not only synnys awey, 
 But very contrycyon, who that have may, 
 That ys purger and clenser of synne.202 
 
Wysdom explains that even if the Mights acknowledge, understand, and resolve not to sin 
again, sin has already produced a shift away from being that this knowledge cannot 
resolve. Instead, the only remedy is “very”—that is, true in the sense of experiential—
contrition. The word must become deed. 
Next, Anima begins to weep—exhibiting the sorrow of “very” contrition—and 
resolves to complete her penance. As she exits, the Wisdom writer draws attention to the 
                                                 





Latin contricio through Anima’s singing of verses from the book of Lamentations: 
“Magna velud mare contricio, contricio tua: quis consoletur tui?”203 Here Anima recalls 
the utter destruction of Jerusalem (itself the dwelling of the Lord in the Pentateuch) in the 
second chapter of Lamentations: “As great as the sea is your sorrow, your destruction; 
who can console you?”204 Yet here, though the Vulgate has contricio only once, the 
Wisdom writer repeats the word and personalizes it, adding “tua.” Rhetorically, this 
addition emphasizes the gravity of the concept of contricio by allowing space for 
polyvalent translation.205 It is possible, in other words, to imagine that the Wisdom writer 
not only wishes to emphasize the importance of contrition to the sacrament, as Paulson 
notes, but signals as well the destruction of sinful self that Anima had become. 
From this position of utter humility, Anima realizes her complete poverty in the 
face of Christ’s sacrifice—his being caritas. And only from this position can Anima 
remember that God is love-giving. Augustine describes this moment well: “I wandered 
away, but I remembered you. I heard your voice at my back, calling me to return…I was 
death to myself. But in you I live again.”206 In the act of remembering, Anima can access 
the education that sacramental penance truly offers: she can re-learn how to be caritas 
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and return to her original self. The humility of contrition leads to this return; the 
sacramental act itself is, as Wysdom instructs, a “yeldynge.”207   
Still, at the moment Anima is ready to engage in the sacrament, she exits the 
stage, and the ritual itself is “performed” outside of the public view. Paulson notes that 
this decision provides the opportunity for a costume change.208 More than that, however, 
it complements the following scene in which Wysdom delivers his “sermon” on the nine 
points. While the contrition scene demonstrates the interior effect of the heart’s contrition 
upon the soul, Wysdom’s sermon makes visible the effect of the second step of penance, 
confession of the mouth. Together, these scenes “show” the audience the inner 
ontological workings of sacramental penance within the soul. After Wysdom’s sermon, 
we witness the ontological effect of the third step, satisfaction of deed. Contrition of 
heart, confession of mouth, and satisfaction of deed express the same relational act, 
which restores givingness within the soul so as to recover its original likeness of being. 
The contrition and sermon/confession scenes figure first the soul’s destruction and 
then a subsequent process of re-creation at the hands of Wysdom. The contrition scene 
reveals the ontological gravity of sin within the soul, particularly the way in which it 
disfigures the soul. Then we see how Wysdom uses Anima’s “contricio” to restore her 
original likeness to God in his sermon. By means of his creative word, Anima is, in a real 
sense, re-formed. As a pair, the two scenes illustrate a more complete picture of the 
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ontological transformation that occurs in sacramental penance: the soul’s re-formation is 
a new birth.  
Wysdom re-forms Anima by verbally constructing her “poyntys,” or “features” 
under the order of caritas.209 Each of these virtues engages the soul in self-giving love, 
whether directed toward God or “thi neybure.”210 Moreover, Wysdom presents the soul’s 
characteristics under this “order” by drawing careful distinctions between symbolic self-
giving and the giving of self that participates in God’s reality. In elucidating the third 
point, for instance, Wysdom explains that he would rather the soul “suffyr pacyenly for 
my love” and reprove her neighbor with mercy than “dyscyplyn…thi body wyth peynys 
greve,” that is, to perform acts of self-mortification.211 In other words, he would rather 
that Anima love both God and neighbor with patience and self-giving love than that she 
practice a symbolic asceticism that is entirely self-focused.212 Similarly, in the fifth point, 
Wysdom implores the soul to “have pyte and compassyon/ Of thi neybur whyche ys seke 
and nedy,” rather than to “[fast] forty yer…in water and brede.”213 Here, Wysdom re-
orders the ontological relationship between the self that imitates Christ by suffering and 
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the soul that restores its likeness to Him by self-giving. The first is a solitary askesis, the 
second is a participatory act that imitates the love that is one with the Father and the Son.  
This is why, in the capstone to the nine points, Wysdom makes clear the proper 
order of Anima’s love, requesting that she “love me soverenly.” That is to say, Wysdom 
doesn’t necessarily condemn the ascetic practices of self-mortification and fasting, but he 
insists that these come after “dedys of charyte.” The demand to act charitably is in no 
way superficial; to love him, he clarifies, is not a symbolic act. Deeds of charity 
participate in him and effect the soul’s original likeness. In fact, in this passage, Wysdom 
formally equates loving him sovereignly with charitable deeds:  
The nynte, God sethe, “Love me soverenly, 
Ande that to me more plesant ys 
Than yf thou went upon a pylar of tre 
That wer sett full of sharpe prykyys 
So that thou cut thi flesche into the smale partys.” 
Lo, Gode ys plesyde more with the dedys of charyte 
Than all the peynys man may suffer iwys. 214 
 
As in each of the points, Wysdom cites first God’s word and then develops his own 
commentary, summarizing the “poynte.” In this final virtue, the love of God as one’s 
sovereign and above all else, is more pleasing than even undertaking to literally imitate 
the crucifixion.215 Wysdom’s commentary then rephrases this love of God as “deeds of 
charity,” reaffirming the copular relationship between loving and giving. This equation 
between the soul’s love of God and giving of one’s love to her “neybur” is another 
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illustration of his insistence that the soul’s likeness to God is participatory, that it resides 
in the giving of itself to others.  
In this way, the play dramatizes the sacrament’s ontological effect.  Wysdom, 
who is Christ the Logos literally re-forms the soul into his likeness, using his Word to re-
install the order of charity. As Anima participates in the rite—with all its external 
requirements—offstage, Wysdom literally creates anew her interior, shaping her in the 
nine virtues under the order of charity.  
That Anima has been reformed by penance isn’t surprising; however, to view 
Wysdom’s speech on the novem virtutes as re-formative in a creative sense is to 
understand how the Wisdom writer imagines the sacrament’s ontological effect. The 
following scene testifies to this effect: having completed the sacrament, Anima emerges 
from off-stage appearing more beautiful than even her initial entrance in the play.216 
Moreover, without prompt or direction, she exhibits caritas immediately, singing: “quid 
retributam Domino pro omnibus que retribuit mihi? Calicem salutaris accipiam et nomen 
Domini invocabo [What can I render to the Lord for all that he has given me? I will 
accept the cup of salvation and call upon the name of the Lord].”217 Thus re-formed in the 
order of caritas, she can appropriately respond to Wysdom’s self-giving mercy with her 
own self-giving: “what can I render to him?” She recognizes and enacts a renewal in 
mutual self-giving, accepting his mercy and calling upon him in mutual love-giving.218 
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Her praise not only participates in the ontological compulsion to givingness, but it also 
rightly orders her relationship to him. Because it comes in the form of a question, 
Anima’s praise recognizes the utter otherness of God, even while she has been restored in 
his likeness.  
The reactions of both Wysdom and the Mights affirm that this is no superficial 
change, but is instead deeply reformative on the ontological level. Wysdom’s immediate 
response witnesses to Anima’s restored selfhood through two seemingly paradoxical 
images: first spousal union and then crucifixion. Wysdom’s marriage of these images 
explicitly joins suffering and self-gift, beauty and destruction, pain and joy. In so doing, 
the Wisdom writer concretizes the relationship between loving and giving oneself away; 
the cross is joy because in God’s economy total self-gift is total self-gain.  
Wysdom first affirms their renewed spousal union by invoking the Song of Songs: 
“Vulnerasti cor meum, soror mea, sponsa [you have wounded my heart, my sister, my 
bride].”219 He follows with declarations of her “hye [divine] love,” her “bewtys bryght” 
appearance, and how she “were never so leve to me verelye,” all signaling the joy of 
marriage.220 Immediately thereafter, he recalls the image of his crucifixion: 
Ande ther [where] your fyve wyttys offendyde has [have], 
Ande to mak a sythe [atonement] be impotent, 
My fyve wyttys, that never dyde trespass 
Hathe made a sythe to the Father suffycyent.221 
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“give back” to him.  
 
219 Wisdom, ll. 1084-85. See also Songs 4:9. 
 
220 Ibid., ll. 1089-93. For the definition of “hye” as “divine,” see MED “heigh” 2a. 
 





Wysdom explains that whereas Anima’s deeds aren’t sufficient to satisfy the demands of 
justice for original sin and cannot make their own atonement, his self-givingness prevails, 
atoning through his gift of self for her sake. He explains his suffering in detail, according 
to each of his senses, especially “by touchynge”: “I felte peyns smerte…My body full of 
holys as a dovehous.”222 Emphasizing the destruction of his body in his passion and 
crucifixion, he signals the ontological gravity of both his becoming a body and suffering 
death as punishment for the sins of his creation.  
Wysdom lingers, remembering his crucifixion in such detail. Yet this slow 
accumulation of detail is more than mere description, as was popular in the affective 
tradition of meditation; instead it lends dramatic power to what becomes a volta or, 
dramatic turn, in his response to Anima’s reformation: “In thys ye be reformyde, Sule, 
my plesere,/ And now ye be the very temple of Jhesus.”223 That is, in his giving, she is 
restored to her original likeness, the “temple” and dwelling place of Jesus. Here, this 
chapter’s epigraphs from Isaiah and Hebrews reveal their ontological weight: Christ is the 
pure self-giving of God who becomes man, who knows human suffering, and who has 
atoned for the sins of humankind by that suffering. Wysdom explains that this 
suffering—Christ’s self-giving love—is the source and end for her own re-formation.  
  The possibility for restoration is, of course, a grace—a gift of God’s selfhood to 
the human soul. God, ipsum esse subsistens, remains in the soul, despite her “wandering,” 
ever giving an imprint of reality to her, that she might return to herself and thus to him.224 
                                                 
222 Ibid., l. 1107. 
 
223 Wisdom, ll. 1108-9, my emphasis. 
 





From Wysdom’s eternal perspective, Anima “ys” and “ware” simultaneously. In Wisdom, 
God is reality, and likeness to God is the human soul’s participation in his transcendent 
selfhood. Participation in reality is the natural state of the soul, as even Lucyfer attests.225 
The essence of human selfhood, then, according to Wysdom’s ontological argument, is 

































                                                 






CARITAS IS A PERSON:  
THE TRANSCENDENT SELFHOOD OF MARGERY KEMPE 
 
 In his famous dream vision, the “joyless jeweler” of Pearl realizes that his 
daughter, dead at two years old, is married to Christ in heaven and was “quen mad on the 
fyrst day!” Yet though he rejoices that she is in heaven, the Jeweler’s belief that earthly 
values have purchase in heaven casts a shadow on his happiness. He cries out: 
“That Cortayse is to fre of dede, 
Ȝyf hyt be soth þat þou conez saye. 
Þou cowþez neuer God nauþer plese ne pray, 
Ne neuer nawþer Pater ne Crede— 
And quen mad on the fyrst day! 
I may not traw, so God me spede, 
Þat God wolde wriþe so wrange away. 
Of countes, damysel, par ma fay, 
Wer fayr in heuen to halde asstate, 
Other ellez a lady of lasse aray; 
Bot a queen!—hit is to dere a date.”226 
 
His incredulity, which edges into dismay that his pearl has become a queen shows he 
does not at all understand God’s mercy; indeed, he even has the presumption to say the 
“Cortayse” that has been shown her ‘is to fre.” A “lady of lasse aray,” he could perhaps 
accept, but queen is too high a rank for someone like her. After all, she died so young, 
she “cowþez neuer God nauþer plese ne pray,/ Ne neuer nawþer Pater ne Crede.” Lacking 
the daughter’s experience of Christian doctrine, and practice with doing good deeds, the 
“tale” she tells is “vnresounable” to her earthly father, the jeweler.227  
                                                 
226 Anonymous. “Pearl.” The Complete Works of the Pearl Poet. Edited and translated by Casey Finch. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, ll. 481-92. Hereafter all citations of Pearl will appear as 
Pearl. 
 




 I open this chapter on The Book of Margery Kempe with a brief reading of Pearl 
because its narrator’s misunderstanding of the nature of God’s caritas strikingly echoes 
the way many readers have misjudged Margery and her Book.228 Critical uneasiness with 
Margery’s sense of her own singularity has the same source as the Jeweler’s difficulty in 
crediting what his daughter tells him. Would a rational observer say either has any 
convincing evidence that she has in fact been chosen? Yet, as the Pearl maiden teaches 
her father, God’s ways are not our ways. “Þer is no date of Hys godnesse...And He may 
do noþynk bot ryȝt...Of more and lasse in Godez ryche…lys no joparde”229; human 
standards not only do not apply in heaven, they are pulled inside out.230 God’s love is 
“unreasonable”; the blessedness it confers escapes all earthly gradations, and it is not 
measured by innocence or the good works of those who receive it.231 This is the character 
                                                 
228 The critical encounter with The Book of Margery Kempe has long expressed disbelief, discomfort, and 
even disdain toward her assumed singularity as sponsa Christi. Like the “gentle jeweler” of Pearl, we seem 
unable to believe that “God would work in so strange a way.” David Aers observes this critical reaction, 
citing studies by Clarissa Atkinson and Sarah Beckwith that, prior to the 1980s, reveal “hostility among 
medievalists” and an “uncritical deployment of…obscure but loaded terms,” “The Making of Margery 
Kempe: Individual and Community.” In Community, Gender, and Individual Identity: English Writing 
1360-1430. London: Routledge, 1988, 74-75. Clarissa Atkinson. Mystic. New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1983. For recent examples of this critical skepticism, see, for example, the conclusion of Tara 
Williams’, “Manipulating Mary: Maternal, Sexual, and Textual Authority in The Book of Margery 
Kempe.” Modern Philology 107 (2010), 550. For an example of the flippancy with which critics have 
regarded Margery’s experience, see the end of Felicity Riddy’s “Text and Self in The Book of Margery 
Kempe” in which she employs the sarcastic phrase “as if” in her critical commentary on Margery’s self-
presentation. 
 
229 Pearl, ll. 593, 596, 601-02, emphasis added. The Pearl poet draws on Isaiah 55, especially verses 8-13. 
 
230 In addition to meaning “correct” and “good,” the word “ryȝt” here also means “in accordance with 
justice,” and “righteous,” MED “right,” definitions 3 and 4. For the jeweler’s daughter, God’s ways may 
seem unreasonable to the world, but they are always just in “Godez ryche [kingdom].” The daughter’s 
queenship is not just good, but due to her.  
 





and condition of caritas, which is where the author of Margery’s Book situates her 
encounter with the reader.232  
 In this chapter, I maintain that Margery defines herself and her relation to others 
in light of her understanding of God as caritas.233 While I do not necessarily advocate for 
a sympathetic reading of the Book, I propose that the skepticism we feel, like the 
Jeweler’s in Pearl, is unwarranted if we attend to the intellectual and religious context 
that determined Margery’s conception of selfhood. I argue that Margery shares the same 
ontology of a self negotiating with its “real” being that we see in Wisdom, especially in 
the opening dialogue of that play. This should not surprise us since The Book of Margery 
Kempe was written in the same region and period as Wisdom; its sense of participation, 
reality, and transcendence draw from the same theological, philosophical, and cultural 
underpinnings. As a result, I will focus attention on modern critical responses to the 
Book, which tend to find Margery’s emotive excesses discomfiting, since they do not 
accord with current neoliberal opinions about the expression of belief. The purpose of my 
work is to expose and begin to fill the gaps in these critiques of Margery. 
The Recent Critical Approach and its Problematic Assumptions 
 About halfway through her narrative, Margery recounts how, at Saint Stephen’s 
church in Norwich, she experiences bouts of uncontrollable weeping and sobbing: 
                                                 
232 Textual criticism on the Book is longstanding given that the protagonist admits to illiteracy and must 
depend on amiable priests to take her dictation. For a helpful summary of that critical history, see Riddy, 
“Text and Self in The Book of Margery Kempe.” I don’t think it necessary to take a firm perspective on 
authorship in order to investigate the underlying assumptions and theo-philosophical underpinnings at work 
in the text. I am not concerned with the question of authorial motive so much as the question of what, 
philosophically, plays out in it.  
 
233 As we shall see, Julian of Norwich instructs Margery about the explicit connection between “charyte” 





Whan sche cam in the chirch yerd of Seynt Stefyn, sche cryed, sche roryd, sche 
wept, sche fel down to the grownd, so fervently the fyer of lofe brent in hir hert. 
Sithyn sche ros up agen and went forth wepyng into the chirche to the hy awter, 
and ther sche fel down with boistows sobbyngys, wepyngys, and lowed cryes 
besyden the grave of the good vicary, al ravyschyd with gostly comfort in the 
goodnes of owr Lord that wrowt so gret grace for hys servawnt.234 
 
As soon as she enters the church yard, Margery is unable to quiet her reaction to the 
“spiritual comfort” that has “ravished” her. Seized by devotion, she “myth not mesuryn 
hir wepyng ne hir crying.”235 Inconsolable as she is, the people question the cause and 
purpose of Margery’s tears: “the pepil had gret merveyl of hir, supposyng that sche had 
wept for sum fleschly er erdly affeccyon.”236 The priests “charitefully led hir to a 
taverne” where a “certain lady” 237 desires to meet with her. Margery follows the lady to 
church, whereupon she views the “pete,” or pieta, and dissolves again into tears: 
And thorw the beholdyng of that pete hir mende was al holy ocupyed in the 
Passyon of owr Lord Jhesu Crist and in the compassion of owr Lady, Seynt Mary, 
be which sche [Margery] was compellyd to cryyn ful lowed and wepyn ful sor, as 
thei sche schulde a deyd.”238 
 
Again, Margery cries uncontrollably. In response to this display, a witnessing priest 
remarks wryly: “Damsel, Jhesu is ded long sithyn.”239 With the exception of the Lady, 
everyone who sees her weeping interprets it in human terms. Such emotion is either the 
result of some material loss or untimely because the event she bewails happened so long 
ago. No one seems to think the tears she sheds are the tears of devotion. 
                                                 
234 Kempe, Margery. The Book of Margery Kempe. Edited by Lynn Staley. Kalamazoo, MI: TEAMS, 1996, 
ll. 3475-80. 
 
235 Ibid., l. 3485. 
 
236 Ibid., ll. 3486-87. 
 
237 There is no critical explanation of this Lady’s identity. The Book only explains that she is a “certyn 
lady” of Norwich who wished to accompany Margery to dinner on the day of her visit. 
 
238 Ibid., ll. 3492-95. 
 




 Observing this scene in her essay “The Crucifix, the Pieta, and the Female 
Mystic: Devotional Objects and Performative Identity in The Book of Margery Kempe,” 
Laura Varnam argues that “Margery achieves…historical and spatial transcendence when 
she makes the death of Christ present in the contemporary time and space of the medieval 
church…Margery’s emotional performance has an important consequence in the 
Book.”240 For Varnam, this transcendence comes as a result of Margery’s ability to 
“mirror” Christ’s suffering and “appropriate” Mary’s sorrow by means of a calculated 
performance in view of an audience, the Lady, who “validates her identity as a holy 
woman.”241 According to Varnam, such validation is the purpose toward which Margery 
directs her “performance” of a “devotional event.” With regard to transcendence, 
Margery’s is merely an “achievement” of performance that directly contributes to her 
efforts of “self fashioning.”242 
Varnam’s analysis is one of many critical interpretations that suggest that 
identity-formation, performance and appropriation, and “transcendence” in terms of 
agency and gender roles are important themes in Margery’s Book. Under the broader 
notion of “self-fashioning,” the term coined by Stephen Greenblatt in Renaissance Self 
Fashioning, these readings make a number of assumptions about the role of agency, 
particularly female agency, and the role it plays in Margery’s narrative.243 Specifically, 
                                                 
240 Laura Varnam, “The Crucifix, the Pieta, and the Female Mystic: Devotional Objects and Performative 
Identity in The Book of Margery Kempe.” Journal of Medieval Religious Cultures 41.2 (2015), 225. 
 
241 Ibid., 224. 
 
242 Ibid., 208, 225. 
 
243 Greenblatt, Renaissance Self Fashioning, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. See especially, 
for our purposes, the Introduction to this dissertation. For examples of this work throughout the 1980s and 
90s, see Sarah Beckwith, “A Very Material Mysticism: the Medieval Mysticism of Margery Kempe,” in 




the notion of “self-fashioning” tends to dovetail with the Book’s many feminist readings, 
which unfailingly point up Margery’s “agency” within the narrative, her marriage, and 
medieval society.  
Yet despite Lynn Staley’s caution that to view the Book as a “pre-feminist 
manifesto” is to be “guided by our own communal values,” Margery still often appears as 
a figure desperate to create a sense of self outside the conventions of her time and 
place.244 Felicity Riddy, for instance, suggests that Margery was “trying to escape” the 
roles determined for her in the world.245 Even sympathetic readings of the Book propose 
“a conscious authorial strategy” that “modifies [devotional traditions] to suit her 
purposes.”246 Some see her knowingly develop a sense of agency through her “effort to 
fashion a distinctive form of spiritual authority.”247 Lisa Manter, for example, suggests 
that Margery “works within these identificatory parameters [of the Passion narrative] to 
create a fictional space where her desires are temporarily reconciled.”248 Such claims all 
                                                                                                                                                 
Brenner, “Margery Kempe and the Critics: Disempowerment and Deconstruction,” Sandra McEntire, 
“Journey into Selfhood: Margery Kempe and Feminine Spirituality,” and Janet Wilson, “Margery and 
Alison: Women on Top,” all three in Margery Kempe: A Book of Essays. Ed. Sandra McEntire. (New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1992); Caroline Walker Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender 
and the Human Body in Medieval Religion, (New York: Zone Books, 1991); Karma Lockrie, Margery 
Kempe and Translations of the Flesh, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991); and Lynn 
Staley, Margery Kempe’s Dissenting Fictions, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1994). This chapter, for the most part, shall cite more recent work, which reproduces the attitudes first 
established in the criticism of the 1990s, after Greenblatt’s seminal work appeared. 
 
244 Staley, Lynn, “Introduction,” The Book of Margery Kempe. (Kalamazoo, MI: TEAMS, 1996), 8. 
 
245 Riddy, “Text and Self in The Book of Margery Kempe,” 437. 
 
246 Williams, “Manipulating Mary,” 529. 
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posit Margery fashioning her self-identity by opposing the roles society and religion 
prescribed for women.249 As David Aers, who speaks for many others, puts it,  
for Margery…a major part of the struggle for a viable identity was inevitably 
against many of these definitions of [licit female identities] and against the 
traditional bonds of the nuclear family… Conformity with conventional female 
life goes against the grain of her own religious identity.250  
 
Margery confronts figures of authority in the community and “negotiates” a self: “The 
anguish and the cultural sources of her divisions are clear in Margery’s attempt to fashion 
an identity in accord with clerical versions of purity and sanctity.”251 More recent work 
has echoed this argument.252 
Yet even while Margery’s Book seems to reflect certain hallmarks of Greenblatt’s 
readings of Wyatt, Shakespeare, or More, framing Margery’s experience as self-
fashioning imports a notion of intentionality that the later English Middle Ages did not 
know.253 The language we have used to describe Margery’s Book—“strategy,” “fashion,” 
                                                 
249 See Greenblatt on “mobility,” in Renaissance Self Fashioning: “We should note in the circumstances of 
the sixteenth century on whom this study focuses a common factor that may help explain their sensitivity as 
writers to the construction of identity: they all embody, in one form or another, a profound mobility,” 7. On 
the “point of encounter” between alien and authority, see Greenblatt’s list of “governing conditions 
common to most instances of self-fashioning,” 9. 
 
250 Aers, Community, Gender, and Individual Identity, 98-99. 
 
251 Ibid., 96, 95. 
 
252 For instance, Jessica Rosenfeld refers to Margery’s desire to “transcend certain social ideals” as 
Margery’s ultimate motivation, see “Envy and Exemplarity in The Book of Margery Kempe,” Exemplaria 
26 (2014), 118. See also Christie, Sheila, “Extra-ordinary Woman: Teaching Female Agency in Margery 
Kempe and the York Play.” Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Teaching 21 (2014). 
 
253 See, for example, Nanda Hopenwasser, “A Performance Artist and Her Performance Text: Margery 
Kempe on Tour,” Performance and Transformation: New Approaches to Late Medieval Spirituality, ed. 
Mary Suydam and Joanna Ziegler. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999: “My analysis…based on my 
approach to performance theory, is eclectic for like Margery, I draw my inspiration from multiple 
traditions. I employ biological, psychological, anthropological, sociological, and mythic approaches, but 
primarily perceive the visionary act as an act of personal creation,” 99. For a helpful analysis of the critical 
reception of Margery’s text that accounts for “anxieties of the times,” see David Wallace, “Anchoritic 
Damsel: Margery Kempe of Lynn, c. 1373-1440,” in Strong Women: Life, Text, and Territory, Oxford: 





“create”—charge the text with meanings that are unavailable to Margery’s concept of the 
self. For The Book of Margery Kempe, we seem to allow ourselves interpretive liberties 
we have been cautioned not to take with Chaucer, Langland, or even with Julian of 
Norwich. 
The same can be said of readings that cast Margery’s “self-styled” saint-hood in 
terms of performance theory.254 As a critical lens, performance theory proposes that the 
female protagonist can have (at least, perceived) control over her identity.255 Framed 
within performance theory, this control manifests as Margery asserts herself through 
performances that enact “licit female identities.”256  
A number of scholars working in performance theory have in fact recently 
borrowed Aers’ notion of “viable identity,” which is itself imbued with Greenblatt’s 
mechanisms of self-fashioning. Drawing on Austin and Butler, these critics argue that 
Margery’s  actions were “identity-producing performances” that allowed her to 
participate in religious and social discourse “outside of ecclesiastical control” and to 
cross the gendered boundaries of marriage and motherhood.257 In Varnam’s reading these 
“identity-producing performances are especially important” because they “confirm 
[Margery’s] identity as a holy woman”:  
                                                 
254 See Varnam, “The Crucifix, the Pieta, and the Female Mystic.” This critical move judges Margery’s 
“fashioning,” simultaneously lauding her “agency” and also deriding her for daring to perform it. For “self-
styled sainthood,” see Gail McMurray Gibson, The Theater of Devotion: East Anglian Drama and Society 
in the Late Middle Ages (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1989), 64. Despite this quip, Gibson’s take on 
the cultural work of the Book is evenhanded compared to more blatant examples of the critical imposition 
of “self-fashioning” upon the Book. Hopenwasser makes the connection explicit in “A Performance Artist 
and Her Performance Text: Margery Kempe on Tour.” Calling Margery a “spiritual gadfly,” Hopenwasser 
argues that she is “a direct antecedent to the self-fashioners described by Stephen Greenblatt,” 98. 
 
255 See, for example, Williams, “Manipulating Mary,” 529-30. 
 
256 Aers, Community, Gender, and Individual Identity, 98-99. 
 





Gender identity is a ‘doing’ rather than a ‘being’; it is produced and constituted in 
the individual moment of performance. The same, I would argue, is true of 
religious identity, especially for a laywoman such as Margery Kempe, who, as a 
married mother of fourteen children, could not assert her piety and holiness in the 
traditional ways available to women in the period, that is, as a virgin, nun, or 
anchoress.258  
 
Varnam claims that religious identity works similarly to Butlerian gender identity, as a 
matter of “‘doing’ rather than ‘being’.” For Varnam, religious identity is a matter of 
performance, and Margery’s sense of self is inextricably tied to her ability to assert 
agency outside of the roles and expectations of a wife and mother in late medieval 
England. These performances and the agency they suppose is the “transcendence” to 
which Varnam refers as she interprets the above “crying scene.” Performance is the 
mechanism by which women achieve self-fashioning.  
Critically, we have assumed that the medieval conception of selfhood valued 
autonomous self-production as “real” selfhood in the ways that Greenblatt has shown in 
accounts of Early Modern figures like Wyatt and More.259 Varnam’s concluding remarks 
reveal this valuation plainly:  
Devotional events inspired by religious imagery function…as an opportunity not 
only for identity-producing performance but also for building female 
communities. Both accounts show how women can attain autonomy and come 
together in a community of female worshippers…For Margery Kempe, the 
opportunity offered by a performative response to devotional objects enables her 
to become a devotional mirror at the center of a female community that evades 
ecclesiastical control and renegotiates the location of sacred space itself.260   
                                                 
258 Varnam, “The Crucifix, the Pieta, and the Female Mystic,” 212. As we shall see, Margery recognizes 
that virginity is not the same as chastity, and her attempts to live chastely are not attempts to reclaim 
virginity.  
 
259 See, for example, Aers, David, Community, Gender, and Individual Identity, 98-99; Low, Anthony, 
Aspects of Subjectivity: Society and Individuality from the Middle Ages to Shakespeare and Milton. 
Medieval and Renaissance Literary Studies. Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 2003; and Little, 
Katherine C. Confession and Resistance: Defining the Self in Late Medieval England. Notre Dame, Ind.: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2006. 






Varnam lauds Margery’s ability to “produce” a selfhood via Butlerian performance 
theory, a performance that others could emulate through an autonomous agency that 
opposes ecclesiastical (male) control and creates a literal space in which she can be a self 
outside of it. This analysis invokes a substantial history of feminist criticism on medieval 
holy women, which has helped to outline the boundaries of female religiosity in the 
period from the High Middle Ages through the Reformation and has studied the 
development of female agency in the period.261 These studies express the reigning 
understanding of selfhood as an object to be owned, an affect to be performed. Margery’s 
achievement of agency, it would seem, is the end toward which medieval proto-feminism 
should strive.262  
Such notions, especially the ways in which we value the subjects who enact them 
are anachronistic, in large part because they hold that no subject has a self unless she has 
the power and ability to assert agency. For example, although Margery herself identifies 
as “the creature” throughout the text, Riddy rhetorically connects the identifier to her 
                                                 
261 These include Lochrie, Karma., McCracken, Peggy, and Schultz, James A. Constructing Medieval 
Sexuality. Medieval Cultures; v. 11. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997; Elliot, Dyan. 
"Flesh and Spirit: The Female Body." In Medieval Holy Women in the Christian Tradition, C. 1100-1500, 
13-46. Brepols Essays in European Culture. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2010; Elliott, Dyan. Proving 
Woman: Female Spirituality and Inquisitional Culture in the Later Middle Ages. Princeton, N.J.; Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2004; and Bynum, Caroline Walker. Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious 
Significance of Food to Medieval Women. New Historicism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1987. 
 
262 Sheila Christie argues, for example, that Margery’s sense of agency was likely bolstered by the 
characters of Mary Magdalen and the Virgin Mary in the York Corpus Christi Play: “while she 
demonstrates agency prior to seeing the [Corpus Christi] cycle, the cycle reflects and reaffirms Margery’s 
attitudes towards her own subjectivity and her authority to negotiate within the family unit.” However this 
argument is based on anachronistic assumptions vis a vis “women’s rights” in the York plays. Christie 
continues: “In other words, Margery is a case study in reception. Her perspectives and behavior suggest 
how female audience members might understand the York cycle, seeing it as an affirmation of women’s 
rights within a patriarchal dynamic and finding a reformation of women’s social position through Mary,” 




claim that Margery has a “limited self-understanding.”263 Lisa Manter comes to the 
opposite conclusion, but works under the same assumption. For Manter, “the success of 
her texts is the success of her identity negotiations.”264 In this regard, Margery’s selfhood 
is tenuous, as it depends upon the persuasiveness of her narrative. Margery and her text 
are what they do.265 
However, such readings come perilously close to participating in the patriarchal 
criticism of Margery’s peers who mocked her for aspiring to holy life even while she has 
so many children.266 They ironically affirm that “licit female identities” exist and are 
legitimately categorized and contained by the patriarchal imagination. Even sympathetic 
readers view her identity in terms of opposing “roles,” arranged teleologically in a 
progression from least to most “feminist.” Tara Williams, for example, frames this 
progression as a “spiritual career”:  
her first difficult childbirth leads to her first vision of Christ and ultimately to her 
life as a spiritual figure and author…Margery remains a mother and wife, but she 
                                                 
263 Riddy, “Text and Self in The Book of Margery Kempe,” 447. 
 
264 Manter, “The Savior of Her Desire,” 40, fn 2. In this footnote, Manter offers a thorough review of the 
feminist criticism on the Book for the decades between 1980 and 2000, noting an overwhelming consensus 
among feminist scholars who “regard her enterprise as ultimately flawed, the result of an overdetermined 
interaction of oppressive patriarchal structures and a subjugated female participant,” 40.  
 
265 To be clear, this is not an outcome Greenblatt intended. He is first to point out, in his introduction to 
Renaissance Self-Fashioning that his observations arise from linguistic shift: the word “fashion seems to 
have come into wide currency as a way of designating the forming of a self,” 2. Greenblatt argues that the 
rise of the term fashion is related to and dependent upon cultural and historical “control mechanisms, the 
cultural system of meanings that creates specific individuals by governing the passage from abstract 
potential to concrete historical embodiment,” 3.  
 
266 Compare, for example, Riddy’s skepticism of Margery as a holy figure with the response of a certain 
anchorite:  
Riddy quips, in “Text and Self in The Book of Margery Kempe,” that the Book “argues, conventionally, for 
the primacy of the contemplative life but, wholly unconventionally, locates that life in the born-again 
mother of fourteen children bellowing her way around Europe. As if.” 448. 
The anchorite, for his part, mocks Margery’s motherhood upon meeting her: “and askyd wher sche had don 
hir chylde the whech was begotyn and born whil sche was owte,” ll. 2419-20. Though Margery cannot 
respond to Riddy, she at least defends herself from the mockery of the anchorite, explaining, “I dede nevyr 




will redirect her domesticity and sexuality into an intimate relationship with 
Christ.267  
 
Thus, even while critics recognize a necessary simultaneity in Margery’s negotiation 
between roles, such readings assume the “replacement” or “renunciation” of one role for 
the other.268 Yet unlike her contemporary critics Margery saw herself as simultaneously 
holy woman, wife, and mother; the roles neither were opposed nor were her actions in 
any way the same as her identity.269 She didn’t “achieve” her “self”  by choosing between 
them. 
 To view episodes like the “crying scene” as singular “devotional events” that 
participate in “fashioning identity” removes them from their narrative context and 
overlooks the narrative’s self-conscious thematic concerns. These are, first, a view of 
reality that aligns culturally, theologically, and philosophically with the Augustinian 
paradox we have encountered in Wisdom and will see at play in Sir Gawain and the 
Green Knight. Additionally, as we have seen in Wisdom, The Book of Margery Kempe 
conceives of the self in terms of the soul’s participation in the highest degree of reality, 
that is, its likeness to Trinitarian relationality. Participation in God’s self-giving love is 
the means by which the soul reforms into original likeness, or what we will call in this 
                                                 
267 Williams. “Manipulating Mary,” 528, 533, 535. 
 
268 Ibid., 537-538. 
 
269 Margery isn’t the only medieval holy woman to be viewed in this way by critics. In an otherwise 
sympathetic reading of the Vita of St. Birgitta of Sweden, Jeannette Nieuwland consistently presents her 
roles as wife and mother as opposed to her spiritual life, as if the combination of motherhood and holiness 
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chapter, the fullness of personhood. For Margery, participation is a process toward full 
personhood that necessitates simultaneity where it isn’t “reasonable,” whether for 
contemporary or modern audiences. Like the jeweler in Pearl, we bristle at Margery’s 
self-proclaimed holiness. Yet her persistence in that process demonstrates what Christian 
personalists have called “transcendent autonomy,” which, as the Pearl explains, defies 
human reason. Within this frame, we attend to the theo-philosophical underpinnings of 
Margery’s world and begin to grasp her sense of selfhood.   
Margery attains her fullness of selfhood by degrees, which reflect the mode in 
which she participates in being by becoming like Christ. Rather than abandon her various 
social roles and responsibilities in the name of agency, she incorporates her social 
position, her marriage, and both her natural and spiritual motherhood into what might be 
called an incarnational spirituality. With Christ at the center of her identity, she begins to 
see her social and domestic roles as guides for participation in his mission. Christ directly 
intervenes in each of her “roles” and reorients them, “techyng” Margery the “wey” of 
caritas. The process described in her narrative, therefore, reflects a deeply personal 
selfhood based on her developing understanding of “ower Lord” as her model self. The 
more she reflects caritas in the world, the more she acts “in [her] propyr persoone.”270  
Transcendent Autonomy, Personhood, and Agency 
As in Wisdom, The Book of Margery Kempe consistently presents charity as the 
essential definition of God, particularly as she encounters him in the second person of the 
Trinity. Immediately in its preface, Margery frames the following narration as the result 
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of God’s “charitable movement of a sinful caitiff.” 271 Yet, for Margery, the concept of 
caritas as Christ is both practically and theoretically linked to the concept of person. 
Margery’s preface notes that God came to her as he came into the world: as the Savior 
“in hys propyr persoone.” 272 In practical terms, her use of the middle English word 
“persoune” immediately associates the notions of being and selfhood with Christ, who is 
the second person of the Trinity.273 This linguistic association has theoretical implications 
because in the medieval participatory imagination, the word “person” participates in the 
Trinitarian concept it signifies. For Margery, as for the playwright of Wisdom, the 
definition of “Cryst ower Savyowr in hys propyr persoone” automatically and 
inextricably links his Trinitarian personhood with self-giving and sacrificial love, or 
caritas.  
As a result, Margery’s sense of her own selfhood hinges on this notion of 
personality, that is, the capacity she has for acting in accordance with her God-given 
being. Specifically for Margery, as for Anima in Wisdom, human personality is fully 
realized when it participates in God’s selfhood, which is caritas. As we have seen in 
Wisdom, God’s grace enables the soul to accomplish this participation through a process 
of returning to its original likeness to God. The soul’s total self giving is its total self 
fulfillment. 
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This paradoxical process has been developed from Augustine and Aquinas by 
Christian personalists as the concept of “transcendent autonomy.” 274 Relying on its 
conceptual roots in classical and scholastic thought, it frames the concept of selfhood 
within a world-view that acknowledges original likeness, or what John Crosby has called 
“ontological nobility,” as a given. More specifically, the development of the personalist 
concept of “transcendent autonomy” is firmly grounded in the Augustinian concept of 
reality we have observed in Wisdom: it acknowledges God as reality itself, and the human 
person as free—through caritas—to transcend itself into God’s reality. Through Aquinas, 
personalists articulate this freedom to transcend as “personal acting,” or freely willed acts 
that accord with Aquinas’ understanding of personal “nature,” or “value.” I will unfold 
these ideas more thoroughly in the latter half of this chapter. Before I do, however, I will 
examine how Margery navigates between the reality of her social world and reality she 
knows through her mystical experience in ways that reveal her understanding that the 
former is not separate from but fulfilled by the latter.  
Margery’s tearful reaction to the pieta in fact previews a set of assumptions about 
reality. Specifically, the scene unfolds from two contrasting perspectives. On the one 
hand, the people around Margery and, later, the priest, expect that Margery’s tears result 
from her grief over the death of the vicar, Richard Caister, who was recently buried. 
Supposing that she was weeping for him, Margery’s witnesses “had gret merveyl of hir, 
supposyng that sche had wept for sum fleschly er erdly affeccyon.”275 To them, her tears 
are excessive, but they recognize the real and necessary cause of her grief to be the death 
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of a beloved priest. For the witnessing priest, they reflect too great an attachment to the 
man himself or to the time they spent together; why else cry for a man who now is surely 
blessed in heaven? 
Margery, on the other hand, experiences the situation from another point of view: 
her emotion is, perhaps, excessive from the perspective of a reality dulled by separation 
from God. However, Margery’s narration shows a second cause for her tears that 
transcends “fleshly or worldly affection.” She betrays no self-consciousness of her tears 
because she does not share the reality through which her onlookers understand the event. 
Even while she grieves the vicar’s death, Margery says she is “ravyschyd with gostly 
comfort.” Indeed, her gratitude and “holy thowtys” for the vicar render her unable to 
“mesuryn hir wepyng ne hir crying.”276 Her tears express the joy and spiritual comfort 
she experienced through the vicar’s good works in her life, having “many tymes herd hir 
confession…and ministryd to hir the precyows sacrament of the awter.”277 This 
simultaneous and overwhelming emotional response of both grief and joy is paralleled by 
her juxtapositional framing of opposites throughout the scene. In this second perspective, 
Margery’s inability to “measure” her tears is a sure sign of unity with God, which she 
expresses as a visible sign of the “the fyer of lofe brent in hir hert.”278 Both grief and joy 
are expressed through tears, which themselves signify a “fire of love.” The contrasting 
realities of Margery’s uncontrollable wailing in front of a simple statue, on the one hand, 
and her experience of unity with God, on the other, expresses the difference between the 
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soul’s knowledge of God’s love and its experience of it. Margery’s experience of God’s 
love—that is, reality itself—through “spiritual comfort” compels her to act, even if her 
action cannot be justified by the logic of earthly reality.   
Formally, the text compresses the contrasting experiences of Margery and her 
witnesses such that the reader experiences both simultaneously; the narrative carefully 
illustrates that her witnesses exist in such a different reality in the moment that they 
completely misinterpret the cause of her tears. As Margery professes repeatedly 
throughout the Book, her purpose is to make the reader see that reality, to “undyrstondyn 
the hy and unspecabyl mercy of ower sovereyn Savyowr Cryst Jhesu.”279  
At the end of the scene, this sense of double reality intensifies as Margery 
experiences the Lord’s passion “thorw the beholding of that pete [in] hir mende.”280 
Again, Margery momentarily participates in a reality that starkly contrasts the experience 
of onlookers, prompting her to “wepyn ful sor, as thei sche schulde a deyd.”281 Though 
the priest seems unable to join her in that reality, the Lady is convinced of Margery’s 
“exampyl.” She affirms Margery’s momentary rapture and weeping as a direct result of, 
as she says, “the grace that God werkyth in hir sowle.”282 The Lady recognizes Margery’s 
affect as the result of God’s supernatural and self-giving grace.  
 Within the larger narrative context, the scene pivots within Margery’s ongoing 
devotion to Mary through adoration of the pieta. Yet as we shall see, Margery’s tears and 
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transcendence are not merely an imitation, nor “appropriation” of Mary’s sorrow.283 They 
are instead the embodied effects of her participation in God’s being and they express her 
sense that her own selfhood is grounded in that being. Despite consistent negative 
reactions to her “excessiveness,” Margery’s experience of God’s reality provides a 
fulfillment and “bliss” she cannot find in the world. Rather than viewing holiness as an 
end in and of itself, Margery recognizes holiness is “the wey” to communion with God. 
Accordingly, terms that have become common in discourses of medieval selfhood 
must be reframed with attention to the underlying theo-philosophical structures and 
paradigms in which Margery’s Book was written. A particular conception of self and 
being is at work in The Book of Margery Kempe that is similar to the concept of selfhood 
I have shown operates in Wisdom. 284 This deeply integrative view orders the proper 
relationship between doing and being as a ground for self-knowledge, self-determination, 
and indeed, one’s relationship of likeness to God. Being determines performance, rather 
than the other way around. A soul determines its selfhood not by asserting its agency but 
by conforming its actions so that they express its ontological origin in God, who created 
it.285 And, whereas performativity conceives the self as the center around which events 
and objects are to be interpreted, ritual invites the self to participate in the center of 
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reality, who is God, by means of events and objects, which are sacramentum.286 Indeed, 
for Margery, ritual is participation in the highest degree of reality, whether liturgical or 
sacramental, whether affective or meditative, and whether prayer or contemplation. 
Accordingly, the concept of agency needs to be considered within the context of 
medieval philosophical explanations of how free will works in conjunction with reason to 
align the self with God’s reality.  
An earlier encounter in Norwich shows how Margery’s discourse with both the 
“White Frer,” Wyllyam Sowthfeld, and Julian function within a world view based on this 
ordered paradigm of reality and experience. The white friar in particular simply assumes 
that a properly ordered relationship between doing and being reflects the soul’s 
participation in the highest reality. Margery first visits him to “wetyn yf sche wer 
dysceyved be any illusions or not.”287 She wants to know whether or not her mystical 
experiences are genuine, whether they are real or whether they are deceptions of the 
devil. The text closely ties Margery’s concern with the reality of her mystical experience 
to her actions in the world, including “preyers,” “comfort,” and her “maner of levyng.”288 
Her concern, therefore, is two-fold: first, do her mystical experiences belong to God’s 
reality or the deceptions and “illusions” of the devil? And, second, does her active life 
participate in God’s reality or the devil’s non-being? The friar responds to her query by 
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arguing that her deeds, in part because they benefit the community, are the result of the 
“Holy Gost werkyng plenyouwsly hys grace in yowr sowle.”289 He counsels that Margery 
can be confident that her mystical experience and its extension in her active life both bear 
fruit because they participate in God’s grace.  
To the friar it seems obvious that the state of Margery’s soul, infused with God’s 
grace and love, causes her acting, not the other way around. For him, it is impossible to 
consider that she could perform holiness without first being holy. Since God “dwellyth 
not in a body soget [subject] to syn,” he encourages Margery to “receyvyn the gyftys of 
God,” which he goes on to equate with “hys mercy.”290 As in Wisdom, God’s self-gift of 
mercy is his dwelling in the soul, and the concept of soul as God’s dwelling grounds the 
understanding of selfhood as the mutual relation of being one with God. Citing Isaiah, the 
friar biblically reinforces his point: “Owyr Lord seyth himself, ‘My spyrit schal restyn 
upon a meke man, a contrite man, and dredyng my wordys.’”291 God’s preferred dwelling 
is the soul of the person whose actions in the world mirror his self-giving love. God asks 
via the prophet: “qui est iste locus quietis meae? [Who will be my resting place?].” His 
answer in the next verse: “ad quem autem respiciam [this is the man to whom I will 
look.”292 The friar’s paraphrase may flatten Isaiah’s force, but the ontological assumption 
underpinning his words to Margery is clear: God will not rest in a place, but in the soul of 
a person who is meek and contrite and who has made herself a proper place for him to 
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dwell. This kind of relationship between God and the soul is bound to bear fruit both in 
the community and within the soul itself.  
Margery’s encounter with the white friar foreshadows Julian’s response to a 
similar inquiry. Once again, Margery is “deeply concerned about the legitimacy of her 
grace.”293 She presents her mystical experiences to the anchoress, “for the ankres was 
expert in swech thyngys and good cownsel cowd gevyn.”294 Margery explains that she 
feels 
the grace that God put in hir sowle of compunccyon, contricyon, swetnesse and 
devocyon, compassion with holy meditacyon and hy contemplacyon, and ful 
many holy spechys and dalyowns that owyr Lord spak to hir sowle, and many 
wonderful revelacyons.295  
 
In response, Julian advises that Margery should be less concerned with the authenticity of 
her experience than with its degree of reality. These are two different concepts for Julian, 
and the latter has ultimate consequences for the soul. Julian’s counsel reflects the exact 
language used in Wisdom to describe the soul as the “sete of God,” affirming that 
Margery’s “mornynggs and wepyngs” are “tokenys” of God’s presence within her.296 She 
advises that the more Margery “hath thes tokenys,” the more she must “stedfastlych 
belevyn that the Holy Gost dwellyth in [hir] sowle.”297 Julian explains that the question is 
not whether Margery’s spiritual experience is legitimate, but whether it is real. 
Legitimacy is a standard of men, while reality is determined by God. Julian reasons: “The 
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Holy Gost mevyth nevyr a thing ageyn charite, and, yf he dede, he wer contraryows to 
hys owyn self, for he is al charite.”298 As in Wisdom, Julian knows that God dwells within 
the soul that receives his grace and it is that indwelling caritas that shapes and legitimates 
its actions. 
Julian also differentiates various degrees of reality and relates them to the kinds of 
experience Margery might have. Her guidance provides a spiritual and philosophical 
basis for Margery to distinguish that which is “ageyn the worshep of God and profyte of 
hir evyn cristen” from “rygth feyth and the rygth beleve.”299 Significantly, Julian affirms 
that both are possible and perhaps sensible experiences, but only the latter is “good” and 
“real.” For Julian, God and the devil “schal nevyr dwellyn togedyr in on [one] place”: the 
further one gets from God, the less one participates in his reality.300  
For precisely this reason, Julian explicitly warns Margery against giving way to 
“doubleness”: “a dubbyl man in sowle is evyr unstabyl and unstedfast in al hys weys.”301 
The anchoress counsels Margery to recognize and adhere to “rygth,” the reality not 
shared by “pepyl [who] slawndryd hir, not levyng it was the werke of God but that sum 
evyl spyrit vexed hir in hir body.”302 Margery begins to realize that as she allows God to 
“dwell” in her soul, she dwells less in the “langage of the world.”  
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Nevertheless, Julian implores Margery to have patience with her experience in the 
world and bear it as “necessary unto yow for in that schal ye kepyn yowr sowle.”303 
Forbearance with the removed reality of worldly experience is the mark of her own self-
possession. Rather than succumb to the language of the world, Margery must dispose 
herself to receive God’s gifts and “tremble at his word.”304 If God dwells within 
Margery’s soul, and her mystical experience originates in communion with the Logos, 
then the words she exchanges “in her mind” with Jesus are the Word that alone “Is.”  
Margery’s experiences with the pieta and her encounters in Norwich show that 
she could access an onto-theological sense of reality and the soul, even as a lay, illiterate 
woman.305 And, significantly, this specific understanding of reality is not only “in her 
mynde,” but also culturally present in the teachings of those she encounters socially.306 
The narrative affirms three general conclusions about the nature of reality that guide her 
concept of selfhood throughout: first, that her experiences may legitimately reflect 
different degrees of reality; second, that her sense of communion with Jesus in their 
“dalliance”—and in her suffering loneliness and rejection—is itself participation in the 
highest reality; and third, that when her soul participates in his reality, it becomes a fit 
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“dwelling” for the Lord. In these scenes, Margery expresses concern for her own 
legitimacy, not in terms of “self-styling,” but in terms of the relation between her 
experiences and objective reality. She and her confidants simply presume the Augustinian 
paradigm of ordered reality and the place of the self within that order. Their judgements 
on Margery’s spiritual legitimacy proceed from that premise.  
Transcendent Autonomy and the Fullness of Personhood 
Early in the Confessions, Augustine recognizes a sense of dialecticism of 
selfhood. He describes wrestling with the knowledge that while “he bears about him the 
mark of death, the sign of his own sin…still he is a part of your creation.”307 Two selves 
emerge here, and Augustine proclaims that they abide simultaneously within the person. 
This simultaneity is an internal tension; it is the “dubbyl” self that Julian warns Margery 
to guard against.308 Her warning voices Augustine’s opening argument from the 
Confessions: “he cannot be content unless he praises you, because you made us for 
yourself and our hearts find no peace until they rest in you.”309 To reach God’s peace, 
Margery understands that she will always be poised between her striving to attain her 
original self and the fallen self who lives in the fallen world. Her selfhood must take in 
both; it will be marked by fluidity, simultaneity, and transition.  
Accordingly, Margery frames her Book within an understanding of this dialectic 
selfhood. In the preface, she explains what is, perhaps, her thesis: “this creatur which 
many yerys had gon wl and evyr ben unstable was partythly drawen and steryd to entren 
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the wey of hy perfecyon.”310 Margery shows awareness that her journey to “perfection” 
depends on Christ’s “example.” Further, she explains her responsibility to respond with 
participation in mutual charity: “Alle the werkys of ower Saviowr ben for ower exampyl 
and instruccyon, and what grace that he werkyth in any creatur is ower profyth yf lak of 
charyte be not ower hynderawnce.”311 Perfection, in other words, is realized by getting 
out of her own way—by allowing God’s grace to direct her toward caritas and away 
from fallenness.  
Within Margery’s framing of dialectic selfhood, agency remains the prerequisite 
for selfhood, but the free agent is “fre to God.”312 Freedom correlates to an authentic 
selfhood which, for Margery, is enabled by the freedom to act in charity. Freedom “to 
God” resolves the internal tension between the ideal, ontologically original self and its 
fallen counter-self. The capacity one has for this true freedom is an understanding of 
agency that personalists have developed as the concept of personality. That is, the 
condition or quality of being a person is the capacity one has to act in accordance with 
one’s given original likeness or “value.” The actions taken by the soul that accord with 
value indicate what personalists have called “transcendent autonomy,” that is, the free 
agency of the will to transcend itself by means of participation in God’s reality. 
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The notion of transcendent autonomy is fundamental to Margery’s self-concept. It 
is a notion founded in classical and scholastic ontological thought—the heart of medieval 
philosophy—which personalists reconcile and develop. Reframing God’s reality as 
“absolute value,” they draw a through-line from Augustine to Thomas Aquinas. Through 
this development, personalists synthesize Augustine’s “degrees of reality” with Thomistic 
thought on the distinction of Goods, especially the concept of bonum.313 Yet as we have 
seen in Wisdom, the concept of transcendent autonomy is already at work via the 
medieval paradigm of epistemological and ontological truth. Margery’s Book articulates a 
lived example of this paradigm. 
Personalists further develop their synthesis of Augustinian and Thomist thought to 
distinguish between Aquinas’ bonum and their concept of value:  
Is value just a new term expressing what Thomas meant by bonum? No, value 
expresses an absolute goodness, or goodness in itself, whereas bonum expresses a 
relational goodness, a goodness that is for someone (this is why Thomas says that 
bonum always involves some respectum ad aliud).314   
 
So, while bonum is a higher good than the merely agreeable or pleasurable, it “lacks that 
absoluteness (goodness in itself) that distinguishes value.”315 Bonum must always be 
understood as relational goodness, not goodness inherent in the thing itself. This 
distinction becomes essential to our understanding of Margery’s desire for chastity.  
One realizes transcendent autonomy when the will, recognizing the difference 
between relational and absolute good, freely chooses bonum and, even better, value, the 
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inherent good in an object over what may be pleasurable or agreeable in it.316 Further, the 
action resulting from that choice recognizes the absolute good for its own sake, and not 
because it is a benefit to the subject. The choice personalizes the soul that makes it 
because, like Christ’s caritas, they realize their own nature by bringing it into accord with 
their ontological reality. Personalists call this condition the “dignity” and “value” of 
personal being. Personal action depends upon freedom (as opposed to license), which 
stems from one’s “ontological nobility,” the inherent and absolute value of the person.317 
In short, the fully personal human being strives to live according to her given ontological 
value through a proper use of her freedom to choose the Good. Transcendent autonomy 
elevates the human creature, who is perhaps unaware of her value and subject to mere 
pleasure, to human person, who is detached from pleasure and free to choose bonum and 
value. The person values herself by valuing others for the good that is in them. For this 
reason, Crosby marks transcendent autonomy as the highest aspiration of the human 
being and the fullest expression of her personhood.318 
Personality and transcendence are therefore inseparable, as Dietrich von 
Hildebrand argues: ontologically, transcendence marks fullness of being. Additionally, he 
suggests that a participatory paradigm is fundamental to the relationship between being 
and acting:  
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the specifically personal character of man as a subject manifests itself in his 
capacity to transcend himself. This transcendence displays itself above all in 
participation in the objective logos of being.319 
 
The objective logic of our being—Crosby’s “ontological nobility”—paradoxically arises 
from participation in the reality that exists outside of ourselves. Being, in other words, is 
God-givenness and the fullest expression of human selfhood is participation in that 
givenness. Crosby clarifies: 
What a value calls for from me is not my self-affirmation performed with 
reference to the value, but rather affirmation of the value for its own sake. And 
yet it remains true that the demands which the world of value makes of us do not 
inflict heteronomy on us, but rather engender the deepest personal life of which 
we are capable.320 
 
Here, both Hildebrand and Crosby develop the longstanding Augustinian claim that God 
is nearer to me than I am to myself: intimeor intimo meo.321 In a personalist reading, the 
very subjectivity of humans to God is, paradoxically, the key to their capacity for 
transcendence. This transcendence, which issues in the form of personal acts, constitutes 
the fullness of personhood.  
For personalists, as well as for Margery, choosing subjectivity to value is non-
threatening and non-oppressive because value is the goodness inherent to the person and 
knit into her very being. Being one with God does not, as Crosby says, “inflict 
heteronomy” on the person as she confronts the demands of the world; he offers goodness 
as a gift of his own reality in the creative act.322 Value, then, is “a goodness that persons 
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have in themselves”; it is how we cooperate with our inherent goodness. In this way, for 
Crosby, “we possess ourselves in transcending ourselves towards value.”323  
Hildebrand extends the point, echoing what we have seen in Wisdom and in 
Margery’s encounter with the white friar, by considering the relationship between doing, 
being, and reality: “This kind of participation is absolutely impossible for any impersonal 
being.”324 The capacity for personal acting, in other words, and one’s disposition toward 
one’s own value is the result of personal being, not vice versa.325 This idea insists on a 
participatory, not performative, relationship between doing and being. Hildebrand gives 
the Augustinian argument a Thomistic slant by proposing that as the soul grows 
increasingly like God, so a person comes to her fullest autonomy by her increasing  
transcendent participation in the good. 326 For both Hildebrand and Crosby, the good is 
accessible only because the soul has a specific personal capacity for participation granted 
by its God-given likeness to the Trinity. Grace enables the transcendence that confers 
selfhood on the being that properly values the good.   
A close look at Margery’s negotiations with her husband John on the subject of 
chastity demonstrates her sense of a dialectical selfhood and transcendent autonomy. The 
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traditional view of Margery’s embrace of chastity sees it as an attempt to create space for 
self-making by “freeing” herself from patriarchal authority. In fact, Margery’s campaign 
for chastity does not arise from a desire to be free from her husband, nor is the product of 
the trauma she experiences in childbirth. It is the outgrowth of an ecstatic vision in which 
she realizes the paleness of her earthly experience in comparison to the bliss of heaven. 
As she lay in bed with John, she unexpectedly  
herd a sownd of melodye so swet and delectable, hir thowt, as sche had ben in 
paradise…Thys melody was so swete that it passyd alle the melodye that evyr 
might be herd in this world wythowtyn ony comparyson.327  
 
The moment causes her to weep and sigh “aftyr the blysse of heven” any time she hears 
earthly music because it immediately brings to mind the contrast between the sounds she 
hears on earth and the “myrth and the melodye that was in heven.” 328 Margery’s 
bedroom is the place where she first inhabits two worlds at once. It is where she first 
moves away from the world and toward union with the transcendent reality of Jesus.  
Margery’s response to her vision is to talk to everyone about it, starting with John. 
She emphasizes the difference between her fallen experience and the fullness of joy in 
heaven: “sche styrt owt of hir bedde and seyd, ‘Alas, that evyr I dede synne, it is ful mery  
in hevyn.’”329 Overcome by the “myrth that is in hevyn,” Margery “cowd not wyl 
restreyn hyrself fro the spekyng therof.”330 The people she speaks to “wer wroth wyth hir 
for sche wold not her no speke of wordly thyngys as thei dedyn and as sche dede 
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beforntyme.”331 She acts, that is to say, to bring herself into accord with the truth of what 
has been revealed to her.  
Margery’s experience of contrast brings into relief the dissimilitude of her actions 
to God’s reality. Margery is compelled to act differently as a result, and this is the 
impetus for her negotiation with John for chastity. Indeed, she reports: “aftyr this time, 
sche had nevyr desyr to komown fleschly wyth hyr husbonde.”332 While she consents to 
relations out of obedience, she states the explicit reason for seeking chastity: that “the 
lofe of myn hert and myn affeccyon is drawyn fro alle erdly creaturys and sett only in 
God.”333  She does not want to free herself from John, for marriage is a sacrament, nor 
does she resist carnal relations; in fact, she admits that she continued to struggle with 
lust.334 Instead, the desire for chastity results directly from the suddenly stark contrast 
between earthly “comowning” and spiritual communion. At this point of contrast, 
Margery views the “bliss of heaven” as an end, reality, and value. In relation to the 
absolute value of heaven, Margery perceives chastity as a means by which she can 
“entren the wey whech wold leden hir to the place that sche most desyred.”335 Chastity, in 
other words, is a bonum, a good which relates to the value of heaven.  
Put another way, Margery begins to recognize relationality to—and specifically a 
sense of communion with—Christ as the ultimate end of her sexual desire. This does not 
mean that Margery sexually desires Christ, but that sexual desire is a sacramentum of 
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spiritual communion with God. Rather than breaking with the “identity” created by her 
role as wife, Margery’s desire for communion with Jesus allows her to use wifehood as a 
model for fostering a relationship with him. As a model, marriage is not a burden but a 
bonum that assists her self-formation. Incorporating wifehood as a model for self-giving, 
Margery negotiates chastity as a “riȝt” and just gift of herself to Christ.  
In this way, Margery’s early desire to be “free to God” expresses freedom in the 
personalist sense. Freedom from her husband is not the final objective; it is instead the 
means of detachment from partial goods that makes her available to form her self 
according to value. Margery distinguishes the notion of selfhood from “wifeness,” and in 
doing so she does not reject her identity, but realizes it. Using marriage as a model for 
self-formation to Christ, Margery both embraces and transcends “wifeness” toward the 
ultimate end of wifehood, which is to be in communion with him, the biblical 
“Bridegroom.” Ultimately, Margery brings her earthly marriage and her sexuality under 
the “right order” of things: they come second, as earthly music is second to that of 
heaven. 
When John falls ill near the end of Book I, Margery shows how this rightly 
ordered model of a self-giving marriage brings her closer to understanding her selfhood 
in relation to Christ. John is “passing” sixty years of age; he suffers a fall down the stairs 
and thereafter becomes incontinent and “childish” and can no longer live on his own. 
Margery, for her part, is afraid to be held responsible for his death, since they are living 




lettyd [hindered] fro hir contemplacyon,” she asks Jesus to let John live for one year so 
that she will “be deliveryd owt [of] slawndyr.” 336  
Jesus agrees to perform the miracle and let him live, but not for the reasons she 
has requested. Instead, Jesus bids Margery to “take hym hom and kepe hym for my 
lofe.”337 When she protests that she won’t have enough time for contemplation, his 
response reminds her that marriage is a sacramentum of her spiritual devotion to him: 
“thu hast seyd many tymys that thu woldist fawyn [gladly] kepyn me. I prey the now kepe 
hym for the lofe of me.”338 Jesus requires her to take care of John, to practice charity 
toward her earthly husband, because this “wifely duty” to him is an extension of His 
caritas to her. He commands Margery to “helpyn hym in hys need at hom as yyf thu wer 
in chirche to makyn thi preyerys.”339 Wife to John and bride to Jesus are made one 
through caritas, even as Margery’s active and contemplative life are united in Jesus’ 
command that she must “geve [him] not ellys but lofe.”340 
Margery does not think of herself as occupying different social identities; Jesus 
explicitly teaches that to embrace “wifeness” will be to embrace both its earthly and 
spiritual senses. In fact, the earlier contrast between earthly and heavenly realities is now 
reconciled through charity. Though she says “hir labowr [was] mech the mor” (l. 4285), 
“she was glad…and toke it mech the mor esily and servyd hym and helpyd hym…as sche 
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wolde a don Crist hymself.”341 From Margery’s perspective, the duties of an earthly 
wife’s self-giving love toward an ailing husband prepare her soul and fulfill her 
formation to original selfhood. In the same sense that “charyte” unites Anima to Christ in 
Wisdom, Margery’s charitable care for John forms her in Christ’s image and unites her to 
him as spouse. 
Further, John’s illness occasions the narrative’s explicit claim about personhood. 
Margery notes the many ways in which John becomes a burden. He “turnyd childisch 
agen and lakkyd reson that he cowd not don hys owyn esement to gon to a sege.”342 
Incapable of caring for himself, John loses all sense of personal and bodily autonomy. 
Margery is alarmed because her house-hold labor becomes “meche the mor in waschyng 
and wryngyng,” which prevents her from contemplation.343 But Jesus reminds her that 
John “hath sumtyme fulfillyd thi wil and my wil bothe,” and Margery also “bethowt hir 
how sche in hir yong age” had loved him.344 Indeed, she had “ful many delectabyl 
thowtys, fleschly lustys, and inordinate lovys to hys persone.”345 Margery remembers the 
person he was before illness and concludes that she “was glad to be ponischyd wyth the 
same persone and toke it mech the more esily.”346 As she remembers her response to “hys 
persone,” she realizes that his incapacity has enabled her to turn the sexual lust into a 
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higher form of love of “the same persone,” even in his “childisch” state. The good she 
loves in John’s personhood is grounded in the goodness of the love she bears Jesus. 
Moreover, Margery loves him personally; she acts in a manner befitting her own 
personhood by treating John with the charitable care and love that befits his inherent 
personhood. In the process of caring for him, and in fulfilling the will of Jesus, Margery 
treats him as worthy of caritas for his own sake, rather than a means to her own holiness. 
As in the very beginning of the narrative, Margery uses the word “person” to mean not 
simply “man,” but being. She does not say, “she loved him,” but instead that she had 
“pleasing thoughts, physical lust, and extraordinary love to his person.” This peculiar 
phrasing suggests she understands his being transcends his physical and mental ailments, 
that he is worthy of charity according to the value he has through Jesus, in whom the 
goodness of personhood resides. John is the “same person” who is valuable in and of 
himself before and after his illness; Margery’s charitable service transcends her 
“punishment” and personalizes both John and herself by recognition of that value. She 
shows, in Crosby’s words, “respect for persons as ends in themselves,” serving him “as 
sche wolde a don Crist hymself.”347     
With this is mind, we should view Margery’s relationship with John, and 
especially the way she negotiates for chastity, within the much broader bounds of 
Margery’s onto-theological understanding of the world. We need to remember, for 
instance, that her desire to be chaste fulfills an earlier covenant she has made with Jesus 
when he first “ravished her spirit” and instructed Margery to “boldly call [him] Jesus, thy 
                                                 





love.”348 To do so, Jesus gives her a set of “commands”: she is to do away with the “hayr 
upon [her] bakke” and “forsake that [which she] lovyst best in this world, and that is 
eytyng of flesch.”349 By no longer punishing herself, by giving up her favorite fare, Jesus 
says, she will grow closer to him, eventually joining him in the “blysse of hevyn.”350 
These renunciations are not at all a means by which she will claim “freedom” 
from the “conventional female life” or claim agency in opposition to “licit female roles.” 
When Jesus requires Margery to fast from eating flesh, he is not merely asking her to go 
hungry as a performance of self-mortification. Rather, he explicitly directs her to replace 
her literal act of eating meat with the incarnational act of consuming him: “instead of that 
flesch, thow schalt etyn my flesch and my blod, that is the very body of Crist, in the 
sacrament of the awter.”351 By fasting, that is, by detaching her desire from her favorite 
food, she takes a first step in making herself available to Jesus. By taking communion, 
what she has given up is replaced tenfold. Meat becomes the body and blood of Jesus, 
who took on flesh to redeem mankind.   
As Margery discovers how to live her earthly and spiritual life simultaneously, 
her narrative reveals a significant underlying assumption about the relationship, which we 
have seen in Wisdom, between the sacramentum and the res. When Margery negotiates 
with John for her chastity, one of John’s conditions is that she eat with him on Fridays, 
traditionally a day on which the devout abstain from meat. But this condition would put 
her chastity into conflict with another of Jesus’ commands. She reacts strongly, citing 
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Jesus’ command for her to abstain from meat: “‘Nay ser,’ sche seyd, ‘to breke the Fryday 
I wyl nevyr yow whyl I leve.’”352 In face of John’s threat to “medyl” her again, she 
consults with Jesus. Jesus reiterates that her fasting from “eating flesch” is instrumentally 
connected to her “fasting” from the consummation of flesh in her sexual relationship with 
John. He releases her from the vow against meat because the fast was never an end but a 
means: “my derworthy dowtyr, this was the cawse that I bad the fastyn for thu shuldyst 
the sonar opteyn and getyn thi desyr [for chastity in your marriage].”353 Her participation 
in the symbolic fast from eating meat was all along in service of the more meaningful fast 
from the “marriage dette.”  
Eating meat in this exchange is double-valent: Jesus’ command to fast from eating 
meat reorients the meaning of “receiving the body.” Both participate in embodiedness, 
consummation, carnality, and both are merely symbolic of Margery’s ultimate destiny: 
marriage to Christ. Each is a foretaste of the “blisse” of the heavenly banquet, itself a 
metaphor for union with God. They are, in fact, sacramentum of different degrees, which 
imitate the ultimate sacramentum of the Eucharist. And the body received in the 
Eucharist participates in the res, which is the full union of flesh and spirit in Christ in 
heaven. Step by step, through the parallel means of fasting and chastity, Jesus prepares 
Margery to receive him as her true spouse.  
To get a clearer picture of what this means, we can view Jesus’ re-orientation of 
consummation alongside a parallel scene from Augustine’s Confessions. When Augustine 
theorizes sin as a “land of unlikeness,” he too experiences a command to re-order his 
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concept of consumption: “I heard your voice calling from on high, saying ‘I am the food 
of full-grown men. Grow and you shall feed on me. But you shall not change me into 
your own substance, as you do with the food of your body. Instead you shall be changed 
into me.’”354 Here, God transfigures the concept of food, by turning physical digestion 
into spiritual nourishment. With physical food, Augustine is the “center” in the event of 
consummation: the food becomes part of his substance, his self. But God decentralizes 
Augustine’s self in the event of consuming spiritual food. Spiritual food re-orients the 
process of consumption. Augustine finds his selfhood depends on God’s self-giving 
presence in him as God becomes the center of Augustine’s self.  
Jesus’ commands to Margery, which transmute literal food into spiritual food, and 
physical union into spiritual union, reveal that she is, ontologically, his bride. In other 
words, Margery’s spiritual marriage with Jesus fulfills the sacramentum of her earthly 
marriage. Jesus transfigures her earthly experience by becoming the center of her 
selfhood. For Margery, union with God reconciles the self’s dialecticism; spiritual union 
enables her to act upon her proper ontology. In this communion Margery discovers the 
fullness of personhood, which turns her worldly desire for the infinite toward the actual 
infinite and converts her previous lust and vanity into hunger for Jesus, whose mercy 
satisfies all desires.355  
Personal Selfhood and Simultaneity 
This strange and otherworldly conception of selfhood belies an association of 
identity with social roles and “fashioning.” Margery’s selfhood isn’t fashioned, but given 
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and learned through God’s mercy. The center of her self-concept rejects categorization, 
though not as a proto-feminist strategy. Rather, Margery’s rejection of categories results 
from her understanding that selfhood is not socially constructed but an ontological 
principle determined by reality itself. 
This principle, which runs from Augustine, through Boethius and Aquinas to 20th 
century personalist thought, explains the famous scene in which Jesus tells Margery that 
he “lofe wyfes also.”356 Critics have presented the interchange as a signal example of 
Margery’s self-authorization as earthly wife and holy woman. 357 In fact, Christ offers this 
revelation on wives in the service of a fairly typical and plainly orthodox doctrine on the 
relationship between God’s mercy and human existence. God’s self-giving mercy makes 
a person who she is by reforming her fallen nature so that, if free, it can accord with 
heavenly “ryght.” Jesus’ affirmation that “I lofe the as wel as any mayden in the world,” 
prefaces his larger point: “of unworthy I make worthy, and of sinful I make rytful.”358 
Jesus can love Margery as well as any virgin because her very being, as much as any 
other’s, is the result of his merciful love in the first place. God’s self-giving and relational 
personhood loves the human creature into the fullness of being.359 
In other words, Christ’s ability to “love wives also” allows Margery to understand 
the theological underpinning of her selfhood. She sees herself simultaneously from 
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earthly and heavenly perspectives; she is Margery, the daughter of Eve, and Margery the 
bride of Christ. Indeed, the dialectic that joins and orders these elements of her 
personhood reflect the being of the God who communicates with Margery “sumtyme the 
Secunde Persone in Trinyte; sumtyme alle thre Personys in Trinyte and o substawns in 
Godhede.”360 We often attend to Margery’s experience with Jesus, the second Trinitarian 
person, but Margery’s mystical experience clearly reflects her knowledge and experience 
with all three persons. The “o” in her testimony above indicates “one,” meaning 
combined or “as one.” Margery encounters God often in differentiated persons of his 
being, but also as “one substance in the Godhead.” They can be distinguished but they are 
the same; Margery communes with God. This simultaneity underwrites the simultaneity 
of her identity in the world. 
In the same way, the “quene” in Pearl attests that Jesus loves wives and widows 
as well as maidens. God’s love is uncontained; no human category can classify or limit it: 
“Ther may no man let me to lofe whom I wele and as mech as I wyl.”361 As Jesus goes on 
to explain, “for lofe, dowtyr, qwenchith al synne.” That is, Jesus can love anyone because 
of what love is. Since all humans are born in sin, Jesus’ love not only saves all, whether 
she be wife, widow, or maiden, it extends to everyone: “Ther is no gyft so holy as is the 
gyft of lofe…and therfor, dawtyr, thow mayst no bettyr plesyn God than contynuly to 
thinkyn on hys lofe.”362 Love is a holy gift from God to his creature and the gift his 
creatures render back to him when they give themselves in love to him. It is not a finite 
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resource to be doled out only to the worthy, but is in fact a gift for the unworthy—all 
fallen creatures, maiden or not, become holy through being loved and loving in return. 
Upon this foundation, layers of simultaneity present themselves to the reader. Thus, even 
as the simultaneous and Trinitarian person of God explains his love to Margery, Margery 
understands herself as simultaneously fallen and redeemed by the Trinitarian nature of 
caritas, at once the alpha and omega of being, giving, and receiving.363 
Margery’s discovery that she is simultaneously wife and mother, prefaces the 
“revelacyons” she is about to receive about love. Before Jesus instructs her to “call him 
her love,” he informs her that she is pregnant. Margery registers her unease at Jesus’ 
annunciation; she says she is “not worthy to heryn the spekyn and thus to comown wyth 
myn husbond.”364 How can she be a spiritual figure and a wife and mother? She wonders 
how she will “do for kepyng of [her] chylde” while participating in “this maner of levyng 
[which] longyth to thy holy maydens.”365 Jesus’ answer reveals worldly roles and 
identities do not apply to his love.  
Indeed, as Margery remarks early on, Jesus’ “pety and compassyon” has the effect 
of “thyngys turning up so down” so that she feels very little in control over her earthly 
identity.366 Upon learning she is pregnant, Margery becomes alarmed and suggests the 
child in her womb is a product of the “gret peyn and dysese” of communion with her 
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husband.367 Jesus tells her, however, that “thow schalt have nevyrthelesse grace, for I wyl 
that thow bring me forth mor frwte.”368 The pun on “fruit” succinctly expresses the 
simultaneity of Margery’s being. Contrary to her panicked suggestion, Jesus explains that 
the baby “is to the rathyr mede and meryte.”369 Indeed, Jesus will “ordeyn for an kepar” 
of the “fruit” of her womb. At his direction, Margery does not reject motherhood; instead 
the fruit of her union with John is made to coincide with the spiritual fruit of her 
participation in God’s will as a holy woman. 
Indeed, Jesus identifies the pregnant Margery not only as wife, but as daughter 
and as chaste: “Ya, dowtyr, trow thow rygth wel that I lofe wyfes also, and special tho 
wyfys which woldyn levyn chast.”370 How can this be? Christ recognizes that because of 
her marriage, the matter of Margery’s chastity depends upon whether she “mygtyn have 
her wyl” with John. Once again earthly and spiritual realities coincide. Still, there is 
something ontologically deeper at play here: by conflating the roles available to her as a 
woman, Jesus acknowledges not only their simultaneous legitimacy but also, more 
significantly, Margery’s likeness to his own simultaneous being. Margery’s motherhood, 
daughterhood, and chasteness combine to form her personhood, just as the Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit are the three persons of the single Godhead.  
An earlier scene previews this ideal likeness between human and divine persons; 
in it, the Lord clarifies the concept of ontological simultaneity from the divine 
perspective. After a series of social rebuffs and threats on her life brought on by her 
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tearful encounters with the “monkys and prestys and seculer men,” the Lord clarifies for 
Margery the origin and purpose of her tears.371 While holy tears are “fre gyftys of God” 
and “the heyest and sekerest gyftys that I geve,” they are not the definitive sign of her 
relationship with him.372 In fact, he admits, he “far sumtyme wyth my grace to the as I do 
wyth the sunne.”373 That is, while he is always with her, his grace is sometimes felt more 
“brightly” than at other times. So Margery will “wepe not alwey at [her] lyst” though his 
“grace is nevyrthelesse in the.”374 Even if she at times will weep without intending to, 
Margery is nevertheless fully herself, for Jesus’ self-giving love is constant.  
If her tears are not the sign of his grace, nor of her steadfast relationship with him, 
how can she be assured of his constant grace? Citing the Gospel of Mark, Jesus assures 
her that her own personal acting is the sign and, moreover, personality is fundamentally 
simultaneous: “He that doth the wyl of my Fadyr in hevyn he is bothyn modyr, brothyr, 
and syster unto me.”375 As we have seen, those who participate in the will of God enter 
into relationship with him, and by participating in his selfhood they are united in him, 
though not the same as him. Jesus then elaborates, affirming the Augustinian principle 
that the basic ontological form is not substance but relationship:  
“Therfor I preve that thow art a very dowtyr to me and a modyr also, a syster, a 
wyfe, and a spowse…Whan thow stodyst to plese me, than art thu a very dowtyr; 
whan thu wepyst and mornyst for my peyn and for my passion, than art thow a 
very modyr to have compassion of hyr child; whan thow wepyst for other mennys 
synnes and for adversytes, than art thow a very syster; and, whan thow sorwyst 
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for thow art so long fro the blysse of hevyn, than art thu a very spowse and a 
wyfe.”376 
 
This gloss is unusual. The scripture passage itself suggests that those who do the will of 
God lose their individuality as mothers, brothers, and sisters when they become members 
of the mystical body of Christ. But here the Lord restores that individuality; Margery’s 
actions on earth allow her to participate relationally in God’s selfhood, yet whether 
mother, spouse, or wife, she is always Margery. Margery is a mother to him when she 
mourns his suffering, a sister to him when she grieves over the sins of her fellow human 
beings, and so on. The reciprocality of the ways in which she stands in relation to God is 
an image of the simultaneity of the persons of the Trinity. 
 From Jesus’ words we see that social roles for Margery are not ends in 
themselves; they pattern or model different ways of achieving selfhood by participating 
in God’s.377 Each social role, moreover, entails actions specific to its purpose: for 
example, motherhood expresses a particular mode of compassion, such that the mother 
can suffer with Christ in ways that a spouse may not.378 The spouse, for her part, longs 
for Christ, while the daughter advocates on his behalf. Together, these actions, which 
make a person like Christ, combine to bring that person to the fullness of being. For 
Margery, to do the “wyl of my Fadyr,” as Jesus asks, is to love him in every expression 
of her being. 
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This sense of integration assures Margery that God’s grace is constant, even if he 
is “an hyd God in the,” like the sun behind a cloud.379 Whether or not she cries and no 
matter her social identity, Margery is a self because she loves as God loves, in caritas. 
Because caritas brings about the reality of God through “hys propyr persoone” in “Cryst 
ower Savyowr,” it elevates the human self to participation in him through the 
simultaneity of transcendent autonomy.380 
Conclusion: Marian Simultaneity and Integral Selfhood 
 Margery’s conception of selfhood as a simultaneous, integrative sense of being, 
incarnates Godliness in lay experience. In her Book, as in medieval culture more 
generally, Mary, the “Modyr of Mercy,” is a primary model of this integrated being by 
virtue of “alle the grace that thow hast.”381 As Tara Williams notes, “the Virgin Mary was 
the most powerful and honored female figure of the Middle Ages, so it is hardly 
surprising that Margery…would seek to imitate her.”382 Williams observes as well that 
Margery’s imitatio Mariae draws particularly on the two Marian devotional models of the 
Mater Dolorosa and the Mediatrix; she adds however that “Margery takes advantage of 
the power [of these devotional models] while virtually ignoring its counterpart: 
humility.”383 I would argue that Margery’s imitation of Mary on the contrary reflects a 
Thomist ontological notion related to the Augustinian paradox of being. Margery, that is, 
understands Mary as a model of selfhood not simply because she is the “most powerful 
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and honored female figure” of her time, but because Mary is the perfect human self. 
Simultaneously Mother and Virgin, she more than any other epitomizes the integrated 
and relational selfhood that is grounded in original likeness to the creator. 
 As we have seen in my analysis of Wisdom, Augustine theorizes being as God’s 
giving of his own reality to his creature. The gift of that reality marks the utter difference 
of God from human beings at the same time that it establishes their likeness to him. 
Aquinas develops this paradox. As if to anticipate modern performance theory, in which 
“identity is a ‘doing’ rather than a ‘state of being’,” Aquinas theorizes that with God, 
doing is being: “creation, as an act, is in God, since whatever God does is identical to 
what God is, given the divine simplicity.”384 The ontological nature of the created being, 
in Aquinas’ words, is “quaedam relatio ad creatorem cum novitate essendi [a kind of 
relationship to the Creator with freshness of being]”385; it “is that which is receiving the 
act of creation.”  For him, relationality, and specifically receptivity, is the fundamental 
“ontological form.”386 
 “Doing” and “being” also cohere in Mary, the virgin-mother “full of grace.” The 
integration of social roles in Mary—she is daughter of God the Father, mother of Christ 
the Son, and bride of the Holy Spirit—is her very identity, and it is a most complete 
expression of original likeness to him that ever was and will be found in any creature. 
Margery, as we have seen, receives and reflects God’s love in the same way by means of 
an imitatio Mariae: “a very dowtyr to me and a modyr also, a syster, a wyfe, and a 
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spowse.”387 In this “identity,” all earthly roles and activities stem from and integrate 
toward the center, who is Christ. Mary models the integration that constitutes the fullness 
of reality.  
 Margery’s intimacy with Christ, therefore, is not “startling,” “strategic,” or 
“patently unorthodox,” as critics have described it, so much as the instantiation of 
Aquinas’s idea of “creatureliness” as based in “relationship.” Like Augustine’s doctrine 
on the relationship between sacramentum and res, “creature” is both noun and copulative 
verb; the identity of creature is itself “a kind of relationship” of receptivity.388 As 
Aquinas argues elsewhere: “the transcendent God is ‘in all things by essence, presence, 
and power…and most intimately so.’” 389 Mary embodies this relationship of receptivity 
to the perfect degree. Nowhere more than in Mary was the presence, power, and essence 
of God so intimately lodged. 
  Because she imitates Mary, Margery’s experiences of ecstatic union with Christ 
aren’t “excessive,” even when she describes them in “domestic and ‘homly’” sexual 
terms.390 When, for example, Christ tells Margery that she “mayst boldly take me in the 
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armys of thi sowle and kyssen my mowth, myn hed, and my fete as sweetly as thow 
wylt” she expects her readers to recognize that the coupling she describes is a form of 
communion.391 This is why every time Christ mentions fleshly communion to Margery he 
begins with a discussion of “fastyng” which is “good for yong begynnars” and concludes 
with “and thu schalt have gret mede therfor in Hevyn.”392 At the end of this “bedroom 
scene,” Christ clarifies what he means in bidding this “homly” affection from Margery: 
“Be thes tokenys mayst thu wel wetyn that I love the, for thu art to me a very modir and 
to al the world for that gret charite that is in the, and yet I am cawse of that charite 
myself.”393 Margery’s acts of “domestic, ‘homly’” affection are the “tokenys,” or 
sacramentum, of caritas, which she has “in” her by means of Christ’s very selfhood. Yet 
these acts, he says, make her his mother, rather than the spouse one might have expected. 
Jesus’ trope links Margery to Mary, and to the grace that made her the exemplar of 
humankind’s original likeness to God. 
When Williams, then, argues that “this sexually suggestive scene…noticeably 
lacks the explicit metaphoricity insisted on by other female visionaries,” she overlooks 
the fact  that Margery presents it not only as a form of communion but also as an imitatio 
Mariae.394 Indeed, Margery seems to signal her sense that her descriptions are tropes by 
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saying that she presents Jesus’ forthcoming litany of gratitude not literally but according 
“to hyr gostly undirstondyng.”395 It is entirely in keeping with her mode of presentation, 
then, that Margery ends this revelation by having Christ make the Middle English verbs  
“kept,” “bathyd,” and “herberwyd” metaphors of one another.396 They all express 
Margery’s receptivity to his grace, which she simultaneously “holds,” and “cares for,” 
and “basks,” and “immerses” herself in, as she makes a “dwelling” for Christ “in [her] 
sowle.”397  
Finally, I return to the “joyless jeweler” of Pearl. Just as he learns he can seek the 
New Jerusalem only through grace, The Book of Margery Kempe teaches its readers that 
grace is center and circumference of Margery’s identity. Her claim that Jesus tells her 
that she is to him “a synguler lofe” and that she could have “synguler grace in hevyn” is 
much more than a “strategy” to “certify her intimacy with Christ.”398 It is a declaration of 
identity that is based entirely in rendering back to God the caritas that God extended to 
her and to everyone else made in his image. If Margery aims to certify her intimacy with 
God, she does so in view of the belief that she, like everyone else, will be subject to final 
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PERSON AND ACT IN SIR GAWAIN AND THE GREEN KNIGHT 
Since Descartes knowledge about man and his world has been identified with the 
cognitive function…And yet, in reality, does man reveal himself in thinking or, rather, in 
the actual enacting of his existence—in observing, interpreting, speculating, or 
reasoning…or in the confrontation itself when he has to take an active stand upon issues 
requiring vital decisions and having vital consequences and repercussions? In fact, it is 
in reversing the post-Cartesian attitude toward man that we undertake our study: by 
approaching him through action.399 
 
In light of the overall claim of this dissertation, in which I have argued that a 
medieval view of selfhood depends on an onto-theological view of the person as image 
and likeness of God, the inclusion of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight might surprise my 
readers. Decades of criticism on this poem have set its religious content against its 
secular genre and concerns. W.A. Davenport, for example, speaks for many when he says 
that the poet  
was aware of theological ideas and debates about morality and salvation, though 
in my view, he did not have a profound interest in either, except insofar as they 
could provide a framework for the imaginative exploration of situations and 
feelings.400 
 
John Halverson made a similar point ten years earlier, arguing flatly that “Gawain’s 
journey has no supernatural motivation.”401 This early treatment has had a significant 
influence on more current readings of the poem, which Britton Harwood has pithily 
termed “an aristocratic-Christian conflict.”402 More often than not, the critical view of 
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this conflict echoes David Aers’ view that “Christianity is thoroughly assimilated to the 
celebration of forms of life aspired to by contemporary gentry and nobles.”403 For 
example, Andrew James Johnson argues that “aristocratic culture seems wholly to absorb 
religion and to transform it into but another facet of the glittering pageant of courtly 
display.”404 This view persists despite Harwood’s warning that the poem’s staging of the 
conflict is “superficial” since, in the end, the poem’s “economy of the gift” subsumes and 
refutes it. Though Harwood takes seriously the poem’s Christian notion of gift, the 
majority of the poem’s criticism treats it as a strictly secular work bound to secular 
interpretation.405 
 However, these readings ironically force the text into a “template” as much as any 
allegorical analysis. Halverson himself pointed out the dangers in “templating” the poem: 
once the template is imposed, it becomes tyrannical. It not only excludes other 
interpretations and clouds perception, but also sends the interpreter off into a 
multiplication of detailed identifications often so far-fetched that they arouse the 
amusement or scorn of all except other believers. It demands that everything be 
reduced to a single set of terms.406 
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As Cecelia Hatt explains, to “template” the text is to “apply a single idea to the 
interpretation of SGGK and try to make everything in the poem fit into it.”407 Yet the 
notion that generic secularity overrides the theological concerns of this poem and that the 
religious “may be brought in from time to time to add extra flavor, or to trace a shape on 
[the poem] that would otherwise be unnoticed” exemplifies a “template” reading driven 
by a “single idea.”408  
As Hatt suggests, we need to view the poem’s secular and religious elements 
together. I agree with her that “the poet’s resistance to a single interpretation is an 
expression of his theological position.”409 By integrating secular and religious content, 
we are enabled to view the fantastic and material elements of the narrative not as 
dismissive of its religious concerns but as participants in its theo-philosophical 
underpinnings. Unless a critic engages the contexts of thought with which the poet is 
otherwise invested, her vision will be incomplete.  
My argument extends Hatt’s analysis to engage what she calls a “Creation-
Consummation model,” which is her name for the particularly medieval epistemological 
framework I have explored in previous chapters. Indeed, the model is “central to the 
theology of Thomas Aquinas”; it encapsulates the Augustinian and Thomist accounts of 
reality we have seen before. Rather than center human experience as the origin and 
meaning of reality, this “model” places God at the center of human life. Creation and 
consummation are the beginning and end of human selfhood, and they revolve around 
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God’s mercy, which is the source and summit of human experience. To this end, I show 
that Gawain and the Green Knight expresses a concern not primarily with the 
“individual”—though it presents the individual as a kind of problem410—but with the 
notion of person (and personality) as an objective ontological category. I argue that a 
concept of the person emerges from the poem and guides it with or without intention, not 
as an interpretive device per se, but as a context for interpretation. Within the poem’s 
theo-philosophical vision, Gawain’s actions reveal the extent to which his personhood is 
founded in the persona of God.    
Selfhood and the Human Person: Reconciling Terms 
Previous chapters in this dissertation have outlined the Augustinian idea that 
selfhood is in constant flux between likeness and unlikeness to God. Sin, both original 
and actual, disrupts the self because it disrupts the soul’s being which resides in its 
having been created in God’s image. As a result, the term selfhood, as I have used it in 
previous chapters, obtains two senses: the selfhood of original likeness and selfhood as 
the process of reformation to its likeness to God’s being. This second sense is not a 
product of self-fashioning or human creation; it is a state of being brought about by 
conforming one’s will to God’s. I have shown how two medieval writers (the Wisdom 
playwright and Margery Kempe), whose experience and education vastly differed, have 
assumed the same notion of human selfhood and its necessary relationship to the selfhood 
of God. Their works argue that the theological connection between God and the human 
being was widespread in medieval culture.  
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In Gawain and the Green Knight, we encounter a third expression of selfhood 
based on the same ontological paradigm. However, we shall see that this poem reflects a 
Thomist sense of “personal” being, through which actus humanus (human action) 
“engages the intelligence and freedom of the person” to reveal what he is.411 Here, 
selfhood is grounded in Aquinas’ notion of a divine persona. As Karol Wojtyla explains, 
we find Aquinas’ discussions of persona “mainly in his treatises on the Trinity and 
Incarnation.”412 We find it there because persona is first a category of God’s being. 
Aquinas’ persona reflects Augustine’s sense of God as reality in that God’s personal 
being remains the basis for human personal being. God and creature are not the same, but 
human creatures have their likeness to God, and so have their personhood from him:  
the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have 
dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like others; 
but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore also 
the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among 
other substances; and this name is “person.”413 
 
Aquinas finds the hypostatic union of God and human in the person of Jesus to epitomize 
the concept of persona and define the human person’s ontological basis. Persona is thus 
a category outside of creaturely existence, though it remains directly relevant to human 
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experience because humans are created as persons, that is, given personhood in their 
creation. As a result, human persons have the capacity to act in a manner that expresses 
who they are, their personhood.414  
Aquinas’ notion of actus humanus, as Rocco Buttiglione explains, indicates an act 
through which a human “engages his humanity”; it is distinguished from the actus 
hominis (“act of man”), which is much more passive and limited in its nature. By this 
Aquinas means that “the concrete man [is] not an abstract subject but a subject which is 
at the same time a created being, and therefore an object, and who manifests his 
complexity in action.”415 In other words, through actus humanus the person participates 
in the objectivity of his createdness through subjective experience as an embodied soul. 
Acts which reflect the goodness of human objecthood—that is, free and moral acts—are 
necessarily subjective experiences, but they cooperate with and therefore reveal the 
reality of the one who creates. This revelation indicates both the truth and reality of God, 
the creator, and God’s self-giving of reality to the human person. As a result, actus 
humanus is personalizing because it participates in and reveals God’s perfect personhood 
and thereby draws the human being toward original likeness. 
 Aquinas’ understanding of actus humanus has been developed by Christian 
personalists as the term “personal acting” to emphasize the notion that free and moral 
action draws the creature up to his created personhood.416 This development of the term 
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remains firmly rooted in the “dyadic structure” of “Thomistic metaphysics…with its 
indissoluble complementarity of substantiality, the in-itself dimension of being, and 
relationality, the towards-others aspect.”417 Such framing maintains as well the Thomist 
“notion of existential being (esse) as act and as intrinsically ordered toward self-
communication.”418 Action that responds to the proper personhood in both the actor and 
the receiver of the action “speaks” that personhood, is a witness to it, indeed, in a sense, 
creates it in the visible world.419 As Crosby explains, “Aquinas expresses it with 
precision when he says of the acting of persons: ‘non aguntur, sed per se agunt: persons 
are not acted on but act through themselves.’”420 For Aquinas, personal acts “reveal” the 
personality of the creature because they involve the full freedom and moral consciousness 
of the act and thereby honor the dignity of both actor and receiver.  
Further, because the divine persona forms the creature’s ontological basis, acts 
associated with relationality and love (concepts we have seen in Augustine as 
synonymous with self) are, for Aquinas, processes that accord with “nature.” They are 
synchronous and yet distinct from being (esse): the two senses of selfhood we have 
discussed before—original likeness and self-formation—are distinguished as persona and 
actus humanus.421 Yet though they are distinct concepts, they make up an “undivided 
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whole” in the person, whether human or divine.422 In their complex unity, these two 
principles express “the person as the highest manifestation of being itself, with the 
resulting characteristics of the person as self-possessing, self-communicative, and self-
transcending.”423 Each of these characteristics is, for Aquinas, an act of being and 
becoming, and together they convey the ontological foundation of the person.424 
Gawain’s Fault: Person and Nature 
With regard to Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, the notion of ontological 
personhood does not refer to Gawain’s “identity” per se. Rather, it assists in unravelling 
the problem of his fault in accepting and failing to return the girdle. In other words, we 
can only perceive Gawain’s “identity” through a proper view of his actions as an 
expression of his personhood. Gawain’s realization that the Green Knight is Sir Bertilak 
offers an entry point to this claim. Once he is caught, Gawain articulates his auto-critique 
as an internal conflict of “kynde”: 
‘Corsed worth cowarddyse and couetyse boþe! 
In yow is vylany and vyse, þat vertue disstryez.’ 
… 
‘Lo! Þer þe falssyng—foule mot hit falle! 
For care of þy knokke, cowardyse me taȝt 
To acorde me with couetyse, my kynde to forsake: 
Þat is larges and lewte, þat longez to knyȝtez. 
Now am I fawty and falce’425 
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Using the first-person pronoun, Gawain says his cowardice and covetousness has made 
him “faulty and false,” but he recognizes the loss of his virtue as an abandonment of his 
knightly “kynde.” “Kinde” means “nature,” and it indicates an ontological grounding of 
the self altogether different from the modern concept of identity. Having forsaken his 
virtuous nature, Gawain becomes another “kind”: “Now am I fawty and falce.” As he 
throws the “falssynge” off of himself, he articulates the connection between the 
seductions of Lady Bertilak and his attachment to his own life (“For care of þy knokke): 
the connection is cowardice. Through the “teaching” of cowardice, he now “accords” to 
the nature of avarice, an excess of desire. Avarice, which is awakened in him by Lady 
Bertilak’s advances, causes him to “forsake” the nature of generosity and loyalty which 
“belongs to knights.” Imagining that he has abandoned one nature for another, Gawain 
realizes that, through the act of accepting the life-saving girdle, he has in fact lost 
himself.  
To a modern reader, Gawain’s view of his failure as a conflict of “natures” may 
seem ironic; facing a foe like the Green Knight, we can hardly begrudge his desire to 
preserve his life. Bertilak himself says that Gawain should not judge himself too harshly: 
“Ȝe lufed you lyf—þe lasse I yow blame.”426 Yet Gawain insists that some essential fact 
of his being has changed. This “kynde” which Gawain’s cowardice has perverted is not 
subjective; it is his nature as a creature God made in his image and endowed with life. 
Human beings do not “own” their lives so much as life has been given to them by the 
God who made them. Indeed, the synoptic gospels each contain this doctrine, and the 
antidote to Gawain’s failure, which reflects the economy of God’s giving: “For he that 
                                                 





will save his life, shall lose it: and he that shall lose his life for my sake, shall find it.”427 
Salvation comes through grace alone, the gift God gave the world he so loved that his 
Son became flesh and suffered death to redeem those he created from dust. Knowing this, 
Gawain acknowledges that “Cowardyse me taȝt/To acorde me with couetyse,” which 
causes him to feel the shame any knight ought to feel who lacks “larges” and “lewte.” 
But his fault as a knight is underwritten by a larger, existential betrayal: by coveting life, 
he has fallen away from himself as a human being, to whom God gave life and through 
whom death shall be dead. 
 Here, Aquinas’ distinction between person and nature proves instructive.428 The 
distinction, as Crosby explains, “[does] not express two different subjects of being” 
within the person but, rather, “one and the same subject of being that now acts through 
itself, and now undergoes what happens in itself.”429 We, the “subjects of being,” 
experience subjectivity in two ways: first, we experience our own acts, which occur “on 
the basis of [our] own understanding of the point of [our] action” (per se agunt).430 This 
is the experience of “acting with an acting that is radically [our] own…not an 
undergoing, or an enduring, or a transmitting of what originates outside of [our]self.”431 
These acts, that is to say, realize ourselves as conforming or falling short of our nature as 
human beings. We also, however, experience an event as something that happens to us 
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(aguntur, literally, “are acted upon”).432 Crosby describes how subjects can be “acted 
upon” by coercion or through the “transmission” of emotions through which the subject 
acts, but understands neither why he acts, nor his action’s consequences. These are 
subjective experiences of “individual” action, but they are actions imposed by other 
subjects.  
The difference between these natures, aguntur and per se agunt, is germane to Sir 
Gawain’s behavior within the walls of Hautdesert, especially when the lines of individual 
fault become blurred. Aquinas’ original distinction poses aguntur as internal to the 
subject, experienced by him but not consciously intended nor performed “through” the 
person himself. These experiences are, for example, emotions, desires, urges, or 
cravings.433 Gawain’s experiences of fear, shame, or cowardice reflect the meaning of 
aguntur. Proper to Aquinas, subjective experience, whether aguntur or per se agunt is 
“nature”; agere is “natural” to man as it arises through him and he experiences them in 
mind and body.434  
How Gawain responds to them, however, belongs to an order crucial to our proper 
understanding of personal acting. To the extent that he reacts, his words and deeds are 
extensions of his feelings; to the extent that his words and deeds make him “visible” by 
acting “through him,” they align him with virtues or vices that exist apart from him. In 
Wojtyla’s words, “efficacy [per se agunt] and subjectiveness [aguntur] seem to split the 
field of human experiences into two mutually irreducible factors.” However, he 
continues, they are in fact two natures within the same “ontological nucleus”—the 
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“subject as a being [in which] every dynamic structure is rooted, every acting and 
happening.”435 These two natures within the person obtain a proper order, so that they are 
said to reveal the person.  
Indeed, “the person is identifiable with an ontological basic structure” 
fundamental to and yet coincident with action.436 As Wojtyla concludes, this  
synthesis not only has its foundation but also occurs actually through the 
mechanism of the basic ontological structure, that is to say, the ontic subject. This 
is the reason why the human being, even while he is the agent in acting, still 
remains its subject.437 
 
Wojtyla’s notion that the person has a “basic ontological structure” despite the 
“dynamism” of its acting, reflects Aquinas’ objectivistic view of the person. This 
objectivistic view recognizes the subjectivity of the person in the individual “experience 
and activity” of each “individual subsistence of a rational nature,” but it takes that 
rational nature as the ground of all experience and activity.438 What makes a creature 
human, Aquinas argues, is his rational nature, which he receives from God’s very being; 
a person’s rational nature is thus something he possesses both as a subject and as an 
object, something he belongs to as much as it belongs to him. This objective good is at 
the same time what a human being shares with God and what one receives from God as 
his subject. 
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 In the Thomist worldview, rationality and freedom are “the principle means, so to 
speak, whereby the human person is actualized.”439 As Wojtyla points out, these indicate 
the “objectivity” of personhood, which constitutes a “completely different treatment” 
from the modern reader’s experience of post-Cartesian selfhood, in which subjective 
lived experience is “absolutized” through consciousness and conceived as the “essence of 
the person.”440 This post-Cartesian model witnesses directly to the notion of “self-
fashioning,” as we have seen in my previous chapters. In the pre-modern view, the person 
is not their experience, nor their consciousness, but is the ontic subject, created as person 
by God, who has experiences and whose consciousness reveals his personhood through 
moral action. 
 It follows, then, that “freedom of the will is not given to us as an end in itself, but 
as a means to a greater end.”441 In the Thomistic view of the cosmos, freedom 
participates in a moral “order” proper to “rational beings, which are persons.”442 In other 
words, freedom “exists for the sake of morality.”443 Properly understood, freedom 
enables humans to express their personhood, which Aquinas argues with regard to the 
created world is perfectissimum ens, the most perfected form of being.444 So, while moral 
actions are not persons, they derive from the perfection of personality and order 
themselves toward perfect ends: actions have moral relevance, on the one hand, and 
                                                 















moral consequences, on the other, because they are made by and are directed toward 
persons.445 Moral acts respect the created value of persons in both the actor and the 
recipient; they therefore speak to the personhood of both parties. In Crosby’s words: 
selfhood, foundational as it is in human persons, does not contain the whole 
essence of personhood…[human] selfhood is a transcendent selfhood. We possess 
ourselves in transcending ourselves towards value. Our self-possession is raised to 
a higher power when the transcendence is potentiated in moral obligation.446  
 
By the same means, immoral action depersonalizes the subject because it deforms his 
nature and perverts his relation to others. Depersonalization does not change the 
ontological structure of the human being—what Crosby calls “value”—but it nevertheless 
damages the soul of the actor because it chooses to accord with lesser goods that act on 
him rather than acting in a manner that realizes his value as a person. Self-possession and 
transcendence are thwarted by the subject’s attachment to vice and lack of self-
determination. 
 Gawain’s failure illustrates this precise problem. The temptation of lesser goods 
ultimately tests not simply his knightly “identity” but his personhood, his being as such. 
The Green Knight reveals that he engineered Lady Bertilak’s enticements precisely to 
reveal the shortcomings that inhere in courtly conduct:  
I wroȝt hit myseluen; 
I sende hir to asay þe, and sothly me þynkkez 
On þe fautlest freke þat euer on fote ȝede. 
… 
Bot here yow lakked a lyttel, sir, and lewte yow wonted; 
Bot þat watz for no wylyde werke, ne wowing nauþer, 
Bot for ȝe lufed your lyf—þe lasse I yow blame.447 
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The Green Knight says Gawain is not guilty of “wylyde werke,” nor has he violated the 
rules of “wowing.” Indeed, he finds him “the most faultless man that went upon the 
earth.” Yet while Gawain negotiates his knightly identity perfectly, the perfection he 
achieves in courtly manners is the source of his failure in spiritual virtue. Virtue, Gawain 
recognizes, is his moral responsibility regardless of his courtly identity.448 Gawain’s sin 
results ultimately from depersonalizing actions through which he clings to his life rather 
than keeping the truth. 
The Person, the Pentangle, and the Maintenance of Mystery 
Grounded in Thomistic thought, the concept of the self I have outlined above 
articulates a logic of selfhood that is well-established by the period in which the Gawain 
poet composed his romance. The differences between the concepts of person and nature, 
a distinction between types of action taken by persons, and the potentiality of human 
action to depersonalize the self are the intellectual context for an assessment of Gawain’s 
personhood and conduct. Gawain’s identity, however, has usually been analyzed 
according to other, post-medieval criteria.449 Hatt, for example, points out that “critics 
have claimed that there are two Gawains in the poem.”450 She adds that 
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Gawain himself is a collection of contradictions, a gentle and courteous man who 
is apparently quite happy to behead a perfect stranger, a knight famed for his 
amorous escapades who tenaciously guards his chastity.451  
 
This emphasis on identity—whether singular or multiple—rather than on his moral 
consciousness—seems to me to be misplaced.452  
Critics have paid inordinate attention to so-called textual “instrument[s] of self-
expression and self-constitution”; these “instruments” turn out to be Foucauldian 
synonyms for self-fashioning.453 As a result, more than one scholar has lamented that 
“Gawain’s subjective consciousness—not his emotions and desires, which are often quite 
apparent, but his reflective, indwelling sense of self—will never be directly accessible to 
us.”454 If, though, we view Gawain’s “subjective consciousness,” as an expression of his 
onto-theological personhood, we can see him more clearly.  
Actually, a logic of a personal selfhood establishes the person—in this case Sir 
Gawain—as an ontological being distinct from, and yet coincident with, actions that 
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“identify” him by revealing his personhood. This medieval concept of personal selfhood 
maintains the idea of mysterious simultaneity, rather than internal conflict or collapse, as 
the default condition of post-lapsarian human experience. The poem posits Gawain as a 
human person created in God’s image with both free will and the tendency toward 
concupiscence; he is not so much “a collection of contradictions” as always on the line 
between conforming or perverting that image.455 The more he conforms, the more he 
achieves personhood, but this process is always unstable. Moreover, this dialecticism of 
selfhood means that his exact “status” between conformation and perversion at any given 
point remains a mystery throughout the poem.  
The character of Gawain makes visible to the reader this invisible ontological 
tension. We have seen the tension emerge in Gawain’s regret at having betrayed his 
“kynde”: because Gawain admits he has betrayed his nature, we are able to perceive the 
underlying paradigm of difference and simultaneity between person and nature. Thus 
Gawain embodies the sustained tension between poles of self-expression that allows the 
human creature to transcend himself into personhood. Without Gawain’s simultaneity, we 
cannot see that both degrees of reality are available to the person. Only this tension 
allows for the revelation that personhood—Aquinas’ perfectissimum ens—exists.456 
Accordingly, the poem argues that the mystery of Gawain’s status, and mystery more 
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generally, is not solvable, nor should it be. Gawain avoids resolution because resolution 
forecloses the possibility of transcendence. 
With this in mind, the poem conditions the reader to abide in mystery throughout 
the poem, often by means of paradox. As David Baker observes, “paradoxes of self-
reference are crucial to the poem” because they reveal the full range of narrative and 
stylistic choices.457 These paradoxes work against hierarchies in both content and form, 
and they are ultimately the reason that “templating” the poem is unproductive. Paradox, 
Baker argues, 
is introduced, cultivated, and prolonged by the poet. Through paradox the 
Gawain-poet challenges linguistic hierarchies by reinventing a French story in an 
altogether English tradition, and further by exploring even the divine nature in the 
vernacular, and that again through paradox. His maintenance of paradox and 
refusal fully to resolve it is a literary refusal to submit to medieval philosophy, 
and a demonstration of the problems and potential of language which impedes 
understanding even as it communicates truth. He chooses the romance style in 
which to do all this, and all in an East Midlands dialect…He assists in raising the 
romance style to a higher intellectual level, undermining another implicit literary 
hierarchy.”458 
 
Baker demonstrates how the poet uses paradoxes “of symbol, narrative, and form” to 
subvert other linguistic and social hierarchies, including the association of poetic style 
with class, and to reject the supremacy of logic within medieval philosophical and 
educational systems.459  
For logicians, paradoxes were problems to be solved; except for those concerning 
God, they could all be organized into taxonomic classes.460 Aside from divine paradox, 
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logic was to be applied to all “insoluble” problems, even to the extent that a linguistic and 
literary hierarchy was invented as a work-around.461 To challenge the hierarchical 
association between romance and the noble class specifically, Baker argues that the 
Gawain poet “[raised] the romance style to a higher intellectual level” by employing 
multiple recursive and unresolved paradoxes. Baker concludes that paradox is the poet’s 
method of subversion—an intervention in the medieval preoccupation with hierarchical 
structures of all kinds, especially the formal and linguistic.  
However, while Baker is right to associate Gawain’s paradoxes with the opening 
of formal and narrative possibility, I posit that the resistance to hierarchy he observes in 
the poem ultimately resists the “solutions” that hierarchies often propose. As a result, 
Baker too broadly associates hierarchy with “medieval philosophy.” In fact, a rhetoric of 
paradox maintains the mysterious theo-philosophical doctrine of reality at play in the 
poem. This doctrine of reality depends on the viability of mystery, and it insists that 
human beings tolerate unsolvable problems. The unsolvable problem at the center of the 
doctrine is the “unreasonableness” of God’s mercy, as we have seen in my previous 
chapters. As Wisdom argues, the point of human existence is not to have knowledge of 
the logos of God’s caritas, but instead to experience it by receiving and reciprocating it. 
Through sustained paradoxical tension, which Gawain’s person embodies, the poem 
illustrates the limits of the human ability to “solve” mysteries. 
Beyond the simultaneous characterization of Gawain, several scenes in the poem 
express a sense of mysterious tension through descriptions of “otherworldly” or “liminal” 
characters and spaces. The Green Knight is one such character, who carries a deadly ax in 
                                                                                                                                                 
 




one hand and a holly branch in the other.462 Though fully decked in “clene” [perfect] 
armor, he lacks a helmet or hauberk for battle.463 The Green Knight’s embodiment of 
contradiction begins a series of similar descriptions that build narrative tension 
throughout the poem. Such tension is appealing to audiences who delight in suspense, but 
through Gawain’s example, it also prepares us to engage in mystery without feeling 
compelled to resolve it.  
For example, when the castle of Hautdesert suddenly appears, Gawain’s sense of 
awe betrays the feeling that the castle is, perhaps, unreal: at the same time that “þe haþel 
auysed,/ As hit schemered and schon þurȝ þe schyre okez,” he notes “þat pared out of 
papure purely hit semed.”464 The massiveness of the castle, its impregnability, its sheer 
being is equally emphasized. The poet’s detailed yet confounding description of the 
castle intensifies the mystery of his subject; even while the castle seems indestructible, 
this impression is balanced with the sense that even the mightiest structures man makes 
on earth seem flimsy and unstable.  
As he approaches the castle, Gawain seems to abide in the mysterious tension of 
the scene and allow for all possible outcomes: is the castle is an actual building? a 
medieval Christmas craft project? is it a hallucination, like a desert oasis that may 
disappear just as he comes too close? The poet notes that the castle integrates seamlessly 
with its surrounding “borelych bole”; its towers match the trees within which it hides, and 
the castle seems to fit its natural surroundings perfectly as it is “loken,” or “framed,” by 
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boughs.465 Yet anchored as it is in the material world, its appearance “out of nowhere” 
makes it seen more than natural. Indeed, Gawain doesn’t see it until he prays to the 
Virgin. As soon as it appears he takes the castle as a divine gift of “Jesus and Sayn 
Gilyan…þat cortaysly hade hym kydde,” who heard his prayer for shelter and befriended 
him.466 The place he approaches is real, supra-real, and spiritual all at once.467 Gawain 
seems to remain open to various possible causes for its sudden appearance, whether they 
be natural, spiritual, or magical, and he responds to this strange situation with surprising 
flexibility. Indeed, throughout the first half of the poem, Gawain models a response to 
mystery that embraces the unknown rather than resolves or rejects it. Rather than grasp 
for clarity upon the paradoxical appearance of the castle, Gawain simply asks the porter if 
he can come in.468  
Gawain’s engagement with mystery in several other scenes offers readers a vision 
for how to approach the complex and simultaneous conception of his selfhood as both 
person and nature revealed by his acts. His acceptance of mystery without grasping for 
full understanding shows us how to engage, for instance, with the simultaneity and 
paradox of personhood imaged by his pentangled shield: 
For hit is a figure þat haldez fyue poyntez 
And vche lyne vmbelappez and loukez in oþer 
And ayquere hit is endelez (and Englych hit callen 
Oueral, as I here, ‘þe endeles knot’). 
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Forþy hit acordez to þis knyȝt and to his cler armez469 
 
As Baker’s extensive analysis shows, the pentangle is a self-referential and self-
replicating paradox, with its “endless,” “overlapping” lines, and “points” that “lock” or 
interlace each other. Like the other mysterious points of tension in Sir Gawain and the 
Green Knight, this shape reveals surprising possibilities, the first of which is a concept of 
“truth” with ontological implications.  
Through its endless interconnectedness, the pentangle becomes an image of 
eternity. As Baker argues, “the Gawain-poet is suggesting that, even though language 
itself cannot express God in medieval thought, linguistic paradoxes can.”470 That is, 
paradoxes can express God insofar as they maintain the legitimacy of mystery—the gap 
between words, which image God’s attributes, and the Word who is God. The gap itself, 
which is always present and acknowledged in medieval modes of thought, holds space for 
God while not attempting to perfectly articulate him.  
By the same method, the ontological concept of “pentangle”—that is, the notion 
of pentangleness—has a being analogous to God’s: as primary substance and form, its 
reality remains imperceptible, even while it gives its shape, image, and meaning to what 
it creates in and of itself.471 Drawing on Ross Arthur’s study of the pentangle’s geometry, 
Baker shows not only that the pentangle is itself a paradox but also that “the pentangle is 
symbolic of paradox…since it contains not itself exactly but merely similar pentangles of 
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decreasing degrees of magnitude.”472 So, as a function of its “medieval mathematics,” the 
pentangle expresses infinite self-replications: “Every regular pentangle contains within 
itself a regular pentagon, in which a new, similar pentangle may be inscribed.”473 All 
perceivable pentangles, such as the one on Gawain’s shield, are the image and likeness of 
their original form.  
In other words, the pentangle expresses mathematically the ontotheological 
conception of personhood in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight and also in Wisdom and 
The Book of Margery Kempe: the pentangle’s self-contained and endlessly repetitive self-
replication articulates the gift of the res to the sacramentum. And the relationship is 
reciprocal: through the visible sacramentum, we gain “philosophical access” to the 
absolute and invisible res.474 Thus, just as God gives his image and likeness to the human 
person through his sheer act of being, the geometrical pentangle gives its shape to new 
and unique pentangles through the creative act of simply existing.475 The pentangle 
images the “truth” that human beings are the imago dei by means of God’s self-
givingness. 
To create imaginative space for transcendence and to articulate its means, each 
point of the pentangle articulates simultaneously a vision of the divine persona and of the 
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perfection of human nature that makes a person God’s image.476 The pentangle’s 
mutually dependent points, separately and by means of their interlocking, show what 
Gawain ought to be, and they show what he is in the world. For instance, the third point, 
“þe fyue woundez/ Þat Cryst kaȝt on þe croys,” explicitly “makes reference to specific 
divine paradoxes central to Christianity—those of the incarnation and crucifixion.”477 
Compressing the entire notion of divine persona, and particularly the notion of a 
hypostatic union of God and man into less than two lines, the poet invites Gawain to 
contemplate, with the reader, on the personhood of Christ as the answer to “quy þe 
pentangle apendez to þat prynce noble.”478 Indeed, the poem presents Christ’s 
personhood as the answer to Gawain’s identity throughout: its beginning on Christmas, 
when Christians celebrate the Incarnation and human birth of God marks the specifically 
personal nature of God in Christ and clarifies Gawain’s own person in the imago dei. 
Specifically, “þe crede tellez” not the details of Christ’s five wounds per se, but of 
Christ’s personhood as God, who “came down from heaven, and by the Holy Spirit was 
incarnate of the Virgin Mary,” who “suffered death and was buried, and rose again on the 
third day.”479 The poet connects the description of Christ’s five wounds to the ancient 
Creed of the church to argue that, though Gawain is not God, he is called to be like him 
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“vpon folde.”480 That is, for Gawain’s “affyounce” to be in the wounds of Christ means 
that even though Gawain’s “faith” remains in the Resurrection, he must be prepared to 
die. Ironically, because the shield cannot protect Gawain from death, it locates the 
concept of faith precisely in the Resurrection. Transcendence through faith depends upon 
the persona of Christ who is grace, but it also results in the personhood of Gawain.  
The fourth point of the pentangle reiterates the personalism of Christ as it applies 
to Gawain through its depiction of the five joys of Mary. These are five of the most 
simultaneously intimate and transcendent of divine-human encounters, which fully 
personalize Mary as theotokos: the Annunciation, the Nativity, the Resurrection, the 
Ascension, and the Assumption. Compressing the mystery of the human-divine encounter 
into such small space formally emphasizes the poem’s themes of tension and 
transcendence. But it also articulates another element of Gawain’s personhood: fiat. 
While Christ’s “five wounds” model for human persons the givingness of God, Mary’s 
“five joys” model the humble receptivity with which persons are to respond. Mary’s fiat 
mihi secundum verbum tuum [let it be done to me according to your word] embraces the 
mystery of the Incarnation and virgin birth, which allows God’s personalizing work to be 
accomplished. This embrace is a free and autonomous transcendence toward God and a 
reciprocation of his caritas: it personalizes Mary, who recognizes God’s absolute value 
and gives herself back to him in love.  
Indeed, the concept of fiat frames the meaning behind Gawain’s oath to the Green 
Knight. Now, Gawain’s oath in no way theologically compares to Mary’s fiat. However, 
it does imitate the principle of self-giving behind the fiat of the Annunciation. The Green 
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Knight first proposes his “game” to Arthur via the court—an indirect proposal to anyone 
brave enough to engage, with the promised reward of the ax framed as a “gyft.”481 But 
when no one will accept the challenge, and Arthur is forced by courtly courtesy to take 
up the ax, Gawain issues his fiat: “I beseche now with saȝez sene/ Þis melly mot be 
myne.”482 With “plain speech,” he clarifies that he will give his life in Arthur’s place and 
associates that gift with his request to take the oath: “And syþen þis note is so nys þat 
noȝt hit yow falles,/ And I haue frayned hit at yow fyrst, foldez hit to me.”483 
In response, the Green Knight narrows the proposal, making the “game” specific 
to Gawain. He first requests to know Gawain’s name, and then insists that he repeat the 
terms of the oath:  
Þen carppez to Sir Gawan þe knyȝt in þe grene, 
‘Refourme we oure forwards, er we fyrre passe. 
Fyrst I eþe þe, haþel, how þat þou hates 
Þat þou me telle truly, as I tryst may.’484 
 
The Green Knight customizes the oath for Gawain, attaching his name, indeed his person, 
to it. Then Gawain “reforms” the accord and becomes, himself, the gift. They discuss the 
terms of Gawain’s quest a year hence. Gawain promises to seek out the Green Knight and 
“foch þe such wages,” that is, to accept the return blow and surely die. In other words, the 
oath that Gawain “swere[s] þe for soþe and by [his] seker traweþ” affirms that the 
exchange be executed according the Green Knight’s word. Gawain accepts these terms 
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because he recognizes Arthur’s value: “No bounte but your blod I in my bode knowe.”485 
Gawain’s fiat, the giving of his own life for Arthur’s sake, will occur if he keeps his 
“traweþ.”  
Despite the entire court’s hesitation, Gawain responds to his moral consciousness 
and accepts the Green Knight’s Christmas challenge on Arthur’s behalf. This is a 
personalizing act because at the same time Gawain’s fiat acts against his own interests, it 
transcends his lower nature—the “wakkest” and “feblest”—to reveal the mystery of his 
personhood.486 Certainly, he acts as a knight by his bravery and courtly courtesy, but he 
ultimately chooses to act in a personalizing way “quatso bifallez after,” because it is the 
action that accords with value.487 When he steps into Arthur’s place to accept the Green 
Knight’s challenge, Gawain makes the mystery of self-sacrifice a visible and legitimate 
choice. His fiat illustrates that the per se agunt involved in that choice not only makes 
him a courteous knight but “engages the intelligence and the freedom of the person.”488 
Significantly, his offering reflects the reason for Christmastide, that Christ gave himself 
freely and totally to humanity by his Incarnation and thus became the salvation of the 
world. Gawain’s self-giving action can thus be viewed as a truly personal act, one that 
accords to his personal nature in likeness to the divine persona. 
The symbolism of the other points—the five senses, the five “fyngres,” and the 
five virtues—articulate the means by which fallen human beings transcend their lower 
nature to participate in the perfection of personhood. The text’s description of these 
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remaining three points illustrates a means of transcendence using “horizontal” and 
“vertical” language. 489 Because “pointe” can mean “virtue” as well as “corner,” we must 
reckon with both “horizontal” and “verticle” meanings of each crook of the pentangle. 
Used together, horizontal and vertical language maintain a fraught interdependence 
reflective of the tension in a paradox.  
This tension insists that horizontal reality is not comprehensive, and therefore 
presents a perspective of the human person as created for, that is, intrinsically directed 
toward the object of eschatological union with God.490 Here again, in form and content, 
simultaneity reigns: for example, the first point, Gawain’s “fyue wyttez,” refers to 
physical “senses,” which are the body’s means of perception. Then again, with the word 
“wit,” the poet simultaneously invokes the common medieval theory of “spiritual 
senses.”491 As Sarah Coakley and Paul Gavrilyuk explain, “it is not uncommon for 
Christian writers to use the language of sense-perception to describe the divine-human 
encounter without qualifying the sense as ‘spiritual’ or correlating them with the soul, 
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mind, heart, and so on explicitly.”492 Therefore, if Gawain is “fautlez in his fyue wyttez,” 
he has both a “fit” experience of perception in his body in addition to a sense of unity 
with God in his soul.493 Gawain’s “wyttez” are in no way passive. The active, disciplined 
response of his bodily perception (horizontal) corresponds to a similarly disciplined 
spiritual response toward objective value—God—in his soul (vertical). This is why the 
poet can speak of Gawain as “funden fautlez.”  
Gawain’s “fyue fyngres” has a similar double meaning, referring to bodily digits, 
but points to supernatural influence on human experience. Notably, as the fingers extend 
from the body, they are associated with specific actions, which, in the Gawain poet’s day, 
convey the effects of both “the five means by which the devil tempts” and “eternal life, 
good works, and various virtues...the Holy Spirit or his gifts.”494 Because Gawain has 
“fayled neuer” in his “fyngres,” which may be temptations, good works, or the gifts of 
the Holy Spirit, the second point of the pentangle reaffirms the ideal of unity with God 
through specific, embodied, and disciplined action.  
Unsurprisingly, then, each of the virtues listed in the fifth point contains a depth 
of meaning through a tension between horizontal and vertical language. This final point 
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of the pentangle lists an additional five virtues, which also serve as traditional ideals of 
courtly conduct: “fraunchyse” [generosity], “felaȝschyp forbe al þyng” 
[fellowship/loyalty beyond all things], “clannes” [purity, chastity], “cortaysye” 
[courtesy], and “pite” [piety], all of which “croked were neuer.”495 However, beyond 
their role in courtly etiquette, these virtues have vertical meanings through which the 
human soul can participate in divine life. For instance, “fraunchyse,” in addition to 
“generosity,” also meant “spiritual freedom.”496 As Hatt argues, each of these virtues 
bears “full semantic weight.”497  
As we shall see, the virtue of courtesy becomes increasingly significant in the 
latter half of the poem. However, its relevance there is predicated upon its meaning as a 
feature of the pentangle. Though critics have long viewed courtesy in Gawain in a strictly 
secular light, I argue that this virtue participates in the same paradoxical tension between 
secular and religious meanings. This tension itself reveals both what Baker calls 
“resistance” and what I view as the didactic opportunity of the poem. For instance, 
Burakov-Mongan identifies several critics who, after J.A. Burrow’s suggestion, view 
courtesy as “a constellation…of specifically secular or courtly values.”498 Finch, as we 
have seen, acknowledges a more complex view, claiming that the poem “concerns, above 
all, the relation of a very real and individual knight to the chivalric and Christian ideals 
symbolized, for instance, in the pentangle depicted on Gawain’s shield.”499 Here Finch 
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simultaneously aligns chivalric and Christian ideals and sets them in opposition, arguing 
ultimately that their entanglement signals a “negotiation between heavenly virtue and 
political reality.”500 Yet, whereas Finch ultimately reads “a complete conflation of the 
two orders,” Harwood offers a third perspective by arguing that the secular and religious 
maintain an “aristocratic-Christian conflict,” which the poem resolves through “the 
economy of the gift.”501 The concerns among Gawain’s critics are diverse and 
comprehensive, but they broadly privilege the secular conventions of the poem’s genre at 
the expense of the poet’s otherwise clear, if implicit, understanding of courtesy. 
In fact, the Gawain poet illustrates courtesy in several instances as more than just 
a courtly virtue. If, as is commonly accepted, the Gawain poet is the author of the other 
Cotton MS poems, the religious dimension of social virtues is easier to acknowledge. For 
example, Burakov-Mongan points out that “in Patience and Cleanness, for instance, the 
poet describes courtesy as a divine attribute, as well as an inner state of spiritual 
perfection.”502 She shows how the poet’s view of courtesy remains consistent with his 
contemporaries “who identify the origins of courtesy with the Annunciation, linking this 
virtue to the life of the Blessed Virgin.”503 On the theological side, Hatt argues that “this 
poet’s interest in embodied human life,” that is, the life of the court, was much more 
integrative than it may appear: “to continue to assert the relation [between human and 
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divine] seems to be the task the poet has chosen.”504 For Hatt, the poet’s investment in the 
endeavor of humanity is itself an attempt to reveal God’s glory, to “point” toward God in 
every instance: the poet’s “interest in human life is not a denial but an assertion of his 
theology.”505 As I will demonstrate, the poet has a clear sense that courtesy has both 
courtly and spiritual meanings, and he deliberately uses them together. 
Here, for example, is Pearl’s description of “cortaysye”: 
‘Of courtaysye, as saytz Saynt Poule, 
Al arn we membrez of Jesu Kryst: 
As heued and arme and legg and naule 
Temen to hys body ful trwe and tryste, 
Ryȝt so is vch a Krysten sawle 
A longande lym to þe Mayster of myste. 
Þenne loke: what hate oþer any gawle 
Is tached oþer tyȝed þy lymmez bytwyste? 
Þy heued hatz nauþer greme ne gryste 
On arme oþer finger þaȝ þou ber byȝe. 
So fare we alle wyth luf and lyste 
To kyng and quene by cortaysye.’506 
 
At this point nearly half way into Pearl, the “gentle” jeweler’s daughter offers her thesis: 
true “courtaysye” cannot be comprehended by any appeal to earthly status or rank, as the 
Jeweler assumes. Everyone in heaven is a king or queen by virtue of being a member of 
Christ’s mystical body. True courtesy is the absolute harmony of the constituent “limbs.” 
For her, “head and arm and leg and insides/belong to his body truly and faithfully”; each 
are necessary to the body’s life and equal participants in it. This harmony is the model of 
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which the body politic is the institutional image, the noble court the cultural image, and 
the coordinated physical and moral make up of human beings the knightly image. “By 
courtesy,” she argues, love triumphs over hate and jealousy.  
The Jeweler’s daughter follows Paul’s epistle in portraying the “divine attribute” 
of courtesy through a metaphor involving the human body, which again calls attention to 
the mystery of the Incarnation, the relationship of caritas between God and his creation. 
In Pearl, the poet articulates this relationship in paradoxical terms that hold a reader’s 
experience of the text in the same fraught position as Gawain’s choice of “kynde.” As 
Finch argues, the poet “seems concerned primarily with demonstrating the profound 
contiguity between the divine and the human,” and his main mode for accomplishing this 
is his combined use of “vertical and horizontal language”: 
Allegorical significance and individualized character, grandiose meaning and 
local event, vertical and horizontal language, in a word, heaven and earth: in the 
Pearl poet these are at once joined and strangely broken off from one another. A 
disturbing and paradoxical relation is established between the spiritual and the 
worldly…We have thrust upon us a pulsating sense of what simultaneously 
separates and joins the visible and the invisible orders.507 
 
In the theological poetics of Pearl, in other words, universal and individual, objective and 
subjective realities are superimposed in the service of making visible human 
personhood.508  
As a result, the poet embraces two theological mysteries “which indicates not 
only [his] genuine and energetic Christian faith but also and unusually lively grasp of 
it.”509 These are the hypostatic (fully divine and fully human) persona of Christ, the 
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incarnate God, and second, the purpose of human life and man’s relationship with the 
Creator.510 Christ’s person as a hypostatic union means that the invisible reality of God is 
fully maintained in Christ, even while Christ simultaneously takes on a fully human 
nature. That God became human without loss of his divine selfhood announces the 
objective of salvation: that the purpose of human life is communion with him. 
Respectively, these mysteries speak to the beginning and end of the created order, as 
witnessed by the Gospel of John; the point of verbum caro factus est is the human 
person’s eschatological union with God. This understanding of God—and particularly 
Christ the “Creator and Consummator” as the incarnate meeting of divine and human 
personhood—provides the poet’s fundamental assumption about reality and, inevitably, 
the notion of human persons.511  
This assumption provides a key to one of the pentangle’s intractable paradoxes: 
its double concept of “trawþe.” The text proposes that the pentangle, by its very linguistic 
appointment, “betokens truth.” Yet this is a truth that requires the reader to hold 
Gawain’s subjectivity as simultaneously already perfect and also striving toward 
perfection. The pentangle, the poet explains, “apendez to þat prynce noble” and “acordez 
to þis knyȝt,” that is “Gawan [who] watz for gode knawen.”512 This rhetoric has an air of 
finality, as though the reader can already judge Gawain’s life and character. Of course, 
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we will learn that he “lakked a lytel” despite his goodness, when it came to keeping his 
truth, that is, his word.  
How can these two perspectives be reconciled? The pentangle offers a vision of 
Gawain’s personhood and so remains an enduring truth: it is at the same time the truth in 
which he was created and to which he has the opportunity to return through personal 
acting modeled by the pentangle’s five points. As we have seen in my previous analyses, 
the soul’s progress is conceptually circular, not horizontal, and it is conceived within the 
eternal perspective: the soul’s reformation toward goodness is a process of becoming 
more itself. Aquinas maintains this idea, affirming that the creation of human beings 
occurred through a “supernatural endowment of grace,” not subject to loss even by sin.513 
Thus the “truth” of the pentangle is its perfection from whence Gawain, its bearer, came 
and toward which he is destined in the order of creation.  
For this reason, as the poet “tarries” to elaborate upon the pentangled shield, he 
introduces it typologically: “Hit is a syngne þat Salamon set sumquyle/In bytoknyng of 
trawþe, bi tytle þat hit habbez.”514 Invoking King Solomon, the poet draws on the power 
of his reputation as a “good king,” and assumes that he, too, was “for gode knawen”515 At 
the same time, Solomon, like Gawain, is prone to concupiscence, especially with regard 
to illicit relationships and his propensity to temptations of the flesh. Thus, the pentangle 
that “Salamon set” holds both bearers to account for the five points it proclaims. Each 
warrior must, as the poet’s descriptive puns imply, put on St. Paul’s “armor of God.”516 
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This is the armor of faith, which is simultaneously the symbol of the warrior himself and 
that supernatural grace which enables him to “state ergo succincti lumbos vestros in 
veritate [stand, therefore, girding up your loins in truth].”517 Gawain is and is ever called 
to be the man to whom such armor “appendez.” So, “as golde pured,” that is, just as gold 
must be refined, the pentangle prophesies that Gawain will follow Solomon in the process 
of becoming as “cler” as his “armez.”518  
  The simultaneity of the pentangled shield as both representation of perfection and 
instrument of formation indeed presents “a blueprint” for Gawain’s selfhood, not as a 
model of identity, but as a model of the ontic subject.519 This dialectic finally explains the 
formal discrepancy in this section of the poem. For, when the speaker introduces the 
pentangle, the poem’s past-tense narration seems to pause, and the present, eternal-
oriented narrative presents the shield as it is: “quy þe pentangel apendez”; “hit is a 
syngne”; “hit is a figure þat haldez fyue poyntez”; “hit is endelez”; “hit acordez.”520 That 
is, the pentangle’s meaning is not governed by time, whether it be the future orientation 
of the narrative or the past-tense description of its bearer; it symbolizes eternity. The 
Gawain poet’s use of paradox thus simultaneously invokes and resists one kind of 
“medieval philosophy,” namely, a secular philosophy that would uphold courtly values as 
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objective goods.521 Like Gawain’s personhood, the pentangle at once incorporates and 
rejects secular values, and the tension between them creates the very space wherein the 
truth will be revealed. 
This is why Gawain expresses a sense of destiny as he prepares to leave Camelot: 
“Of desines derf and dere/what may mon do bot fonde?”522 More than a quest undertaken 
in search of adventure, Gawain’s “covenant” with the Green Knight roots his “destiny” in 
the concept of theological personhood. In other words, the quest has ontological 
consequences that depend on Gawain’s fulfillment of his oath to seek out the Green 
Knight. To accept the Green Knight’s “game” in Arthur’s place was only an initial 
response to moral consciousness. But as he leaves for Camelot, Gawain embarks on the 
fulfillment of truth, which is simultaneously the keeping of his word and the realization 
of what he is. As Kelsey explains in light of Aquinas’ thought on human embodiedness, 
“the fact of destinedness, the context of mission and vocation to and by that end, is as 
primordial to concrete human personhood as is the fact of its creatureliness.”523 Gawain’s 
mission connects his personal acting to his ontological personhood; the action of 
fulfilling the oath would map his body onto his personhood and bring him to its fullness. 
There is no better time for such a mission, the poem argues, than Christmas, when 
Gawain and the court celebrate the epitome of personal acting, God’s union of the divine 
persona with human flesh in the Incarnation.   
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 Depersonalization in the Castle of Hautdesert  
 Only within the tension of the pentangle’s simultaneous meanings can actus 
humanus reveal human potential for transcendence into persona. The pentangle models a 
“truthful” response to moral consciousness that accounts for ontological value, personal 
autonomy, and freedom from attachment. To enact such a response, however, Gawain 
must admit his own inhering, innate weakness. He must discover how by coveting his 
life, he comes close to losing it, and how his acceptance of the green girdle 
depersonalizes him because he fails to remember God’s gift, by which he was created and 
redeemed.524  
This process, as Aquinas describes it, involves detachment from lower-order 
goods in favor of the absolute good, he calls bonum. Bonum refers to a “relational 
goodness, a goodness that is for someone”; it is an “objective good” that has “a 
foundation in the nature of human beings” because humans are relational beings.525  
Personalists, including Crosby and von Hildebrand, develop Aquinas’ view of bonum 
toward a notion of value, and they understand a human being’s affirmation goodness as a 
personalizing response to “value.” Crosby explains: “when we speak of [value], we do 
not speak of the goodness for the human person [bonum], but of a goodness that persons 
have in themselves.”526 A response to the value in another is personal because it draws 
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the person out of him or herself by engaging in free and moral action toward the other for 
the other’s own sake.  
Such action affirms personhood in the other without loss of it in oneself; in fact, 
the actor’s own personhood “deepens,” as Crosby explains: 
What a value calls for from me is not my self-affirmation performed with 
reference to the value, but rather affirmation of the value for its own sake. And 
yet it remains true that the demands which the world of value makes of us do not 
inflict heteronomy on us, but rather engender the deepest personal life of which 
we are capable.527  
 
Persons do not respond to value out of egotistic motivation. Rather, they are drawn 
outside of themselves, beyond the grasp of the ego, to respond to the goodness in the 
other. To the extent that a person recognizes goodness in another “for its own sake,” over 
and above the good that the other may be in relation to him, the person transcends bonum 
(good for) toward the Good (goodness).  
Crosby borrows the phrase “for its own sake” from Wojtyla, who associates such 
a response with Aquinas’ definition of love:  
Love is directed in a special way toward other persons, for in them we find an 
object commensurate with ourselves. True love, the kind of love of others worthy 
of a human person, is that in which our sensory energies and desires [what 
Aquinas calls “natural” love] are subordinated to a basic understanding of the true 
worth of the object of our love.528 
 
To love the other is to recognize the other as a person; this response, Aquinas says, is a 
“demand and even an ideal of morality.”529 We can see, then, how Aquinas’ notion of a 
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moral “demand” suggests the personalist concept of value and lends a philosophical 
foundation to the concept of “value.”  
From this point of view, the actors in the latter half of Sir Gawain and the Green 
Knight misunderstand value by transforming it into use. The juxtaposition of hunting and 
bedroom scenes in Fit III clearly illustrates how use requires an objectification and 
instrumentalization that depersonalizes both the user and the one who is used. The very 
equation of Gawain’s tête-à-tête with Lady Bertilak and her husband’s hunts for deer, 
boar, and fox points to this degradation of being. For example, the poem describes the 
pageantry of butchering of the hind in the form of a deer’s blazon: 
Þe best bozed þerto with burnez innoughe, 
Gedered þe grattest of gres þat þer were 
And didden hem derely vndo as þe dede askez… 
Boþe þe hede and þe hals þay hwen of þenne 
And syþen sunder þay þe sydez swift fro þe chyne 
And þe corbels fee þay kest in a greue. 
Þenn þurled þay ayþer þik side þurȝ bi þe rybbe 
And henged þenne ayþer bi hoȝez of þe fourchez…530 
 
The poem spends thirty-six lines detailing the process, which fits the aristocratic 
courtliness the poem celebrates. Yet, as we shall see, this scene juxtaposed with Lady 
Bertilak’s rhetorical depersonalization of Gawain emphasizes the objectification of the 
hunted in both scenarios. The piece by piece dismemberment renders the deer 
unrecognizable: “and bred baþed in blod blende þeramongez.” The deer is reduced to 
meat, a “fee” for each hunter and a “blende” of blood and gore for the dogs’ 
consumption. From this point in the poem, there are no more “hinds,” only “venyson,” a 
noun which marks the ontological change in the animal from forest creature to food. By 
the end of the passage, the deer is no longer a living creature, but an object for use. 
                                                 





In a similar way, Lady Bertilak spends several days deconstructing the interlacing 
“points” of Gawain’s personhood explicitly to “wonnen hym to woȝe,” that is, to put him 
in danger of violating the truth of his oath.531 She continually tries to define Gawain’s 
identity, each time defining his courtesy and other attributes for, she claims, “I wene wel, 
iwysse, Sir Wowen ȝe are,/ Þat alle þe worlde worchipez.”532 She uses this knowledge to 
induce him to court her, as if she is the hunter, he the deer, in a chase of love.  
As a result, Gawain is coerced into finding a way to deny her commands without 
himself violating the laws of courtly courtesy. One way he tries to do this is by 
acknowledging that he is her prisoner, but asking to be released so that he can dress 
himself.533 Even though good manners demand she grant this request, she refuses to do 
so:  
Ȝe schal not rise of your bedde. I rych yow better: 
I schal happe yow here þat oþer half als 
And syþen karp wyth my knyȝt þat I kaȝt haue.534 
 
She will “direct” him (“rych yow”) better. She will in effect circumscribe his autonomy 
not only by “fastening” him (“happe yow”) to the bed, trapping him in the most 
vulnerable condition, but more importantly by then telling him who he is and what he 
will do.535 In short, she depersonalizes Gawain; she turns him into an object of pleasure—
and suggests that he do the same to her—then denies him the freedom to act in any 
manner through himself. In testing Gawain’s skill as a courtly lover, the lady reduces him 
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to an object of lust to which she can assign a “price,” rather than as a person who has 
inherent value.536  
 Praising his honor and “daynte wordez” on their first morning together, Lady 
Bertilak proclaims, “And syþen I haue in þis hous hym þat al lykez,/ I schal ware my 
whyle wel, quyl hit lastez.”537 Gawain’s responds to this praise by saying:   
I be not now he þat ye of speken— 
To reche to such reuerence as ye reherce here 
I am wyȝe vnworþy, I wot wel myseluen— 
Bi God, I were glad and yow god þoȝt 
At saye oþer at seruyce þat I sette myȝt 
To þe plesaunce of your prys; hit were a pure joye.   
 
Although typically regarded as a demonstration of Gawain’s command of courtliness, his 
self-deprecation reflects the spiritual virtue of courtesy: Gawain insists that he knows 
himself well enough to know he’s not the person she has said he is. His answer is more 
than an elegant flourish, a way to offer his obedient service in the same act in which he 
refuses Lady Bertilak’s compliments. His humility points to the humility among one’s 
peers whose exemplar the Pearl maiden had said is the courtesy that perfectly 
harmonizes souls as members of the body of Christ. Gawain clearly understands how 
courtly discourse works, but his words open onto larger objective virtues than those that 
govern courtly savoir-faire.   
So, from the very beginning of their time together, Gawain realizes he is in moral 
danger. While the lady accuses him of being a “sleeper vnslyȝe,” Gawain’s moral senses 
remain alert: he feels “schamed” even as the lady “droȝ þe dor” and before he fully 
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processes the “meruayle” of her sudden appearance in his chamber.538 That he is in moral 
danger is signaled further by Gawain’s impulse to “sayn” himself (makes the sign of the 
cross), “as bi his saȝe þe sauer to worthe [as by his prayer the safer to become].”539 He 
has need; Lady Bertilak suggests the “fine force” of courtliness behooves her to offer her 
body for Gawain’s pleasure if he chooses: 
‘Ȝe ar welcum to my cors, 
Yowre awen won to wale, 
Me behouez of fyne force 
Your seruaunt be, and schale.’540 
 
The courtesy she proposes is clearly instrumental. The lady suggests an exchange of 
“service,” which fulfills the courtly expectation through its lack of mutuality; it demands 
the submission of one party to the full “force” and power of the other. In other words, 
Lady Bertilak perverts the mutual self-giving that spiritual courtesy implies in favor of 
the power-play that is courtly courtesy. While she claims that he has the upper hand, she 
has already forced his submission to her by “catching” him in bed. The notion that she is 
“obliged” to be his servant is a lie, and his acquiescence to her proposition of “service” 
would amount to false courtesy.  
In response, Gawain appeals to value and attempts to correct the concept of 
knightly service under the order of virtue: 
‘I am wyȝe vnworþy, I wot wel myseluen— 
Bi God, I were glad and yow god þoȝt 
At saȝe oþer at seruyce þat I sette myȝt 
To þe plesaunce of your prys; hit were a pure joye.’541 
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Gawain would be glad, he says, to offer some speech or service that might accord to her 
“prys.” “Prys” can mean “monetary exchange value” or “price,” but also “non-monetary 
value” or “worth,” associated with Christ’s redemption.542 The word refers both to the 
courtly virtue of high nobility and to the “price”-lessness of human value. Just as 
significantly, Gawain reframes her conditions of service: instrumentalization and 
objectification result in exchanges based on power. Their competitiveness is destructive 
to the person. Instead, self-giving based on the inherent value of the other results in 
mutual exchanges that free the persons involved. Mutual relationality is, like the Trinity, 
fruitful. When Gawain uses the word “pure,” at the end of the line, he points to not only 
the “total” but the “perfect” and “clean” joy Christ’s sacrifice opens to those he 
redeems.543  
However, the lady closes off the multivalence of Gawain’s word, “prys,” and 
makes clear that she speaks only of courtly renown, particularly in terms that privilege 
how Gawain is regarded by others. Using his proper name for a third time, she identifies 
him specifically as “þe prys and þe prowes þat plesez al oþer.”544 For her, Gawain is an 
object of the court: he is not a man “of prys,” but a man-price small enough in value to be 
held “in [her] honde.” For the Lady, it’s not that Gawain has mastered the courtly ideal, 
but that he is nothing but these courtly virtues. Indeed, throughout the stanza, Lady 
Bertilak explicitly objectifies him using words like “chepen” (bargain, haggle, or trade) 
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and “cheue” (get) to refer to her process for “choosing” him among other knights. Hers is 
a particularly one-dimensional proposal:  
‘For were I worth al þe wone of wymmen alyue, 
And al þe wele of þe worlde were in my honde, 
And I schulde chepen and chose to cheue me a lorde, 
… 
Þer schulde no freke vpon folde before yow be chosen.’545 
 
Given the opportunity, she would spend any personal or financial capital to snag him. 
Through her praise of his “bewte and debonerte and blyþe semblaunt,” she ultimately 
bargains his true value down far enough to gain his promise of service.546 
Recognizing the lady’s false courtesy, Gawain is forced to play to her power with 
courtly discourse that invokes both senses of courtesy and walks the line of humility that 
can be interpreted as both spiritual and courtly. For instance, after Gawain initially rejects 
her excessive praise, she reiterates that she “haf hit holly in my honde þat al desyres,” 
reminding Gawain that she has him “in hor holde,”547 Gawain responds: 
‘Madame,’ quoþ þe myry mon, ‘Mary yow ȝelde, 
For I haf founden, in god faith, yowre fraunchis nobele; 
And oþer ful much of oþer folk fongen hor dedez; 
Bot þe daynte þat delen for my disert ny euer— 
Hit is þe worchyp of yourself, þat noȝt bot wel connez.’548 
 
On the one hand, Gawain is a paragon of courtliness. “May Mary, our mother, reward 
you!” as Finch’s translation goes, “Your generosity is noble and although men will 
admire and imitate peers…This esteem is your tribute.” Gawain praises Lady Bertilak’s 
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generosity, which is a model for others to emulate, but goes on to say she’s been too 
openhanded in her praise of him, which only proves how worthy of praise she is.  
On the other hand, by punning on the word “ȝelde,” Gawain makes available a 
more literal translation: 
‘Madame,’ said the merry man, ‘submit yourself to Mary, 
For I have found, in good faith, your generosity noble; 
And so will many others find your deeds; 
But the courtesy that they give, I never deserved— 
It is the worship of yourself, that cannot but be well known. 549    
 
This reading emphasizes the depersonalizing potential of Lady Bertilak’s flattery. In the 
final line, Gawain refers not to his own honor, but to the lady’s repeated insistence that 
she “byndes” him in the bed and that she “schal happe” him whom the whole world 
loves.550 In other words, he argues, the more she praises him for his supposed courtesy, 
the more she praises herself for having caught him. Indeed, it “cannot be but well known” 
that she has trapped him there, because she repeats the claim several times. While her 
generosity as his host had been noble, and while others may praise it, false praise is a 
means to the “worschyp” of herself. This praise, like the use of her body for pleasure, 
instrumentalizes courtesy and falsifies it. 
The next day Gawain realizes that the moral danger of false courtesy presages the 
mortal danger of depersonalizing coercion. Lady Bertilak tells Gawain that he is not 
himself because he hasn’t kissed her, as she had said he needs to do as a faithful suitor. 
When he parries this by saying she might take offense, she tells him the laws of love 
warrant his seizing the kiss anyway:  
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‘Sir, ȝif ȝe be Wawen, wonder me þynkkez. 
Wyȝe þat is so wel wrast always to god 
… 
Þou hatz forȝeten ȝederly þat ȝisterday I taȝt te 
… 
‘Ȝet I kende yow of kyssyng’ quoþ þe clere þenne, 
Querso countenaunce is couþe, quikly to clayme; 
Þat bicumes vche a knyȝt þat cortaysy vses.’551 
 
If Gawain claims to “use courtesy,” which to her means if Gawain is Gawain, he will not 
miss his chance to claim a kiss when he is shown favor. The lady explicitly proposes 
force as a remedy for refusal: she says he “may not be werned” and, even if he were 
refused, he could “constrayne [any lady] wyth strenkþe.”552 Yet Gawain responds by 
drawing a contrast between coercion and “goud wille,” arguing that “þrete is vnþryuande 
in þede þer I lende,/ And vche gift þat is geuen not with goud wille.”553 There is a clear 
distinction for Gawain between “threats” and “good will” that renders a “gift” what it is. 
In fact, threats work against courtesy; they are a tactic of coercion that place both actors 
in grave danger. 
The Lady’s rhetoric expresses the absolute opposite of actus humanus in that it 
pits Gawain’s identity against his virtue, rather than uniting them, as illustrated by the 
pentangle’s ideal. Her approval of coercion in fact speaks directly to the issue of identity 
since, as Aquinas says, coercion denies the person of his or her being (esse) as person. 
Coercion separates the esse from its corresponding freedom of action, which is given to 
intellectual creatures for their own sake. (Non-rational creatures lack the same freedom 
because they are created for use by other creatures.) The juxtaposition of Lady Bertilak’s 
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claim with Lord Bertilak’s boar hunt becomes all the more meaningful in this context. As 
Crosby says, “when persons are coerced, some other is acting through them: but as 
persons they act through themselves.”554 This is why the actus humanus is crucial to 
personality:  
Only because persons have a being radically their own can they act with acts 
radically their own. Only because persons are autonomous in their being are the 
capable of autonomy in their acting. If persons were really nothing but 
instrumental means or pieces of property… their esse could not support the agere 
of acting through themselves.555 
 
When Lady Bertilak offers “service” to Gawain in the form of praise, pleasure, or gifts, 
she attempts to contract him, to use him as a means, and to “remwe” his “mode” [to 
“remove,” “take away,” or “change” his “mind”].556 Not only does she thereby distort the 
meaning of courteous service, she also in a sense violates his person and then invites him 
to repeat that violence by seizing a kiss from her. She acts against both the individual and 
the relational sense of personhood. 
In their final exchange, Lady Bertilak again makes Gawain realize that socially 
sanctioned notions of courtesy can place him in a position of “gret peril.” The poet 
underlines the difference between his hostess’s maneuverings and spiritual courtesy when 
he says “Gret peril bitwene hem stod,/Nif Mare of hir knyȝt mynne.”557 That is, Mary, the 
exemplar of spiritual courtesy whose image is painted on the inside of Gawain’s shield, 
stands between him and the Lady to defend him. In fact, the poet reiterates that Gawain is 
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“hir knyȝt,” not Lady Bertilak’s, when he underscores the dilemma Gawain faces in the 
press of her advances: 
For þat prynces of pris depresed hym so þikke, 
Nurned hym so neye þe þred, þat need hym bihoued 
Oþer lach þer hir luf oþer lodly refuse.  
He cared for his cortaysye, lest craþayn he were, 
And more for his meschef ȝif he shulde make synne 
And be traytor to þat tolke þat þat telde aȝt.558 
 
Lady Bertilak has “pressed him so hard,” and “urged him so near the limit,” that 
rhetorical skill no longer will suffice to avoid physical sin. Gawain will have to be very 
clear about which definition of courtesy he will display: he must choose between the 
Lady and the Virgin. He worries that cowardice might taint his “courtesy,” which 
indicates that he’s more concerned about spiritual virtue rather than courtly manners. 
Indeed, he emphasizes this by then expressing the harm he would suffer if he sinned by 
doing “meschef” and proving to be a traitor. Gawain’s courtesy is strong enough to meet 
these challenges without losing his honor: “’God schylde!’ quoþ þe schalk. ‘þat schal not 
befalle!’”559 But when it comes to saving his life, he will learn that only spiritual courtesy 
will suffice. 
Although the lady does not gain the use of his body, she succeeds in coercing him 
into knightly service by coming to his chamber earlier each day to catch him by surprise, 
chastising him for “sins” associated with false courtesy, and cheapening his virtue. Each 
day that she hunts him, she depersonalizes him by using him as a means in a plot; the 
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result of her successive attacks dulls Gawain’s conscience to the point that he can only 
act out of fear, rather than truly “through himself.”  
As we have seen in Wisdom, to dull the conscience is no small matter. Aquinas 
theorizes conscience as a “cognitive act,” that is, the “application of knowledge” that 
“dominates an act.”560 Crosby explains further that conscience speaks a person’s “self-
presence,” which is the person’s awareness of himself as a subject, and his action. The 
conscience is “the radical way in which I determine myself (and only myself) from the 
center of my being.”561 The poet seems aware of this as upon the lady’s very first 
entrance to his chamber, Gawain “compast in his concience” because he senses danger to 
himself and must determine he should act in response. Yet as he loses autonomy day by 
day, he is less able to use his conscience to direct his action. Gawain’s turn from his 
“kynde” happens as much through the lady’s insidious and persistent attacks upon his 
conscience as it does through actual sin. 
Gawain finally begs Lady Bertilak to stop her manipulative action against his 
person: “And þerfore I pray yow displese yow noȝt/ And lettez be your bisinesse, for I 
bayþe hit yow neuer/ To graunte.”562 But by the end of their third exchange it is too late. 
Gawain wishes not to displease Lady Bertilak, but that is as far as his courtly courtesy 
can take him. He does not intend to consent to her false courtesy, nor to accept her gifts, 
because they lie about who he is. Nevertheless, when Lady Bertilak tells him that the 
girdle with save his life, “þen kest þe knyȝt, and hit come to his hert” that “hit were a juel 
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for þe joparde þat hym jugged were.”563 Gawain’s judgement fails: he “reasons” that if he 
manages to escape being slain, then “þe sleȝt were noble.”564 Fear has taken over, and 
actus humanus turns into actus hominis. Fittingly, as he dresses himself for his encounter 
with the Green Knight, Gawain is no longer concerned with courtesy, but “for gode of 
hymseluen.”565 
What I have demonstrated thus far as coercive and depersonalizing behavior 
conspicuously coincides with “the system of gift exchange” that, as Marcell Mauss 
explains, facilitates the “struggle among nobles to determine their position in the 
hierarchy.”566 In fact, drawing on gift theory, which combines sociological and 
archeological research to examine cultural and individual systems of gift, exchange, and 
commodity, Harwood shows how the theory of this “system,” which is developed from 
the work of Mauss as well as Claude Levi-Strauss, Marshall Sahlins, and others maps 
onto Gawain’s presentation of 14th century courtly culture: “Owing to the classic research 
by Marcel Mauss, the existence of a noble class has become linked to an exchange 
system of obligatory and interested gifts.”567 Arguing that the Green Knight’s show of 
mercy in the final Fit disrupts the “obligations” of the system, Harwood concludes that 
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“the poet uses the economy of the gift” to illustrate the “dangerous” intersection between 
cultures of nobility and Christianity, and also to “cancel” that intersection by mercy.568  
Specifically, Harwood demonstrates how Gawain, Sir Bertilak, and the Lady 
participate in each of the “three obligations,” which hinge on “spending to the 
humiliation of others” as a measure of social value and wealth.569 The Lady eagerly 
complies with her noble obligation to give to the point of excess and humiliation, and 
within this framing, Gawain is again used as a pawn in a “game.” Gawain accepts the 
girdle, in part, because he is obligated by the conditions of his nobility and, therefore, by 
the conditions of the cultural system of exchange, to respond to her initiation of the gift. 
Indeed, the system of gift exchange in Gawain depends on the giver’s use of the receiver 
as a means to show his or her own courtly “virtue and therefore power.”570 The 
obligations of this system become visible through the Bertilaks’ depersonalizing actions, 
such that the system itself becomes the agent of depersonalization. The obligations thus 
reveal a structure that imitates the relationality of Trinitarian love through gift, but in 
every way delivers its practical and spiritual antithesis. Notably, the “obligatory largess” 
expected of the nobleman only appears like charity.571 As Harwood explains, the Gawain 
poet’s contemporary, William Langland, specifically contrasts the courtly show of 
“generosity” with the theological virtue of charity572—that is, God’s free, total, faithful, 
and fruitful self-gift.  
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Lady Bertilak augments her coercive tactics by framing her proposals in terms of 
gift exchange. Gift giving becomes the agent of her assertion of power and of 
depersonalization; thus her giving acts against the “charity” by which it is disguised. As 
we have seen, persons only fully realize themselves through acts of true self-giving 
caritas; to withhold the opportunity for self-actualization by perverting the name of 
caritas is especially egregious. It is no mistake that both the Gawain-poet and modern 
gift theorists associate noble gift exchange with war and personal violence.573 As 
Harwood explains of the Green Knight’s proposal to exchange axe blows, “because 
reciprocal insults, boasts, blows, and gifts function alike, the poet can refer the exchange 
of blows as boasting and call it a gift.”574 This principle also applies to the exchange of 
words between Gawain and Lady Bertilak, as well as to her appropriation of caritas as 
she gives him the green girdle. The Gawain-poet reveals the conventions of noble gift 
exchange to be a kind of medieval double speak, through which obligation and the 
potential of humiliation facilitate the use of persons under the guise of caritas.    
Significantly, according to gift theorists, gift objects obtain a participatory 
relationship with their giver. Harwood notes that “not every piece of property is utterly 
distinct from the person who owns it.”575 Garments, as we see throughout the poem, 
participate in the person they adorn; for Gawain to receive the girdle is for him to receive 
her person. This participatory relationship between giver and object suggests that, even if 
ill-intentioned, the object given both symbolizes self-gift and actualizes it on the part of 
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the giver. The green girdle makes this explicit; to give it to Gawain, the lady must first 
remove it from her own body.576 Gawain knows that he should not accept her token—
neither the beryled ring, nor the green girdle—because he would then be obligated to 
reciprocate the gift. Yet this is an obligation he cannot fulfill: “I haf none yow to norne ne 
noȝt wyl I take.”577 Further, reciprocation of any kind, whether object, oath, or his actual 
self, would symbolize a consummation of the relationship, a giving of oneself to another 
so as to effect communion. Once he receives the girdle, he carries Lady Bertilak on his 
person as he once carried the Virgin Mary upon his shield.   
The replacement of the Virgin’s image with Lady Bertilak’s token symbolizes the 
other more significant reason that Gawain accepts the girdle and the extent to which 
coercive speech and gifts of clothing have actual depersonalizing effects. Gawain’s fear 
is significant, and he misplaces his faith in the Lady, but these are only symptoms of 
Gawain’s slowly-developing concupiscence. In fact, he accepts the girdle because he is 
not free to act according to his moral consciousness—that sense of personhood which 
guides moral decision making and frees the person from attachments so as to act in 
accordance with persona. On its deepest ground, Gawain’s acceptance of the girdle is a 
failure of proper personal love—the love which demands free, total, faithful, and fruitful 
communion in relationships, rather than the use of others. He engages in the system of 
exchange only because he learns that it will profit him, thereby betraying the attachment 
he has developed over the course of his time in Hautdesert. As Aquinas might put it, 
passion “moves [Gawain] to attachment,” causing him to sin by first accepting the girdle 
and then withholding it from Lord Birtilak for fear of losing his head. Yet Gawain has in 
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effect already lost his head, where moral consciousness and reason might have 
intervened. This is why Harwood observes—though he does not explain this claim—that 
“the girdle testifies to fallen humanity’s inability to make a gift of itself.”578 Gawain is no 
longer fully personal, and he is therefore no longer free to act through himself. 
For this reason, as the Green Knight brings the ax down upon his neck, Gawain 
flinches, unable to finally keep his “traweþ.” In response, the Green Knight utters the 
now familiar phrase, “you are not Gawain.” And this time, it’s true: 
 “Þou art not Gawayn,” quoþ þe gome, “þat is so goud halden, 
Þat neuer arȝed for no here by hylle ne be vale, 
And now þou fles for ferde er þou fele harmez! 
Such cowardise of þat knyȝt cowþe I neuer here. 
… 
My hede flaȝ to my fote and ȝet flaȝ I neuer; 
And þou, er any harme hent, arȝez in hert.”579 
 
By the end of the narrative, Gawain has truly ceased to be himself as he has failed to act 
in accordance with his personhood by accepting the girdle.  
Conclusion: Mercy Restores the Person 
 Morgan’s plot to use Gawain as a means to embarrass Arthur and destroy 
Guinevere requires that he be objectified so that, as Crosby puts it, Gawain will be “lost 
as a person.”580 Indeed, her plot reflects a failure to act according to Aquinas’ demand of 
love: “When I look at others only insofar as they intersect with my projects, then of 
course I lose them as persons, because I am not willing to let them exist for me as ends in 
themselves.”581 Depersonalization results from a lack of proper response to both one’s 
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own and the other’s personal selfhood. At its heart, depersonalizing action is a failure of 
love. 
Yet, as the Green Knight illustrates, mercy both restores love and anticipates 
Gawain’s restoration to himself. By not demanding an eye for an eye, or in this case, one 
severed head for another, the Green Knight catalyzes the process of penance, and his 
speech of absolution makes Gawain “hardily hole.”582 Though Hatt holds back from 
arguing that the Green Knight is a Christ-figure, she does suggest that his “generosity and 
openness…reverberate with religious symbolism.”583 For me, the suggestion of “religious 
symbolism” still ventures too far. However, the Green Knight’s show of mercy, whether 
or not a part of Morgan’s larger plan, speaks to the paradigmatic order which provides 
this poet’s “context of thought.” 
The poem’s benediction reminds us that the answer to all depersonalization is 
Christ’s personal selfhood, which is mercy itself: “Now þat bere þe croun of þorne/He 
bring vus to His blysse! Amen.”584 Indeed, mercy belongs to the order of God’s glory. 
Through the Incarnation, mercy expresses Aquinas’ notion of eternal law, “expressed by 
the Word” and “appropriated to the Son,” a “type of Divine Wisdom, directing all actions 
and movements.”585 Perhaps through the Green Knight, Mercy himself, who “makes all 
things new,” welcomes Gawain and his reader into “þis New Ȝer.”586 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
582 Ibid., ll. 2390-94. 
 
583 Hatt, God and the Gawain-Poet, 222. 
 
584 Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, ll. 2529-31. 
 
585 Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 93, a. 1. 
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